State v. Charles Lee, Ii

• Decision Date: 23 January 1986
• Docket Number: 86-LW-0853,83 CA 17
• Parties: STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles LEE, II, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles LEE, II, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 83 CA 17.

86-LW-0853 (4th)

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fourth District Gallia

January 23, 1986

Hamlin C. King, Gallipolis, Ohio, for appellant.

Prosecuting Attorney Joseph L. Cain, Gallipolis, Ohio, for appellee.

DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

STEPHENSON Presiding Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction and sentence entered upon a jury verdict by the Court of Common Pleas of Gallia County, Ohio, finding Charles Lee II, defendant below and appellant herein, guilty of murder, in violation of R.C 2903.02.

Appellant assigns the following errors:

"FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

It was error for the Juvenile Court to relinquish jurisdiction over the juvenile Appellant to be tried as an adult when it was unreasonable for the Juvenile Court to believe that he falls into both of these contradictory categories: (1) He is dangerous because he is charged with a serious crime; and (2) he is unamenable to rehabilitation because the bindover investigation found nothing wrong with him to rehabilitate, all in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. It was further error to relinquish jurisdiction over him in the absence of an additional finding that he was unamenable to "care' in any facility designed for the care and supervision of delinquent children.

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

The Lower Court erred by denying the Appellant's motion for acquittal at the conclusion of the State's case and by denying his motion for a new trial when reasonable minds could not differ that the State's case, viewed in its most favorable light, does not preclude a reasonable doubt of the Appellant's guilt and the circumstantial evidence by which the State seeks to prove his guilt does not exclude all reasonable theories of innocence, contrary to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.

THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

The admission over the Appellant's objection of the contents of a prejudicial telephone conversation between the decedent and her mother violated both the hearsay rule and the Appellant's right of confrontation, in violation of both the Sixth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution.

FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

The Lower Court erred by admitting into evidence over objection a very flattering color photograph of the decedent when it tended to prove no disputed issue in the case and was clearly calculated to prejudice the jury against the Appellant by confusing undue sympathy for the victim with the issue of his guilt or innocence.

FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

The Court erred by allowing the State's fingerprint expert to testify that the fingerprints he found on the purported murder bullet box were those of the Appellant when the fingerprint card from which he made the match was not disclosed in discovery and the fingerprints were never properly authenticated as those of the Appellant.

SIXTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

The Appellant having been convicted of murder should be serving reformatory time, since he was seventeen years of age at the time of the offense and had no prior record.

SEVENTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

The Lower Court erred by denying the Appellant's motion for a new trial based on the misconduct of state witnesses when he presented unrebutted and impartial testimony that two crucial State witnesses had intentionally violated the Court's sequestration order, and two crucial witnesses had been prompted by courtroom spectators during their testimony, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Lower Court further erred by giving unsworn testimony on the matter.

EIGHTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

The Court erred by permitting, over objection, an armed uniformed deputy with a large mace on the floor beside him to sit immediately behind the Appellant, in full view of the jury, without any showing that such was the least obtrusive manner in which to maintain order and security at the trial and by denying the Appellant's motion for new trial based on that ground, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

NINTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

The Court erred by admitting over objection Appellant's inaudible post-indictment statements obtained by illegal means, induced by promises, and elicited surreptitiously by an agent acting for the police, contrary to the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution."

On April 7, 1983, a criminal complaint was filed in the Gallia County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, by Captain Carl Langford of the Gallia County Sheriff's Department which averred that appellant, then 17 years of age, was a delinquent child in that on or about March 20, 1983, he "did purposely cause the death of Barbara Lynn Twyman," in violation of R.C. 2903.02 and R.C. 2151.02. On April 7, 1983, the State moved for a Juv.R. 30 hearing to determine the appropriateness of transferring the case from the juvenile division to the general division of the Court of Common Pleas. On April 13, 1983, the juvenile court held a Crim.R. 30(A) preliminary hearing to determine if there was probable cause to believe that appellant committed the murder. On April 14, 1983, the juvenile court made a journal entry stating that there was probable cause to believe that appellant committed the murder and ordered the matter continued for a mental and physical examination of appellant and a report on appellant's social history.

On May 2, 1983, a hearing was held pursuant to Juv.R. 30(B) to determine whether to transfer jurisdiction. The physical examination revealed no serious medical problems for appellant other than a birth defect identified as a sunken chest; appellant's probation officer's social history report revealed that in the 1983 school year, his grades and attendance had dropped and that he only had one minor traffic offense prior to the charge in the case at bar.

A psychological evaluation of appellant found no significant problem and found nothing mentally wrong with appellant which would require treatment; Dr. Albrecht determined that the "entire issue of "need for treatment' or the ability to profit from facilities would have to be evaluated in terms of the kind of setting which might be provided." At the hearing's conclusion, the juvenile court held that there were reasonable grounds to believe that appellant was not amenable to care or rehabilitation and that the safety of the community required that appellant be placed under legal restraint for a period extending beyond appellant's majority, and thus relinquished jurisdiction to the general division of the Court of Common Pleas. On the same date, appellant was released from custody upon posting of his bond.

On May 16, 1983, an indictment was returned by the Gallia County, Ohio Grand Jury charging appellant with murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.02. On May 19, 1983, appellant was arraigned on the indictment and he entered a plea of not guilty. On July 21, 1983, appellant filed a demand for discovery. On August 18, 1983, the State filed a response to appellant's demand for discovery, stating that " evidence may be viewed at the Prosecuting Attorney's office on August 22, 1983, between the hours of 9:00 A.M. and 4:00 P.M.." On August 23, 1983, appellant filed an acknowledgement of observation of the state's physical evidence, including a .22 pistol, two vials with .22 caliber bullets, and a box of such bullets.

On September 6, 1983, appellant filed a motion for exculpatory information that included the following:

"4.If no fingerprints of Charles Lee were found on the gun which is alleged to be the murder weapon, that would be exculpatory."

Also on September 6, 1983, appellee filed a supplemental response to appellant's demand for discovery which listed a number of tape recorded conversations between appellant and Shirley Furst wherein appellant made a number of incriminating statements; appellant filed a motion in limine to exclude any testimony of the decedent, Barbara Twyman, with her mother and/or father in that such conversation would constitute hearsay. On September 12, 1983, appellant filed a motion to suppress all tape recorded statements made of conversations between Shirley Furst and him on the grounds that they were illegally obtained, denied counsel at an essential stage of the proceeding, were obtained by someone acting on behalf of the state without advising him of his constitutional rights, and/or were obtained by the promise of reward.

On September 13, 1983, the state filed a response to appellant's motion for exculpatory information, stating in response to appellant's fingerprint inquiry that:

"Defense counsel has the ballistics report and can draw his own conclusion from said report. Counsel for the state need not prepare this case and the defense case as well."

On September 14, 1983, appellant moved to require more specific answers with regard to the state's September 13 response, but did not list the fingerprint inquiry as one to which a more specific state response was required. On the same date, appellant filed a supplement to his motion to suppress certain tape recordings to include testimony of witnesses as to what they heard in any conversations between Shirley Furst and appellant.

On September 19, 1983, a hearing on appellant's motion to suppress and supplement thereto was held. At the conclusion of this hearing, the court determined that a tape of conversations between Shirley Furst and appellant at a motel along with police testimony overhearing those conversations would be suppressed in that the tape was...