State v. Chaplin

Citation286 A.2d 325
PartiesSTATE of Maine v. Milton E. CHAPLIN, Jr.
Decision Date24 January 1972
CourtMaine Supreme Court

Richard S. Cohen, Peter T. Dawson, Asst. Attys. Gen., Augusta, for plaintiff.

Wathen & Wathen, by Daniel E. Wathen, Augusta, for defendant.

Before DUFRESNE, C. J., and WEBBER, WEATHERBEE, POMEROY, WERNICK and ARCHIBALD, JJ.

WEBBER, Justice.

On appeal. Defendant, indicted for the murder of his wife, was by jury verdict convicted of manslaughter. The defendant elected to testify in his own behalf and some of the facts are not in dispute. While engaged in a struggle in their home involving the possession of a hunting knife, either (a) the defendant stabbed his wife, or (b) he suddenly relinquished his grasp upon the knife and she accidentally stabbed herself. Immediately thereafter the assisted her out of the apartment and to the lawn where she lay until removed to the hospital by ambulance. During that period she made certain statements admitted in evidence as dying declarations. Several witnesses were then present including the defendant. Apart from statements bearing on the victim's expectation of impending death, she was variously quoted by the witnesses who were present as follows:

Witness Struck: 'She (Mrs. Chaplin) also stated to get him (the defendant) away from me, 1 that he done this to her, that she wanted somebody to watch the children.'

Witness Thomas: 'He did this to me. * * * Please get him away from me, I can't breathe.'

Witness Ward: 'He told her he loved her, and he didn't mean it. * * * She asked him why he had done it. And he said, 'You made me."

That the significant portions of the above quoted statements were actually made as part of a conversation between Mrs. Chaplin and the defendant became apparent when the defendant testified as follows:

(On direct examination) 'I kept telling her I loved her, I loved her. And then she said, 'I don't want to die. Get away from me. You did this,' she says, 'Get away from me.' * * * I said, 'I didn't mean to. You made me.' * * * And Susie (Mrs. Chaplin) kept saying, 'Get him away from me, he did this to me, I can't breathe.' And Mrs. Ward told me, 'Give her some air."

(On cross examination) 'I kept telling her I loved her, and I loved her. And then she said, 'I don't want to die. Get away from me. You did this.' * * * And I was kissing her at the same time. * * * And then she told Mrs. Ward-I think she said, 'Get him away from me. He did this to me.' * * * And I remember she said, 'Why did you do that?' And I said, 'I didn't mean to. You made me.'

Very shortly after this conversation occurred, Mrs. Chaplin was removed to the hospital where she died within a few hours. Several witnesses were permitted to testify over objection to statements made by Mrs. Chaplin at the hospital not in the presence of the defendant. We quote only those portions of the testimony which raise issues of law for review, as follows:

Witness Struck: 'She stated that he had done this to her, and that he had tried to stab her twice before. * * * As I said, at the scene she had stated that she was going to die, and this was what she was saying when I first got in there (the emergency room), too. * * * And this was repeated periodically throughout my stay in the emergency room.' (Emphasis ours.)

Witness Dr. Peddle: 'She said 'I am going to die,' many times. She said this many times.' (As to her condition), 'The fact that blood pressure was no recordable, the pulse was not palpable. She was suffering from extreme blood loss, and she was conscious. * * * I said, 'What happened?' * * * She said, 'My husband stabbed me.' * * * She said, 'He has tried before, but I would not let him. " (Emphasis ours.)

Witness Nurse Baker: 'She asked if she was going to die. * * * She asked several times.' (Witness did not respond to that inquiry). * * * Then she said, in the accident room, she knew she was going to die. * * * She said, 'He stabbed me, he's tried several times before. " (Emphasis ours.)

Witness Nurse Edgecomb: 'She said she was going to die, and for someone to help her, she was going to die. * * * Several times. * * * She stated that he stabbed her. * * * She said her husband stabbed her. She should say her ex-husband, she was trying to get a divorce.'

After a preliminary hearing in the absence of the jury on the issue of the voluntariness of certain admissions made by the defendant, Sergeant Struck was permitted over objection to testify in the presence of the jury that immediately after the death of Mrs. Chaplin he charged the defendant with murder and transported him from the hospital to the county jail; that in the course of this transportation in a police car the defendant, not as part of a police interrogation or in answer to a question, spontaneously informed the witness, 'That the only reason why he moved here was because he had lost his license, and that he wanted to make a living for his wife and family; and that if he hadn't have been so jealous he wouldn't have stabbed her, if only he hadn't have been so jealous; and then he made the statement that he wanted her to himself; he didn't want to share her with anyone.' Officer Marshall testified that in a conversation with his brother Roy Chaplin at the hospital which the witness overheard, the defendant said, 'I shouldn't have stabbed her.' Officer Greenleaf who was driving the police car in which the defendant was transported to jail heard only snatches of conversation and recalled only that the defendant had said to Sergeant Struck, 'I'm sorry that I stabbed her. If I hadn't been so jealous this wouldn't have happened.'

