State v. Chapman

Citation365 S.W.2d 551
Decision Date11 March 1963
Docket NumberNo. 49625,No. 2,49625,2
PartiesSTATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Arthur CHAPMAN, Appellant
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

No attorney for appellant.

Thomas F. Eagleton, Atty. Gen., James W. Steele, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

STOCKARD, Commissioner.

Defendant Arthur Chapman has appealed from the judgment of the Circuit Court of Texas County whereby he was found guilty of stealing a motor vehicle and sentenced to confinement for two years in the penitentiary. He has filed no brief in this court. The sufficiency of the evidence is not challenged, and the statement of the facts may be brief.

On Sunday, March 11, 1962, at 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon Donald Ellis parked his father's 1957 Plymouth automobile in front of his home in Cabool, Missouri. The next morning the automobile was gone, and no one, including defendant, had been given permission to use it. At 4:30 o'clock on the morning of March 14, a police officer of the City of Rolla saw the Ellis automobile being driven by defendant near the bus station. Defendant drove into a parking area, left the automobile and entered the station. When the police officer learned by radio from police headquarters that the automobile had been stolen he examined it and found therein a hypodermic needle and two bottles of narcotics in a satchel, and he also found some articles of clothing which had defendant's name written on them. Defendant was apprehended about three hours later. At the trial he did not testify or offer any testimony.

Defendant filed no motion for new trial denominated as such, but after verdict he filed a 'Motion to Modify Judgment' which the trial court considered to constitute a motion for new trial, and so shall we. In the motion defendant requested that the trial court 'modify the verdict of said jury' because the court denied his motion that he be granted an eye examination, and because it 'denied an application * * * for subpoena of defense witnesses to be heard on the trial.'

The trial was held on May 21, 1962. On April 6, 1962, defendant, acting pro se, filed a motion in which he stated that he was charged with 'violation of Missouri Auto Theft Statute' and that he elected to act as his own defense counsel. He then alleged that he was 'lawfully and Constitutionally entitled to call and have witnesses in his behalf and to have the assistance and protection of [the] court guaranteeing such right,' that he 'suffers from an incurable eye depth perception affliction with other allied causation which in itself is bonifide evidence refuting aforesaid State's charge of theft of a motor vehicle and driving same many miles guided by artificial lighting,' and that he 'possesses no monies or other worldly possessions with which to procure an eye examination by a qualified specialist.' He then requested that the trial court 'order that he be given a thorough examination by an eye specialist skilled in eye diseases at aforesaid Respondent's [State of Missouri] expense and that a report therefrom be filed in evidence in this Court.' On May 14, after 'informal discussion in open court between defendant and Court,' the trial court appointed counsel, a member of the Texas County bar, to represent defendant. The transcript shows no ruling on the motion filed pro se on April 6. When defendant's trial commenced on May 21 he announced ready, and at no time during the trial did he make any further request for a physical examination at either his or the State's expense. The failure to seek a ruling on his motion and the announcement of ready for trial could properly be considered as an abandonment of the motion. However, whether or not the motion was in fact abandoned, no prejudicial error resulted.

'A request by accused [when incarcerated] that he be permitted to undergo a physical examination so it may be used as evidence at the trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and in the exercise of discretion such an examination may be permitted or denied.' 23 C.J.S. Criminal...

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6 cases
  • State v. Carter
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • August 31, 1982
    ...the right "to an examination by a specialist at the expense of the State" if it is "essential to due process of law." State v. Chapman, 365 S.W.2d 551, 552 (Mo.1963). We do not deal here with a total prohibition of expert assistance. The principal opinion's narrow definition of the attorney......
  • State ex rel. Foster v. Luff, 14742
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • April 4, 1980
    ...state's experts. See Robinson v. Pate, 345 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1965); State v. Taylor, 202 Kan. 202, 447 P.2d 806 (1968); State v. Chapman, 365 S.W.2d 551 (Mo.1963). It is obvious that where the prosecution's case encompasses expert testimony on matters which are in dispute, a defense attorn......
  • State v. Aubuchon, 49909
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • September 14, 1964
    ...either controlling or particularly persuasive. The Missouri cases cited are generally not in point; however, in the case of State v. Chapman, Mo., 365 S.W.2d 551, where defendant sought a physical examination at the expense of the State, the Court said, loc. cit. 552-553: "A request by accu......
  • State ex rel. Hoover v. Bloom
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • January 11, 1971
    ...constitutional requisite; nor has our search revealed any such cases.' See also McGarty v. O'Brien (1st Cir.), 188 F.2d 151; State v. Chapman, Mo., 365 S.W.2d 551; State v. Aubuchon, Mo., 381 S.W.2d 807. Apparently to the contrary is the holding in Jacobs v. United States (4th Cir.), 350 F.......
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