State v. Charada T.

Decision Date08 May 2014
Docket NumberNo. 76,76
Citation991 N.Y.S.2d 9,23 N.Y.3d 355,14 N.E.3d 362,2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 03293
PartiesIn the Matter of STATE of New York, Respondent, v. CHARADA T., Appellant.
CourtNew York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Marvin Bernstein, Mental Hygiene Legal Service, New York City (Deborah P. Mantell, Sadie Z. Ishee and Maura M. Klugman of counsel), for appellant.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York City (Claude S. Platton, Barbara D. Underwood and Steven C. Wu of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

ABDUS–SALAAM

, J.

We hold that, in this Mental Hygiene Law article 10 proceeding, Supreme Court erred by permitting an expert witness to

introduce hearsay testimony about a crime respondent Charada T. was never charged with committing, but that this error was harmless under the circumstances.

Respondent Charada T. has been convicted of committing three violent sex offenses, two of which occurred within the span of an hour. Close to midnight on September 16, 1997, respondent attacked a woman on the street in Manhattan by choking her until she lost consciousness, striking her repeatedly in the head, and forcing her to perform oral sex on him. About 40 minutes later on September 17th, respondent attacked another woman by choking her with a payphone cord and striking her in the head before penetrating her vaginally and anally. Respondent also forced the victim to perform oral sex on him while threatening her with a razor. After his arrest, respondent admitted to the police that he choked the September 16th victim and orally sodomized her. Respondent was later indicted on multiple counts related to both September 1997 offenses. He pleaded guilty to rape in the first degree (Penal Law § 130.35

), sodomy (Penal Law § 130.50 ), and assault in the second degree (Penal Law § 120.05 ) in satisfaction of all charges and was sentenced to 12 years in prison.

In 2002, while respondent was serving his sentence for the 1997 convictions, DNA evidence linked him to a rape he committed on July 7, 1996 while on parole for selling drugs. In that incident, respondent lured a woman who approached him to buy drugs to a rooftop and forced her to have sex with him by punching her in the face. Respondent pleaded guilty to rape in the first degree and was sentenced to 13 years in prison.

A presentence report prepared in connection with respondent's 1997 convictions (hereinafter, 1997 presentence report) alleges that respondent committed a fourth rape within 24 hours of his other two September 1997 offenses. That record alleges that, at around 2:14 a.m. on September 18, 1997, respondent dragged a female victim between a garbage dumpster and a construction site near the Port Authority bus terminal, stripped her of her blouse and coat, choked her, and vaginally raped her. The 1997 presentence report indicates that the allegations were based on a sworn statement made by a New York City police detective who investigated respondent's offenses and spoke to the victim. Respondent never admitted to committing the fourth rape and was never charged in connection with that offense, although according to the 1997 presentence report, he admitted to police that he was in the vicinity of the Port Authority near the time of the rape for the purpose of soliciting a prostitute.

While incarcerated for his rape convictions, respondent was cited for dozens of disciplinary offenses and infractions. One incident, in which respondent was discovered hiding in the dark in the correctional officers' restroom, resulted in stalking charges and respondent's expulsion from sex offender treatment. Respondent was also placed in the special housing unit after he grabbed a female correctional officer and pulled her toward the bars of his cell while he was masturbating.

As respondent's release date approached, the State of New York (the State) commenced the instant article 10 proceeding seeking a determination that respondent is a detained sex offender requiring civil management. Prior to trial, respondent moved to preclude the State's expert witness, Dr. Roger Harris, from presenting hearsay basis testimony about the uncharged rape. The State opposed the motion, arguing that this hearsay information was reliable because it came from a presentence report, an official record mental health professionals customarily rely upon in forming opinions in article 10 proceedings. Supreme Court denied the motion, ruling that the State could elicit testimony from Dr. Harris about the uncharged rape.

Dr. Harris testified at trial that, based on his review of respondent's criminal, prison, and mental health records, he concluded that respondent suffers from a mental abnormality that predisposes him to commit sex offenses and causes him serious difficulty controlling that conduct (see Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03[i]

). Dr. Harris testified in detail about respondent's three rape convictions; he also stated that respondent had been accused of another “incident” near the Port Authority “about 24 hours” after the September 1997 rapes. Dr. Harris briefly described the alleged fourth rape and noted that, unlike respondent's other sex offenses, respondent had “not acknowledged” committing this crime, though he had “place[d] himself in th[e] vicinity.”

Dr. Harris testified that, in his view, respondent suffers from three conditions: paraphilia

not-otherwise-specified (NOS), personality disorder with antisocial traits, and alcohol abuse. In explaining how these disorders affect respondent's mental abnormality, Dr. Harris focused primarily on respondent's sex offenses that resulted in convictions, respondent's descriptions of those offenses as recounted in writings he prepared during sex offender treatment, and his prison disciplinary record. Particularly, Dr. Harris testified that, based on the brutality of respondent's rapes, his expressed sexual arousal at the violent

sexual assaulting of women, and his impulsive misconduct toward the corrections officer, respondent had violent and sadistic tendencies, as well as a lack of volitional control, which predisposed him to commit further sex offenses.

