State v. Chambers
| Docket Number | CR-21-0388-PR |
| Decision Date | 07 August 2023 |
| Parties | STATE OF ARIZONA, Petitioner, v. HON. BRYAN B. CHAMBERS, JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GILA, Respondent Judge, HEATHER ELAINE HENDERSON, Real Party in Interest. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Appeal from the Superior Court in Gila County The Honorable Bryan B Chambers, Judge Nos. S0400CR201800269 S0400CR201900011 S0400CR201900012
Order of the Court of Appeals, Division Two 2 CA-SA 2021-0053 Filed Nov. 16, 2021
Bradley D. Beauchamp, Gila County Attorney, Diana L. Kanon (argued), Joseph E. Collins, Deputy County Attorneys, Globe Attorneys for State of Arizona
Jeffrey B. Cloud (argued), JCloud Law, PLLC, Scottsdale, Attorney for Heather Elaine Henderson
Mikel Steinfeld (argued), Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice, Phoenix, Attorney for Amicus Curiae Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice
OPINION
¶1 We consider whether a county attorney's prior representation of a criminal defendant creates an appearance of impropriety in a current prosecution, warranting disqualification of an entire county attorney's office, absent a finding that a substantial relationship exists between the two matters. Because the current prosecution for a drug sale offense is not the same nor substantially related to the prior representation in a marriage annulment matter, we hold that there is no appearance of impropriety upon which to disqualify the office.
¶2 Before 2008, Elaine Henderson (Henderson) married Gary Roberts (Roberts), believing she was divorced from her first husband, Charles Henderson (Charles). While Henderson was in prison for possession of a dangerous drug for sale, she learned that her former sisterin-law sought to have her charged with bigamy because she never finalized her divorce from Charles. Consequently, Henderson's father retained Bradley Beauchamp (Beauchamp) on her behalf to secure an annulment of her marriage to Charles.
¶3 Beauchamp and Henderson never met in person. They only communicated by telephone and mail. Henderson does not remember much about the representation, but she recalls that she may have received, signed, and mailed documents. She never discussed with Beauchamp why she was in prison or the nature of the underlying charges. She does not remember discussing her relationship with Roberts but believes she must have provided information about his location and their marriage. Eventually, Beauchamp obtained a default annulment and his representation of Henderson ended in 2009.
¶4 In 2010, while still in private practice, Beauchamp represented the state in a child support enforcement matter against Henderson. In court and on the record, Beauchamp asked Henderson to waive any potential conflict due to his prior representation in the annulment matter, which she did. In 2012, Beauchamp was elected Gila County Attorney and currently leads the Gila County Attorney's Office ("GCAO").
¶5 In May 2018, Henderson was arrested for the transport and possession of methamphetamine for sale. Detective Richard Rosales interviewed Henderson concerning her connection to the Aryan Brotherhood (the "AB") through her husband, Roberts. The purpose of the interview was to determine if Henderson had any information that would make it worthwhile to offer a plea agreement conditioned on her cooperation. Henderson told Detective Rosales that her husband's name was "Grizz," and that he had "probated" under an AB member but was never fully "patched."[1] She also told Detective Rosales that she knew other people affiliated with the AB but did not want to provide their information. Detective Rosales consulted with now County Attorney Beauchamp about offering a plea agreement based on Henderson's information, but no such offer was ever made.
¶6 GCAO charged Henderson for the crime of possession of methamphetamine for sale on May 30, 2018, and eventually extended a plea offer with a stipulated thirty-two-year prison term. In early 2019, Henderson filed a motion to disqualify GCAO based upon an appearance of impropriety given Beauchamp's previous representation in the marriage annulment matter. The trial court denied the motion after considering the four-factor inquiry, which is set forth in Gomez v. Superior Court, 149 Ariz. 223 (1986):
(1) whether the motion is being made for the purposes of harassing the defendant; (2) whether the party bringing the motion will be damaged in some way if the motion is not granted; (3) whether there are any alternative solutions, or is the proposed solution the least damaging possible under the circumstances; and (4) whether the possibility of public suspicion will outweigh any benefits that might accrue due to continued representation.
