State v. Chambers

• Decision Date: 10 November 1920
• Docket Number: 347.
• Citation: 104 S.E. 670,180 N.C. 705
• Parties: STATE v. CHAMBERS.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

104 S.E. 670

180 N.C. 705

STATE v. CHAMBERS.

No. 347.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

November 10, 1920

Appeal from Superior Court, Rockingham County; Ray, Judge.

James Chambers was convicted of subornation of perjury, and he appeals. New trial ordered.

In a prosecution for subordination of perjury, evidence of the occurrences at the trial at which the alleged false testimony was given was admissible to show motive by defendant, to present clearly the setting of the facts and circumstances and to corroborate the testimony of witnesses to the threats by which defendant procured the giving of the false testimony.

The state's evidence tended to show that at the August term 1919, four young men, Will Tolbert, Henry Chambers (son of defendant), Will Clowers, and a man by the name of Fox, were indicted for breaking, entering, and stealing from the store of Edmunds at Leaksville, N. C., and the case stood for trial at that term. Of these defendants, Tolbert and Henry Chambers were present; Fox and Clowers had run away. On the Sunday afternoon before this court convened on Monday morning, the defendant James Chambers, father of Henry Chambers, went to the house of Mrs. Tolbert, the mother of Will Tolbert codefendant with Henry Chambers, and, according to the testimony of Mrs. Tolbert, Will Tolbert, Tom Lemons, and the defendant James Chambers took Mrs. Tolbert and Will into a room and said to Will:

"Bill, remember what I told you. There are not but two who know anything about this, for the others are gone, and, if you tell a word or leak a drop, I'll shoot your brains out."

When the case was called the following Tuesday morning, the court permitted the solicitor to try separately Will Tolbert and Henry Chambers, the only two of the young men caught at that time. Will Tolbert was first tried, and both he and his mother testified that neither he nor Henry Chambers had anything to do with the breaking into Edmund's store. Will Tolbert, however, was convicted and sentenced to 18 months on the roads. In the course of the trial it developed that Clowers was in Greensboro. The solicitor sent an officer immediately after him, postponing the trial of Henry Chambers until Clowers could be produced as a witness. The officer returned with Clowers, and thereupon both he and Henry Chambers pleaded guilty to the charge. Immediately after Will Tolbert was convicted and sentenced, his mother became conscience-stricken, and told one of the officers that she had sworn falsely when testifying in behalf of her son. She went back upon the stand in the afternoon and told the judge of it and that the reason for her doing so was because the defendant James Chambers had made the threats on the Sunday afternoon before, detailing that incident in the same way then as she did on the trial of this case.

The defendant admitted that he was at Mrs. Tolbert's house, but denied that he had made any threats, particularly those set out in the state's evidence, and stated that he had gone to her house simply to prepare for the trial of his own son.

There are 37 exceptions in the record, 26 of them to the admission or exclusion of testimony.

The defendant was convicted, and from the judgment of the court upon the verdict he appealed.

J. M. Sharp and J. R. Joyce, both of Reidsville, for appellant.

James S. Manning, Atty. Gen., and Frank Nash, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

WALKER, J. (after stating the facts as above).

The first six exceptions relate to the examination of witnesses by the state as to what occurred at the trial of Will Tolbert, in which the perjury was alleged to have been committed. This testimony was competent for several purposes, and, among them, to show the commission of the perjury and the threats and coercion of the defendant to bring it about, and also to corroborate the state's witnesses who testified at the trial of this case. There are other reasons which sustain the rulings of the court not necessary to be set out in much detail, as they are very apparent upon an inspection of this record. We may state this much, as applicable to these exceptions and to several others, that the testimony to which many of the exceptions were taken was competent and relevant as tending to show a motive on the part of defendant, and to present clearly the setting of the facts and circumstances under which the defendant conceived and executed his nefarious scheme to subdue witnesses by his intimidation of them in order to protect and save his son, and thereby to obstruct the fair administration of justice in the courts, and especially was it relevant as corroborating Mrs. Tolbert. The evidence tended to show that Henry Clowers was protesting his innocence so long as only he and Will Tolbert were present; that a separate trial being ordered, and Will Tolbert having taken the stand and denied that he and Henry Chambers had anything to do with the entry into Edmund's store, Henry Chambers still protested his innocence until Clowers was brought from Greensboro, when, seeing that all of his efforts were futile, he pleaded guilty. Another reason why this testimony was admissible is that the perjury of Will Tolbert must be proven, and all the evidence excepted to tended to show, in connection with his own testimony and that of his mother, that perjury had been committed.

These reasons also apply to exceptions 7 to 24, both inclusive. As to exception 8, which was to the exclusion of the question of defendant to Pat Adkins, a deputy sheriff, it appears that the question was afterwards substantially answered, and fully enough, to render harmless any error if one was committed. Monds v. Town of Dunn, 163 N.C. 108, 79 S.E. 303; Berbarry v. Tombacher, 162 N.C. 497, 77 S.E. 412. Besides, it did not appear at the time what his answer would have been to the question. Smith v. Com'rs, 176 N.C. 466, 67 S.E. 378. Another reason why the ruling was correct is that the proposed testimony was hearsay, as it called for the unsworn declarations of Will Tolbert, and this also applies to exception 25.

The next exception was directed to what manifestly was a mere "slip of the tongue" by the judge, which was harmless, as it appeared beyond question what was the charge in the indictment, and the whole case was, in that respect tried upon the correct theory. That portion of the charge to which exception 27 was addressed was an attempt by the judge to explain the nature of the offense and to state its several elements, and in no sense was it an expression of opinion upon the facts. The passage in the charge which follows shows conclusively that no expression of opinion as to the facts was intended, nor was any such opinion given or intimated. The defendant's contention was that, even if the testimony of the witnesses in the other case was false and perjured, he was in no way responsible for it, as he did not instigate it. The judge fairly stated this to the...