Dr. Harris described respondent's failure to complete prison sex offender treatment on three occasions between 2001 and 2010. Dr. Harris stated that near the end of respondent's second and only significant period in sex offender treatment in 2006 and 2007, treatment staff told him that his progress was not sufficient. Dr. Harris then testified, over a general objection by respondent's counsel, that he reviewed evaluations prepared by treatment providers after respondent had been “disconnected” from treatment. These evaluations stated that respondent “did not understand his sexual assault cycle” and minimized his behavior, and that his treatment had been terminated as “unsuccessful.”

Respondent's expert, Dr. Don Greif, testified that he agreed with Dr. Harris that respondent suffers from alcohol abuse and personality disorder with antisocial traits, but opined that, in his view, these disorders do not prevent respondent from controlling his behavior. Dr. Greif also disagreed with the paraphilia

NOS diagnosis because he concluded that respondent's sex offenses were motivated by feelings of rage and hostility, and a wish to exert power over his victims, rather than to achieve sexual arousal by coercion. According to Dr. Greif, respondent's rapes included “sadistic elements” indicating respondent “wanted to hurt his victims,” but it was “not clear that his sexual arousal depended on” hurting or humiliating them. Dr. Greif also opined that, although respondent did not complete sex offender treatment, his progression through several stages and his writings indicated that he was “making an honest and full fledged attempt to come to terms with what he had done.”

After the close of proof, Supreme Court instructed the jury that expert testimony about hearsay statements from respondent's records was “admitted for the limited purpose of informing you as to the basis of the expert's opinions” and should “not ... be considered as establishing the truth of those out-of-court statements.” Regarding the uncharged rape, the court...

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13 cases
  • State v. Joseph R.
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • 23 Diciembre 2020
    ...regarding the hebephilia diagnosis would have resulted in a different verdict (see generally Matter of State of New York v. Charada T. , 23 N.Y.3d 355, 362, 991 N.Y.S.2d 9, 14 N.E.3d 362 [2014] ).Respondent failed to preserve for our review his contentions that petitioner failed to establis......
  • State v. Allan A.
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • 20 Julio 2022
    ...2 N.E.3d 204 ; Matter of State of New York v. Bass, 119 A.D.3d 1356, 1357, 989 N.Y.S.2d 556 ; cf. Matter of State of New York v. Charada T., 23 N.Y.3d 355, 361, 991 N.Y.S.2d 9, 14 N.E.3d 362 ). The court also properly concluded that expert testimony on the condition of hypersexuality could ......
  • State v. Abdul A., 2013-09692
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • 24 Diciembre 2014
    ...the jury evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect (see Matter of State of New York v. Charada T., 23 N.Y.3d 355, 361–362, 991 N.Y.S.2d 9, 14 N.E.3d 362 ; Matter of State of New York v. Floyd Y., 22 N.Y.3d 95, 109, 979 N.Y.S.2d 240, 2 N.E.3d 204 ). Applyin......
  • State v. Juan U.
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • 9 Octubre 2020
    ...i.e., evidence concerning offenses for which respondent was never indicted (see generally Matter of State of New York v. Charada T. , 23 N.Y.3d 355, 361, 991 N.Y.S.2d 9, 14 N.E.3d 362 [2014] ), we conclude that reversal is not required. Notwithstanding the improper hearsay basis evidence, t......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
4 books & journal articles
  • Expert witnesses
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive New York Objections - 2020 Contents
    • 2 Agosto 2020
    ...v. Donald DD., 24 N.Y.3d 174, 996 N.Y.S.2d 610 (2014); State v. John S., 23 N.Y.3d 326, 991 N.Y.S.2d 532 (2014); State v. Charada T. , 23 N.Y.3d 355, 14 N.E.3d 362 (2014) (doctor’s testimony regarding an uncharged rape was not reliable and thus did not meet the standard set forth in Floyd b......
  • Expert witnesses
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books New York Objections
    • 3 Mayo 2022
    ...Y. , 22 N.Y.2d 95, 979 N.Y.S.2d 240 (2013); see also State v. John S. , 23 N.Y.3d 326, 991 N.Y.S.2d 532 (2014); State v. Charada T. , 23 N.Y.3d 355, 14 N.E.3d 362 (2014) (doctor’s testimony regarding an uncharged rape was not reliable and thus did not meet the standard set forth in Floyd be......
  • Expert witnesses
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive New York Objections - 2019 Contents
    • 2 Agosto 2019
    ...v. Donald DD., 24 N.Y.3d 174, 996 N.Y.S.2d 610 (2014); State v. John S., 23 N.Y.3d 326, 991 N.Y.S.2d 532 (2014); State v. Charada T. , 23 N.Y.3d 355, 14 N.E.3d 362 (2014) (doctor’s testimony regarding an uncharged rape was not reliable and thus did not meet the standard set forth in Floyd b......
  • Expert witnesses
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive New York Objections - 2021 Contents
    • 2 Agosto 2021
    ...v. Donald DD., 24 N.Y.3d 174, 996 N.Y.S.2d 610 (2014); State v. John S., 23 N.Y.3d 326, 991 N.Y.S.2d 532 (2014); State v. Charada T. , 23 N.Y.3d 355, 14 N.E.3d 362 (2014) (doctor’s testimony regarding an uncharged rape was not reliable and thus did not meet the standard set forth in Floyd b......

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