¶7 The trial court found: (1) there was no evidence from which it could conclude Henderson made the motion for the purpose of harassment; (2) Henderson would not be damaged by denial of the motion because there was nothing in Beauchamp's previous representation that could be used against her; (3) other alternative solutions to disqualification existed that were less damaging than disqualification;[2] and (4) public suspicion of GCAO's continued prosecution did not outweigh its potential benefits because there was no allegation that GCAO was giving Henderson any preferential treatment.
¶8 Additionally, the court reviewed Ethical Rule ("ER") 1.9 and found that the two cases-the prior annulment matter and the instant prosecution-were not substantially related. The court therefore concluded that there was no appearance of impropriety and denied Henderson's motion.
¶9 In 2021, Henderson renewed her motion to disqualify GCAO based upon this Court's opinion in State v. Marner ex rel. Cnty. of Pima, 251 Ariz. 198 (2021), and on new information not previously considered. In her motion, Henderson theorized that she could have provided confidential information to Beauchamp concerning Roberts' AB affiliation and that this may have caused him to form a poor opinion of her, resulting in him "throw[ing] the book" at her with "extremely harsh" plea offers.
Henderson also argued that, under State v. Hursey, 176 Ariz. 330 (1993), an appearance of impropriety existed due to the potential that, during the prior representation, she and Beauchamp shared a confidential communication regarding Roberts. Accordingly, Henderson asserted that the court should presume prejudice to her and disqualify GCAO.
¶10 The State opposed the renewed motion, arguing that no good cause warranted reconsideration and that the Gomez factors did not support disqualification.
¶11 The trial court heard argument from the parties on Henderson's motion and then recessed to review Hursey, which involved the disqualification of a prosecutor who had formally represented a defendant in a prior criminal matter. 176 Ariz. at 331. Reading portions of Hursey into the record, the trial court noted that "[t]he mere fact of confidential communications in the prior relationship is enough to presume prejudice to the defendant." Id. at 334. The court acknowledged, however, that Beauchamp's prior representation of Henderson involved an annulment rather than a criminal matter and that Henderson "hasn't really shown that there was some confidential communication that has now prejudiced her here." Nonetheless, the court felt bound to follow Hursey and assume prejudice to Henderson that warranted disqualification of the entire GCAO.
¶12 The State petitioned for special action review, but the court of appeals declined to accept jurisdiction in a split decision. We granted review to clarify our holding in Marner and to consider whether the trial court abused its discretion in disqualifying the entire GCAO by finding an appearance of impropriety without first finding that a substantial relationship existed between the prior representation and the current prosecution. The disqualification of a prosecutor's office is also a matter of statewide importance and is likely to recur. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution.
¶13 We apply an abuse of discretion standard to a trial court's decision to disqualify counsel. Marner, 251 Ariz. at 200 ¶ 8. However, "[w]e review conclusions of law de novo." Id. "An error of law in reaching a discretionary conclusion may constitute an abuse of discretion." State v. Thompson, 252 Ariz. 279, 290 ¶ 26 (2022).
¶14 We begin by clarifying our holding in Marner. Henderson argued before the trial court on her renewed motion that Marner represented an issue of first impression concerning an extension of the four-factor Gomez inquiry to disqualify a prosecutor's office based on an appearance of impropriety. According to Henderson, Marner "is the first time the Supreme Court has said an appearance of impropriety by itself is enough to kick an entire prosecuting agency off of the case." The State argued that Marner merely reiterated the analysis previously set forth in Gomez.
¶15 While Henderson may have accurately characterized Marners result, that characterization is not what made Marner a case of first impression. We stated that "[b]efore us is an issue of first impression for this Court: whether an appearance of impropriety, arising from a prosecutor's actual misconduct, may be imputed to disqualify an entire prosecutor's office." Marner, 251 Ariz. at 199 ¶ 1 (emphasis added). Thus, the issue of first impression in Marner was whether actual misconduct required disqualification of an entire prosecutor's...
To continue reading
Request your trial