State v. Chandler
| Decision Date | 15 September 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 764SC307,764SC307 |
| Citation | 228 S.E.2d 69,30 N.C.App. 646 |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Don CHANDLER. |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Atty. Gen. Rufus L. Edmisten, by Asst. Atty. Gen. Guy A. Hamlin, Asheville, for the State.
Turner & Harrison, by Fred W. Harrison, Kinston, for defendant appellant.
Defendant first argues that the judgment appealed from should be arrested because the verdicts on the two charges of resisting an officer are inconsistent. He argues that since the jury found him not guilty of resisting Officer Jarman, it could not legally find him guilty of resisting Officer Sims. The verdict of not guilty in the case of resisting Officer Jarman is not such a fatal defect appearing on the face of the record as to require that the judgment be arrested in the case of resisting Officer Sims. Under the factual situation here presented, the jury's verdict in either case was not dependent upon its verdict in the other case. Defendant's motion to arrest judgment is denied.
On three separate occasions during the trial the court instructed the defendant and his witness to confine their response to the question asked. This is the basis for defendant's exceptions 4, 8, and 14, upon which he bases his second assignment of error. We have examined each and find the court correctly and properly instructed the witness with respect to his or her testimony. The court did not violate G.S. 1--180, as defendant contends, and express an opinion as to the evidence. This assignment of error has no merit.
On cross-examination defendant testified that he had been convicted of felonious assault on a police officer, attempted maiming and unlawful wounding, and petty larceny of an auto. On cross-examination he was allowed to testify that he pled guilty to the felonious assault because he worked a deal. On redirect examination with respect to these convictions the record reveals the following:
'Q. The instance that the Solicitor--District Attorney--has asked you about where you were convicted of unlawful wounding, what happened in that case?
COURT: Objection sustained.
Q. Did you enter a plea of guilty or were you convicted by the Court?
A. I entered a plea of guilty, sir. A bullet ricocheted and hit a gentleman and I . . .
COURT: Sustained. You have answered the question.
Q. Did you fire a weapon at anyone?
A. No, sir.
COURT: Sustained.
Q. Now the occasion that the District Attorney has questioned you about, he said auto larceny, what were you convicted of or plead guilty to?
A. I pleaded guilty to being in the car because you don't know about them things . . .
COURT: Sustained. You have answered the question.
Q. Did you know at the time that you were in the car that it was stolen?
A. No, sir.
Q. After talking with the District Attorney, you entered a plea by your lawyer?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. That was in Virginia?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now the other charge which the Solicitor asked you about, I believe Felonious Assault, when did that occur; do you recall the date? I believe you said a police officer was involved?
A. If that's the one, I pleaded guilty to it because there was a bunch of gentlemen there; and the lawyer said . . .
COURT: Sustained. Gentlemen, I'm not permitting either State or the defendant to go into long explanations of the offenses. It's right to ask about what they were; but the circumstances of each case is not material here.
Q. I'll ask you if you entered a plea of guilty to that or if you were convicted by the Court?
A. I pleaded guilty to it, sir.'
In his third assignment of error, based upon exceptions 9 through 13, defendant contends that the court erred in not allowing him to explain the prior convictions he admitted on cross-examination. While a witness is entitled to explain on cross-examination or on redirect examination any convictions he has admitted, Stansbury, N.C. Evidence 2d, § 112, the trial court is allowed considerable discretion in limiting such explanations. State v. Sanders, 276 N.C. 598, 174 S.E.2d 487 (1970); State v. White, 271 N.C. 391, 156 S.E.2d 721 (1967).
In the present case we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in its rulings challenged by these exceptions. We do not conceive how the defendant might have benefited by being allowed to further pursue the matter. Defendant has failed to show he was prejudiced in any way by ...
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State v. Duvall
...toward him. The judge's warning was entirely proper. See State v. Herbin, 298 N.C. 441, 259 S.E.2d 263 (1979); State v. Chandler, 30 N.C.App. 646, 228 S.E.2d 69 (1976). We do not find that Judge Brown's comments constituted an impermissible expression of opinion. The trial judge has a duty,......
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State v. Herbin
...L.Ed.2d 139 (1967); and to admonish the defendant and his witness to confine their responses to the questions asked, State v. Chandler, 30 N.C.App. 646, 228 S.E.2d 69 (1976). See also, 88 C.J.S. Trial § 49(3) A trial judge has the duty to control the examination of witnesses in the interest......
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