State v. Chavis
| Decision Date | 06 November 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 19719,19719 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | The STATE, Appellant, v. William Edison CHAVIS, Respondent. |
Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod, and Asst. Atty. Gen. Hutson, S. Davis, Jr., Columbia, for appellant.
William O. Kneece, Columbia, for respondent.
This is an appeal from an order of the Honorable John A. Mason, Judge, Richland County Court, dated May 7, 1973, ordering the South Carolina Highway Department to reinstate the motor vehicle driver's license of the respondent, which had previously been suspended by the Department.
Respondent Chavis was arrested by a Columbia City policeman on December 1, 1971, and charged with the violation of Sec. 46--343 of the 1962 Code of Laws of South Carolina (). Chavis refused to submit to a breathalyzer test and his trial was set for December 14, 1971, but was continued until March 7, 1972, at least inferentially on the motion of Chavis. On the latter date, he was tried and convicted by a jury before a municipal judge of the City of Columbia.
Due to reasons or circumstances not at all mentioned or explained in the record, the South Carolina Highway Department was not notified of either Chavis' refusal to submit to the breathalyzer test or his conviction until on or about February 1, 1973. Upon receipt of notice that he had refused to submit to the breathalyzer test, the Department notified him on February 8, 1973, that his license would be suspended for a period beginning February 8, 1973 and ending May 8, 1973, in compliance with Sec. 46--344(d), supplement to the 1962 Code of Laws of South Carolina, for failure to submit to the breathalyzer test. Following receipt of notice of respondent's conviction of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the Department on February 22, 1973, notified him that his driver's license would be suspended for a further period beginning May 8, 1973 and ending November 8, 1973, in compliance with the provisions of Sec. 46--348 of the Code.
Approximately two months after Chavis received his first notice of suspension, this proceeding was commenced on April 9, 1973, when Judge Mason issued a rule to show cause why Chavis' driver's license should not be returned to him along with restoration of full driving privileges. By agreement of counsel the case was submitted on the record without argument, and, on May 7, 1973, Judge Mason issued the order now appealed from.
The above related facts are all gleaned from the agreed statement of the case, the record before us containing no pleadings, no exhibits, and no other evidence. The order of Judge Mason contains no additional facts and was predicated upon his conclusions that the length of time elapsing between Chavis' refusal and conviction and the subsequent suspensions was unreasonable; that the Department was, therefore, estopped from effecting the suspensions; and that under the circumstances, the suspensions violated basic fairness and, therefore, the due process of law provisions of both State and Federal Constitutions.
It should be noted at the outset that there is no contention or suggestion that there was any reasonable delay on the part of the South Carolina Highway Department once it received the appropriate notices, and no other suggestion of any improper conduct on the part of the Department itself. The parties responsible for the delays in sending the notices to the Department are not parties to this proceeding and the record contains no evidence as to the circumstances occasioning the delay. The record is devoid of any evidence tending to give rise to an inference of any prejudice to Chavis from the delay of the local officials in reporting to the Highway Department. Chavis was himself charged with knowledge of the law, and that thereunder his license was required to be suspended. There is nothing in the record to suggest that he sought, wished or desired to have the suspensions promptly ordered so that he could get them behind him. For aught the record shows, he simply kept quiet and continued...
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City of Myrtle Beach v. Juel P. Corp.
...however, does not work an estoppel against the Department's enforcement of the Highway Advertising Control Act. See State v. Chavis, 261 S.C. 408, 200 S.E.2d 390 (1973) (the State held not estopped to suspend the driver's license of a defendant convicted of driving under the influence becau......
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Board of Physician v. Mullan
...four months after conviction, while dilatory and not forthwith, was valid, absent some showing of prejudice); State v. Chavis, 261 S.C. 408, 200 S.E.2d 390, 392 (1973) (noting that when "there is nothing other than an unexplained delay on the part of the reporting officials, unaccompanied b......
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Flowers v. South Carolina Dept. of Highways and Public Transp.
...however, does not work an estoppel against the Department's enforcement of the Highway Advertising Control Act. See State v. Chavis, 261 S.C. 408, 200 S.E.2d 390 (1973) (the State held not estopped to suspend the driver's license of a defendant convicted of driving under the influence becau......
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Wilson v. S.C. Dep't of Motor Vehicles
...DUI and the suspension of his driver's license by the highway department immediately upon learning of the conviction. 261 S.C. 408, 409–11, 200 S.E.2d 390, 390–91 (1973). Specifically, the court noted there was no inference or indication in the record that Chavis suffered any prejudice as a......