State v. Charles L.
| Decision Date | 24 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | AC 44690 |
| Citation | 217 Conn.App. 380,288 A.3d 664 |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. CHARLES L. |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Richard E. Condon, Jr., senior assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).
Jonathan M. Sousa, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Sharmese L. Walcott, state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
Elgo, Cradle and Clark, Js.
The defendant, Charles L., appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (1). On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the evidence was insufficient for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that his actions constituted an act likely to impair the health of a child and (2) " § 53-21 (a) (1) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of this case ...." We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts, which are either undisputed or reasonably could have been found by the jury, and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. In April, 2014, the defendant had a daughter, J, with his then wife. The defendant's wife died soon thereafter.
In June, 2016, following the death of his wife, the defendant married D. They had a daughter together, L, and the two children resided with them in a two bedroom apartment in Manchester. D's sister, B, and B's daughter also lived with them in the two bedroom apartment.
At some time in September, 2017, the defendant, D, J, L, and B were visiting the defendant's friend, who lived nearby. At one point during that visit, D said that she was ready to leave, and B joked that they were going to leave J with the defendant. In response, the defendant "blew up," said, and then said that no one cared for J. The family then left the friend's house and began walking back to their apartment, and the defendant argued with B as they walked.
After the family returned to their apartment, the defendant went to the kitchen with D and J. Still angry, the defendant stated: "[I]f anybody loved me and [J], then I'm just going to take our lives." He then proceeded to retrieve a generic brand cleaning solution from a cabinet, as well as a cup for himself and a cup that specifically belonged to J, and then poured the cleaning solution into both cups. He instructed J to "come here and drink this ...." D was standing next to J and told her to stay where she was, and J obeyed. The defendant then poured the cleaning solution from J's cup into his own and went outside. D left the apartment with J.
In December, 2017, D disclosed this incident to an investigator with the Department of Children and Families (department) while present at a meeting between the investigator and B. The department prepared a report reflecting these allegations and submitted it to the Manchester Police Department. On December 13, 2017, Officer Antony DeJulius spoke with the defendant about the allegations in the report, and the defendant admitted to them, stating that he was angry and "just reacted." The defendant then became upset and threatened to harm himself, so DeJulius prepared a hospital committal form and brought the defendant to a hospital. In January, 2018, DeJulius obtained written statements from D and B about the September, 2017 incident. DeJulius then obtained an arrest warrant for the defendant. The defendant was arrested on February 8, 2018.
The state charged the defendant with three counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21 (a) (1),1 two counts of threatening in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-62, and one count of strangulation in the second degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 53a-64bb. The state subsequently filed a new short form information that removed the threatening and strangulation counts, added a fourth risk of injury count, and added a count charging the defendant with cruelty to persons in violation of General Statutes § 53-20 (b) (1). On April 11, 2018, the defendant pleaded not guilty to all charges and requested a jury trial.
Prior to trial, on January 14, 2020, the state filed a five count long form information, setting forth specific accusations supporting the crimes charged.2 On January 22, 2020, the defendant's trial commenced. After the state rested its case, the defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Practice Book §§ 42-40 and 42-41 on counts one, two, and four, which charged the defendant with risk of injury, and count five, which charged the defendant with cruelty to persons. The trial court granted the motion as to counts two and four but denied it as to counts one and five.
On January 23, 2020, the state amended its long form information, removing the two counts of which the defendant had been acquitted and renumbering the counts so that count three, which charged the defendant with risk of injury, and count five, which charged the defendant with cruelty to persons, were now labeled counts two and three, respectively. After the close of evidence, the court instructed the jury as to the remaining three counts, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty as to count one and not guilty as to counts two and three. On March 9, 2021, the court, Graham, J. , sentenced the defendant to a term of imprisonment of ten years, execution suspended after five years, and five years of probation. This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.
The defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of risk of injury to a child pursuant to the act prong of § 53-21 (a) (1). Specifically, he argues that the state "did not present evidence that [he] committed an act of blatant physical abuse or engaged in conduct directly perpetrated on J," as he contends is required by State v. Schriver , 207 Conn. 456, 466–67, 542 A.2d 686 (1988). To that end, he argues that "[t]here is no evidence that the defendant ever approached J, nonetheless physically touched or committed blatant physical abuse upon her ...." (Citation omitted.) He further argues that the state presented insufficient evidence to prove that the defendant's "act" was "likely" to be injurious to J's health. For the reasons discussed herein, we disagree with the defendant.
We begin our analysis by setting forth the well established legal principles for assessing an insufficiency of the evidence claim. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Petersen , 196 Conn. App. 646, 655, 230 A.3d 696, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 921, 232 A.3d 1104 (2020). (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rhodes , 335 Conn. 226, 233, 249 A.3d 683 (2020).
The defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because there was no evidence that he engaged in "blatant physical abuse." Specifically, he claims that, in order to be convicted under the act prong of § 53-21 (a) (1) for conduct likely to impair the health of a child, there must be evidence that the defendant physically touched the child. He further argues that, even if the statute does not require a defendant to physically touch a child, his conduct was not sufficiently egregious for the jury to have concluded that he engaged in "blatant physical abuse" of a child.
We begin our discussion with a brief overview of § 53-21 (a) (1). Section 53-21 (a) provides in relevant part: "Any person who (1) wilfully or unlawfully causes or permits any child under the age of sixteen years to be placed in such a situation that the life or limb of such child is endangered, the health of such child is likely to be injured or the morals of such child are likely to be impaired, or does any act likely to impair the health or morals of any such child ... shall be guilty of ... a class C felony ...." (Emphasis added.) Our courts (Citation omitted; emphasis omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Robert H. , 273 Conn. 56, 65, 866 A.2d 1255 (2005).
Since its passage, a judicial gloss has been imposed on § 53-21. Pertinent to the issues raised in this appeal, our Supreme Court in State v. Schriver , supra, 207 Conn. at 461, 542 A.2d 686, distinguished between acts likely to impair the "morals" of a child and acts likely to impair the "health" of a child. It stated that an act likely to impair the morals of a child involves "deliberate touching of the private parts of a child under the age of sixteen in a sexual and indecent manner ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.,...
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