State v. Chappelle
| Decision Date | 21 October 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. COA07-1312.,COA07-1312. |
| Citation | 667 S.E.2d 327 |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Jason Jeremiah CHAPPELLE. |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Where the State presented substantial evidence of each element of arson, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motions to dismiss. Testimony that the victim of the arson refused to agree to allow defendant to store stolen goods in her home was relevant to show defendant's motive to burn the premises. The trial court did not err in allowing defendant to dismiss counsel over tactical differences and represent himself after a thorough colloquy demonstrating that his waiver of his right to counsel was knowing and voluntary. The prosecutor's closing argument approached, but did not exceed, the bounds of propriety. Where defendant has not shown error, he cannot prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant's stipulation as to his prior convictions is effective to establish the convictions but ineffective to establish that his out-of-state convictions are substantially similar to a North Carolina offense.
Jason Jeremiah Chappelle ("defendant") was found guilty of one count of first-degree arson at the 7 January 2007 Criminal Session of Pasquotank County Superior Court. The State's evidence at trial tended to show that defendant was acquainted with Colleen Durant ("Durant"), the occupant of a mobile home that was singed by a late-night fire on 20 July 2006. Durant and her overnight guest, Leanne Martin ("Martin"), each testified to the events of that evening. Defendant repeatedly knocked on the doors and a window of Durant's home and attempted to persuade the two women to let him in. The women told him to go away but did not call police. Eventually they turned off the lights and went to bed. Defendant again called out to the women, then all became quiet. No one else came to Durant's home that evening. Shortly after the women retired to bed, Martin smelled smoke. When Durant opened the door, she saw smoke coming from beneath the mobile home. Durant and Martin called police and the fire department.
Deputy Sheriff Forbes responded to the call. He found the two women in the street and saw flames coming from the back of the mobile home. Ms. Durant told him that "she knew who did it" and, giving defendant's name, told police that defendant was wearing blue shorts and riding a red bicycle. Firefighter Nelson extinguished the fire and noticed pieces of cardboard in the area of the fire. Two arson experts ruled out accidental causes and concluded that an incendiary fire was started by an open flame. These experts testified to burned debris, including insulation, vinyl skirting, and cardboard. Durant testified that the trailer's vinyl skirting, previously intact, had been partially removed. Although there had been a pile of cardboard boxes sitting near the front door of the mobile home before defendant's evening visit, only one box remained.
Deputy Gregory and Deputy Wooten testified that they found defendant on the edge of a road in the trailer park within view of Durant's home. He was wearing a blue t-shirt and blue shorts. He was astride a red bicycle. Deputy Wooten took him into custody. A search produced a cigarette lighter from defendant's pocket and a six-inch knife from his waistband.
At the close of the State's evidence, defendant's motion to dismiss was denied. Defendant, through counsel, advised the court he would not be presenting any evidence, and court was adjourned for the day. The next morning, defendant dismissed his attorney, and the court permitted him to present evidence. Defendant's motion to dismiss at the close of all the evidence was denied.
At sentencing, the trial court found defendant to be a prior record Level IV for felony sentencing purposes based upon prior convictions in the State of North Carolina and the Commonwealth of Virginia. Defendant received an active sentence of 117 to 150 months.
Defendant appeals.
In his first two arguments, defendant contends that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court erroneously allowed Durant to testify to other crimes, then allowed the State to impermissibly question other witnesses regarding that testimony. We disagree.
Defendant asserts that the evidentiary exception allowing motive evidence is closely circumscribed, and evidence detailing the cause of an argument that distinctly references other crimes, as contrasted with evidence that a dispute simply existed, is inadmissible to show motive. We first review defendant's arguments regarding Durant's testimony.
At trial, the State sought to introduce evidence of an argument between defendant and the victim as proof of malice and defendant's motive to commit arson. At the conclusion of the voir dire hearing, defendant contended first that the substance of the argument was irrelevant and, second, that under Rule 403 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by the likelihood of undue prejudice. The trial court first ruled that the proffered testimony was relevant for the limited purpose of proving motive. The trial court then ruled that the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudicial value, stating that "enough of it [would be allowed] to support [the State's] theory." Defendant did not make a continuing objection or request a limiting instruction.
The jury returned to the courtroom, and Durant was permitted to testify to an argument with defendant that occurred on the day preceding the arson, as follows:
Q. [D]id [the defendant] say anything that concerned you . . . earlier in the day when he talked to you and you decided not to let him in any more[?]
A. I didn't want to let him in any more.
Q. And why was that?
A. Because he wanted to rob a place on Main Street Extended and take money, diamonds, and guns, and he said the drug dealers would be interested in them and he wanted to store stuff at my house and I said, no. And I refused to let him in my house because he wanted to rob this place, store the stuff at my place, and bring these bad people, you know, to my place.
. . .
Q. [D]id he make a telephone call from your house?
A. Yes, he did. . . . He made a telephone call from my house to somebody and was talking to them about robbing the place.
Q. And what did he want that person to do . . . ?
A. To help him rob the place.
On cross-examination, Durant referenced this testimony upon three occasions. First, she acknowledged that she had considered defendant a friend, then stated "But . . . I didn't realize and I didn't know that he was a thief either, you know." Defendant's objection was overruled. Second, Durant stated, without objection, that the day of the arson was "the day he talked about robbing the place." Finally, Durant twice referred to the defendant as "thief," whereupon the trial court admonished her to "just answer the question."
Defendant contends that this testimony went beyond the scope necessary to show that defendant and the victim had an argument and instead provided irrelevant and inflammatory "other crimes" evidence that tended only to prove that defendant was a "robber" or "thief" and was not admissible under Rule 404(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. He further asserts that, even if the testimony was admissible, any probative value was substantially outweighed by the dangers of unfair prejudice and misleading the jury and the testimony should have been excluded under Rule 403.
Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion rather than a rule of exclusion. See, e.g., State v. Agee, 326 N.C. 542, 549-50, 391 S.E.2d 171, 176 (1990). The rule permits evidence of defendant's prior bad acts when introduced for a proper purpose. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b)(2007) (). The "acid test" under Rule 404 is still relevancy. State v. Emery, 91 N.C.App. 24, 33, 370 S.E.2d 456, 461 (1988)(citing State v. McClain, 240 N.C. 171, 177, 81 S.E.2d 364, 368 (1954)).
A defendant's motive to commit a crime is clearly of consequence to his guilt or innocence. In the instant case, the nature of defendant's argument with Colleen Durant, and her reaction to that argument, tended to show that he had a motive to set fire to her residence and was relevant to the State's theory of the case. We hold that Rule 404(b) did not require its exclusion as evidence probative only of defendant's propensity to commit crimes.
The trial court enjoys broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence under Rule 403, and will be reversed "only upon a showing that its ruling was manifestly unsupported by reason and could not have been the result of a reasoned decision." State v. Anderson, 350 N.C. 152, 175, 513 S.E.2d 296, 310 (1999) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also State v. Chapman, 359 N.C. 328, 348-349, 611 S.E.2d 794, 811 (2005)(discussing Rules 402 and 403 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence and the meaning of unfair prejudice).
In the instant case, the trial court considered the nature of the evidence, the possibility of prejudice to the defense, and arguments from both parties before rendering a decision. Upon a thorough review of the record, we cannot say that the trial court's decision was either arbitrary or unsupported by reason. Anderson at 175, 513 S.E.2d at 310. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Colleen Durant's testimony regarding the subject of the argument between Durant and defendant during the day preceding the...
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