State v. Chakerian

• Decision Date: 22 February 2018
• Docket Number: NO. S-1-SC-35121,S-1-SC-35121
• Citation: 458 P.3d 372
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. Stefan CHAKERIAN, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

458 P.3d 372

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Petitioner,

v.Stefan CHAKERIAN, Defendant-Respondent.

NO. S-1-SC-35121

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Filing Date: February 22, 2018

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Martha Anne Kelly, Assistant Attorney General, John Kloss, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.

Dane Eric Hannum, Albuquerque, NM, for Respondent.

MAES, Justice.

{1} New Mexico law provides a motorist arrested for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DWI) the right to an independent chemical test in addition to the test administered by the police. See NMSA 1978, § 66-8-109(B) (1993). In this case we address (1) whether the arresting officer denied Defendant Stefan Chakerian this right when the officer provided Defendant with a telephone and telephone directory, but took no additional steps to help Defendant arrange for the test; and (2) what role law enforcement officers have after an arrestee expresses a desire for an additional test under Section 66-8-109(B). The Court of Appeals held that Section 66-8-109(B) requires law enforcement to "meaningfully cooperate" with an arrestee who desires to obtain an additional chemical test, and reversed Defendant's DWI conviction. State v. Chakerian , 2015-NMCA-052, ¶ 19, 348 P.3d 1027.

{2} We hold that Section 66-8-109(B) requires law enforcement to advise an arrestee of the arrestee's right to be given an opportunity to arrange for a qualified person of the arrestee's own choosing to perform a chemical test in addition to any test performed at the direction of the arresting officer. This section does not, however, confer any additional obligation on law enforcement to facilitate the arrestee in actually arranging for the test. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the metropolitan court convictions of DWI and speeding. Because the convictions are affirmed, we do not address the issue of what the sanction should be when the State denies a driver the statutory right to an independent test. We remand to the metropolitan court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{3} Albuquerque Police Officer Mark Aragon pulled over Defendant Stefan Chakerian around 2 a.m. for speeding on Central Avenue in Albuquerque. Officer Aragon approached Defendant and, after he smelled alcohol on Defendant's breath, began a DWI investigation. After the investigation, Officer Aragon arrested Defendant for DWI and took him to the Southeast Albuquerque Police Department (APD) substation in order to conduct a breath alcohol test. Before beginning the breath test, Officer Aragon read the implied consent rule to Defendant, which included Defendant's right to an independent test performed by a person of Defendant's own choosing. At the substation, the Intoxilyzer 8000 machine malfunctioned after the first breath test, and the test could not be completed. Officer Aragon then drove Defendant to the downtown Prisoner Transport Center (PTC) to attempt another breath test. At the PTC, Officer Aragon was able to obtain two breath samples from Defendant, which indicated breath alcohol concentrations of .12 and .11, respectively. These breath alcohol concentrations were recorded onto a breath card.

{4} After completing the test, Officer Aragon drove Defendant to the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC). At the MDC,¹ Defendant told Officer Aragon that he wanted an additional chemical test. Officer Aragon allowed Defendant access to a telephone, a phone directory, and a pen while they waited for a routine medical screening of Defendant. Officer Aragon testified that Defendant had access to a telephone and telephone directory for twenty to thirty minutes; Defendant testified that he had this access for approximately ten to fifteen minutes. When the time came for the medical screening, Defendant told Officer Aragon he was finished with the telephone and telephone directory.

{5} Defendant moved to suppress the admission of the breath card at trial in the metropolitan court on the grounds that he was not afforded his right to an independent test pursuant to Section 66-8-109(B). The trial judge denied the motion but stated, "I just don't see, the way things happened, that he was really afforded an opportunity to have a blood test given to him." The judge admitted the breath card and found Defendant guilty of DWI and speeding.

{6} Defendant appealed to the district court. He argued that the trial judge found he was not afforded his right to a reasonable opportunity for an independent test and, therefore, the trial judge erred in admitting the breath card. The State argued that the trial judge made no finding that Defendant was not given a reasonable opportunity for an independent test and that the trial judge correctly denied Defendant's motion to suppress the breath card.

