State v. Chastain

• Decision Date: 23 February 1910
• Citation: 67 S.E. 6,85 S.C. 64
• Parties: STATE v. CHASTAIN.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

67 S.E. 6

85 S.C. 64

STATE v. CHASTAIN.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

February 23, 1910

Appeal from General Sessions Circuit Court of Greenville County Chas. G. Dantzler, Judge.

Robert Chastain was convicted of manslaughter, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Martin & Earle, for appellant. Proctor A. Bonham, for the State.

GARY A. J.

Under an indictment charging the defendant with murder, the jury rendered a verdict of manslaughter, and he was sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of eight years. The defendant made a motion for a new trial upon grounds hereinafter set out in his exceptions, which was refused. He then appealed upon the following exceptions:

(1) "The presiding judge erred in refusing defendant's motion for a new trial. Specifications: (a) Verdict was clearly against the weight of testimony. (b) Jury disregarded charge that defendant had a right to interfere in behalf of one seriously assaulted. (c) Error in charging law of self-defense: (1) In failing to charge that one dangerously assaulted need not at his peril attempt to retreat; (2) and in charging only the first three elements of such plea."

(2) "The presiding judge erred in charging the law of self-defense. Specifications of error: (1st) In failing to charge that one in imminent danger is not required to retreat unless there is a probable means of escape. (2d) In charging as follows: 'And three essential elements constitute self-defense'--whereas, it is submitted that 'if defendant has no other probable means of escape' is an essential element in the law of self-defense, and should have been charged."

(3) "The presiding judge erred in charging law as to manslaughter, there being no evidence making such charge relevant."

(4) "The presiding judge erred in charging law as to manslaughter, in that he failed to charge (1st) that it was the taking of the life of another in sudden heat and passion upon a sufficient legal provocation; (2d) in charging substantially that the only difference between murder and manslaughter was that in murder malice existed, and in manslaughter malice was absent."

The appellant's attorneys argued the exceptions under three heads:

(1) "That the jury disregarded the judge's charge that one had a right to interfere in behalf of another dangerously assaulted."

The exception fails to specify in what particulars the jury disregarded the judge's charge, in this respect. But waiving such objection, we are unable to discover any testimony from which such inference can reasonably be drawn. The exception raising this question is overruled.

(2) "That the circuit judge erred in declaring the law as to manslaughter, in that he failed to charge the jury that it was the killing in sudden heat and passion on sufficient legal provocation, and instructing the jury that the only difference between murder and manslaughter was that malice was present in murder, and absent in manslaughter."

Manslaughter as defined in section 120 of the Criminal Code, is the unlawful killing of another without malice, expressed or implied. His honor, the presiding judge, charged the jury that there were two forms of felonious homicide--murder and manslaughter--and, after defining murder, said to the jury: "Manslaughter is the other form of felonious homicide, and it is the unlawful killing of another without malice aforethought, either expressed or implied." If the appellant desired a further definition of manslaughter, it was his duty to present requests embodying such proposition. State v. Adams, 68 S.C. 421, 47 S.E. 676; Jennings v. Mfg. Co., 72 S.C. 411, 52 S.E. 113; Williams v. Railway, 76 S.C. 1, 56 S.E. 652; State v. Thompson, 76 S.C. 116, 56 S.E. 789; Snipes v. Railway, 76 S.C. 208, 56 S.E. 959; Morrison v. Ass'n, 78 S.C. 398, 59 S.E. 27. This exception is overruled.

(3) "That the circuit judge erred in charging the...