State v. Chambers, 9435

• Decision Date: 03 November 1972
• Docket Number: No. 9435,9435
• Citation: 1972 NMSC 69,502 P.2d 999,84 N.M. 309
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles Vestal CHAMBERS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Page 999

502 P.2d 999

84 N.M. 309

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles Vestal CHAMBERS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 9435.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Nov. 3, 1972.

Dan B. Buzzard, David W. Bonem, Clovis, for appellant.

David L. Norvell, Atty. Gen., Prentis Reid Griffith, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for appellee.

OPINION

COMPTON, Chief Justice.

The defendant was charged with murdering his wife on December 1, 1970, in Curry County, to which he entered a plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. Upon the suggestion of insanity the defendant was committed to the New Mexico State Hospital for psychiatric evaluation. Later, he was convicted of first degree murder and appeals from the judgment imposing sentence therein.

The appellant first contends that the court committed prejudicial error in giving the following instruction:

'In order to find the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity you must be satisfied that, at the time of committing the act, the accused, as a result of disease of the mind (a) did not know the nature and quality of the act or (b) did not know that it was wrong or (c) was incapable of preventing himself from committing it.'

The claimed vice in the instruction is the term 'you must be satisfied.' This instruction precisely tracks the language suggested by this court in the case of State v. White, 58 N.M. 324, 330, 270 P.2d 727, and approved in State v. James, 83 N.M. 263, 490 P.2d 1236. It is our conclusion that the instruction is a correct statement of the law. Compare State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 60 P.2d 646.

The appellant next contends that the trial court committed error in refusing his tendered instruction advising the jury that he would be given a sanity hearing and committed to the New Mexico State Hospital should he be found not guilty by reason of insanity. We see no error in the ruling of the court. The tendered instruction presented an irrelevant issue for consideration by the jury. This conclusion is in accord with those jurisdictions expressing a majority view on the issue.

Appellant further contends that the court committed error in refusing a tendered instruction relating to his diminished responsibility resulting from mental disease or defect of the mind.

The tendered instruction reads:

'If you find the defendant was legally sane, then the Court instructs you that as an additional defense if you find or if you have a reasonable doubt whether by reason of a disease or defect of the mind the defendant was incapable of thinking over the fatal act beforehand with a calm and reflective mind (or with a fixed and settled deliberation and coolness of mind) then, you shall find the defendant not guilty of first and second degree murder and will pass on to the question of whether he is guilty of voluntary manslaughter.'

The appellant relies on State v. Padilla, 66 N.M. 289, 347 P.2d 312. Noticeably, the instruction in Padilla concluded, '* * * you shall find the defendant not guilty of first degree murder and will pass on to the question of whether he is guilty of second degree murder.' (Emphasis added). While Padilla stands for the proposition that a disease or defect of the mind may render an accused incapable of cool deliberation and premeditation and may be sufficient to reduce the charge against him from first to second degree murder, it does not hold that such mental condition may reduce the charge to voluntary manslaughter. We conclude that the court did not err in refusing the tendered instruction.

The appellant further complains that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the testimony of a psychiatrist based on out-of-court statements of third persons regarding the previous conduct of the appellant. Dr. John F. Hughes, a psychiatrist, first testified that appellant was suffering from 'a temporary psychosis or insanity.' He stated that it was his opinion that because of this psychosis the appellant was incapable of preventing himself from firing a gun at his wife and that the appellant on December 1, 1970, was incapable of premeditation, deliberation, or malice. On cross examination Dr. Hughes was questioned with regard to certain reports obtained by Mrs. Edna Fitz, the Community Services Social Worker, relating to Chambers' past behavior and which were a part of the hospital records. He had not seen them at that time. Later, after he had reviewed and evaluated the reports, he was recalled. On the basis of these reports, he testified that in his opinion the appellant was suffering from an emotional state at the time of the homicide and was sane at the time of the alleged offense. It was his opinion that the killing was not an isolated incident, but was part of a 'permanent personality pattern of violence and threats of violence when under emotion within his household.'

The New Mexico courts have not spoken directly on this point and cases from other jurisdictions offer divergent views. At 31 Am.Jur.2d, Expert and Opinion Evidence, § 86, the following is stated:

'* * * the opinion of a medical expert as to the sanity of a defendant in a criminal proceeding based partly upon the statements of third persons out of court is generally considered inadmissible.'

However, we think the better reasoned authorities take a different view. In Brown v. United States, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 134, 375 F.2d 310 (1967), the Court said:

'In forming an expert opinion it may be necessary to rely upon information--hearsay though it be--which in part is derived from persons charged with the supervision of the one whose conduct is involved. The information is winnowed through the mental processes of the expert, and is...