{7} The district court affirmed the DWI conviction on the grounds that Defendant failed to establish any prejudice regardless of whether he was given a reasonable opportunity to obtain an independent test or not, citing State v . Gardner , 1998-NMCA-160, ¶ 13, 126 N.M. 125, 967 P.2d 465 (explaining the burden is on a defendant to "show prejudice from the statutory violation[ ] before suppression of the test results or setting aside the conviction[ ] [is] required"). Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a divided decision, the majority concluded that the plain meaning of Section 66-8-109(B) "imposes a duty upon the State, a duty that requires law enforcement to meaningfully cooperate with an arrestee's express desire to arrange for an independent blood test. The level of meaningful cooperation required by law enforcement will depend upon the facts and circumstances in each particular case." Chakerian , 2015-NMCA-052, ¶ 19, 348 P.3d 1027. The Court determined that Defendant was not afforded his right of a reasonable opportunity to arrange for an independent chemical test and reversed the district court's affirmation of the metropolitan court judgment. Id . ¶¶ 23, 33. The Court remanded the case to the trial court to determine the sanctions for the statutory violation. Id. ¶¶ 32-33.

{8} Dissenting from the majority, Judge Zamora argued that Section 66-8-109(B) does not require police to assist an arrestee in arranging and effectuating an independent test. "The way our statutory provision is currently written means being informed of this statutory right, being given a reasonable opportunity to arrange for the independent testing, and nothing more." Chakerian , 2015-NMCA-052, ¶ 44, 348 P.3d 1027 (Zamora, J., dissenting).

{9} The State petitioned this Court to review the Court of Appeals opinion, arguing that the Court of Appeals erred by (1) interpreting Section 66-8-109(B)(1) to include an affirmative duty on law enforcement to provide a "meaningful opportunity" for a DWI suspect to procure an independent chemical test, and (2) allowing the State to be sanctioned for failing to provide this meaningful opportunity. We granted certiorari pursuant to Rule 12-502 NMRA.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

{10} In this case we must interpret the meaning of Section 66-8-109(B). Statutory interpretation is a matter of law and is reviewed de novo. State v. Johnson , 2001-NMSC-001, ¶ 5, 130 N.M. 6, 15 P.3d 1233. Our main goal when interpreting statutory language "is to give effect to the Legislature's intent." State v. Almanzar , 2014-NMSC-001, ¶ 14, 316 P.3d 183 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To discern the Legislature's intent, the Court "look[s] first to the plain language of the statute, giving the words their ordinary meaning, unless the Legislature indicates a different one was intended." Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "When a statute contains language which is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation." Johnson , 2001-NMSC-001, ¶ 6, 15 P.3d 1233 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

{11} The State argues that the plain language of Section 66-8-109(B) only requires law enforcement to advise the arrestee of the right to be given an "opportunity to arrange" for an independent test but does not require law enforcement to make the opportunity "meaningful." The State relies on the principle that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the judiciary must apply the statute as written and refrain from interpreting it to include any additional requirements that the statute does not already set forth. See Almanzar , 2014-NMSC-001, ¶ 14, 316 P.3d 183 ; State v. Hubble , 2009-NMSC-014, ¶ 10, 146 N.M. 70, 206 P.3d 579 ("We will not read into a statute language which is not there, especially when it makes sense as it is written.").

{12} Defendant asks this Court to affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and its conclusions that the opportunity for an independent test described in Section 66-8-109(B) must be "meaningful" and the police must "meaningfully cooperate" with an arrestee's express desire to arrange for an independent chemical test. Defendant frames the right to an additional test as a matter of due process to challenge the reliability of the State's evidence.

{13} The Court of Appeals agreed with this view, concluding, " Section 66-8-109(B) affords fundamental fairness and at the same time, constitutional due process." Chakerian , 2015-NMCA-052, ¶ 18, 348 P.3d 1027. Given this framing of the statutory right, the Court determined that law enforcement must do something more than just provide an arrestee the opportunity to arrange a test. "[T]he opportunity provided must be meaningful" and police must "meaningfully cooperate" with an arrestee's desire to obtain an additional test. Id. ¶¶ 19, 22. The Court held, "[d]oing nothing more than providing access to a [telephone directory] and telephone in the early morning hours fails to rise to the level of meaningful cooperation required...