In the course of the presentation of the State's evidence there was admitted over objection a photographic slide in color depicting cuts on the left arm of the victim as well as the puncture wound and surgical scar on her abdomen, this photograph having been taken during the autopsy.

While the State was in the process of proving the continuity of possession of the knife alleged to have been the weapon employed to inflict the fatal wound, a witness for the State testified as follows:

'Q. Now did something happen when Lorraine Allen came into your kitchen?

A. Yes. She came screaming through the door with a knife in her hand, and said, 'This is what he did it with."

Counsel for defendant immediately objected and asked that the answer be stricken. This was done and the jury was instructed to disregard the testimony. Counsel for defendant then moved for a mistrial which motion was denied.

Officer Marshall, called as a rebuttal witness by the State, was permitted over objection to relate what Roy Chaplin had said to the defendant as part of a conversation which the two brothers had at the hospital. Roy Chaplin was quoted as saying, 'I knew some day your temper would catch up to you,' and 'You know this has happened twice before.' As a witness for the defendant, Roy Chaplin had denied making these statements to the defendant.

At the close of the State's case and again before the case was submitted to the jury, the defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal. In each case the motion was denied.

This appeal must be sustained and a new trial ordered. Since the case must be tried anew we will discuss certain points raised by defendant even though they may not be decisive of this appeal.

Dying Declarations.

A. Statements made by Mrs. Chaplin at the scene.

As already noted Mrs. Chaplin was half led and half carried from her home by the defendant and placed in a reclining position on the lawn. She was bleeding profusely and was suffering mental and physical anguish from the wound she had just received. During the very short period she remained there before the arrival of an ambulance, she made certain statements, the most significant of which were addressed to her husband who remained kneeling beside her. These statements were admitted as dying declarations by the Court. Later in this opinion we will have occasion to discuss the rules applicable to such declarations. Suffice it to say that these declarations were admissible not only as dying declarations, the declarant giving every evidence of her knowledge of impending death and the hopelessness of her case, but also on two other independent grounds. Mrs. Chaplin's utterances on this occasion, following so soon after her traumatic experience as to form a part of it and to negative any opportunity or purpose to fabricate evidence, were admissible as part of the res gestae. In Hersum, Admr. v. Kennebec Water Dist. (1955) 151 Me. 256, 270, 117 A.2d 334, we had occasion to discuss the res gestae rule in these terms:

'This was no mere narration of a past event. Rather was it a spontaneous explanation uttered in the course of a continuing action. In State v. Maddox, 92 Me. 348 at 353, 42 A. 788 at page 789, the general rule was stated as follows: 'It is said in Lander v. People, 104 Ill. 248, that, 'the true test of the admissibility of such testimony is that the act declaration or exclamation must be so intimately interwoven with the principal fact or event which it characterizes as to be regarded a part of the transaction itself, and also to clearly negative any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony" 20 Am.Jur. 553, Sec. 662, 2 states in part, 'Stated differently, the term 'res gestae' comprehends a situation which presents a startling or unusual occurrence sufficient to produce a spontaneous and instinctive reaction, during which interval certain statements are made under such circumstances as to show lack of forethought or deliberate design in the formulation of their content. Statements which conform to these requirements and which in some way elucidate, qualify, or characterize the act in question are admissible in evidence as a distinct and separate exception to the hearsay rule.' The precise form of the statement does not govern its admissibility. It may be in narrative form and in answer to a question if it meets all the...

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16 cases
  • State v. O'Clair
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • June 14, 1972
    ...of death even though not made in the presence of the accused murderer (State v. Bordeleau, 1920, 118 Me. 424, 108 A. 464; State v. Chaplin, 1972, Me., 286 A.2d 325); declarations constituting a verbal part of the act itself (Inhabitants of Deer Isle v. Inhabitants of Winterport, 1894, 87 Me......
  • Ramirez v. State
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • December 20, 2001
    ...(App.1935); State v. Batten, 17 Wash.App. 428, 563 P.2d 1287 (1977). 25. See Mansfield v. State, 758 So.2d 636 (Fla. 2000); State v. Chaplin, 286 A.2d 325 (Me. 1972); Jackson-El v. State, 45 Md.App. 678, 415 A.2d 312 (1980); see also Foster v. State, 508 So.2d 1111 26. See State v. Weinberg......
  • State v. Collins
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • December 8, 1972
    ...in the present decision, however, is calculated to impair the precedental effect of the recent decision of this Court in State v. Chaplin, Me., 286 A.2d 325 (1972) delineating the practice to be followed in relation to deetrminations of the admissibility of 'dying declarations' as an except......
  • State v. Anderson
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • December 31, 1979
    ...event or shortly resulting therefrom and were not the result of a reflecting mind seeking exculpatory excuses. See State v. Chaplin, Me., 286 A.2d 325, 332 (1972). The trial Justice was correct in leaving to the jury the issue of the trustworthiness of Anderson's extrajudicial 11. Sabatino'......
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