State v. Chenoweth

• Decision Date: 22 June 2015
• Docket Number: No. 71520–8–I.,71520–8–I.
• Citation: 354 P.3d 13,188 Wash.App. 521
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Chad Curtis CHENOWETH, Appellant.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

188 Wash.App. 521

354 P.3d 13

STATE of Washington, Respondent

v.Chad Curtis CHENOWETH, Appellant.

No. 71520–8–I.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.

June 22, 2015.

Oliver Ross Davis, Washington Appellate Project, Seattle, WA, Chad Curtis Chenoweth, (Appearing Pro Se), Walla Walla, WA, for Appellant.

Skagit County Prosecuting Atty., Erik Pedersen, Attorney at Law, Mount Vernon, WA, for Respondent.

Opinion

VERELLEN, A.C.J.

¶ 1 Chad Chenoweth appeals his conviction for first degree incest committed against his son, who was 19 years old at the time. He contends that the trial court erred by admitting his wife's testimony in violation of the spousal privilege, admitting hearsay testimony about the son's disclosures, and instructing the jury that corroboration of the son's testimony was not required. Because the statutory exception to the spousal privilege for criminal proceedings involving “any child” of the spouses is not limited to minor children, the trial court properly admitted the wife's testimony. And because the son's disclosures were not offered for the truth of the disclosures but to show context for the investigation, this evidence was properly admitted. Finally, the court's instruction on noncorroboration was a correct statement of the law and did not amount to a comment on the evidence. Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTS

¶ 2 Jainni and Chad Chenoweth married in 1991. Jainni¹ already had a daughter at the time. She and Chenoweth then had a son, C.C., who was born in Washington in January 1992. After C.C. was born, the family moved to Idaho.

¶ 3 Jainni described C.C. as disabled and mentally slow. C.C. was placed in a special education program at school. He also attended counseling and was on medication for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder for a period of time.

¶ 4 When C.C. was 12, he was placed in a state school and hospital in Idaho for individuals with mental disorders. C.C. remained in that placement until age 18.

¶ 5 When C.C. was about 16 or 17, Jainni moved back to Washington. In 2010, C.C. moved in with Jainni and Chenoweth in Bow, Washington. C.C. stayed in a downstairs room and spent most of his time playing video games. He could not cook for himself and had to be reminded to shower and dress properly. He was unable to hold a job and received SSI benefits.

¶ 6 Chenoweth was working at an auto repair shop in Marysville at the time. In October 2011, Jainni was hospitalized for a few days and Chenoweth cared for C.C. In April 2012, Chenoweth moved out of the home but remained married to Jainni. In late summer 2012, C.C. also moved out to live with his sister.

¶ 7 Soon after he moved out, C.C. disclosed to Jainni that Chenoweth had raped him while she was hospitalized in October 2011 and he was in Chenoweth's care. C.C. told his mother that one day while he was playing video games at the house, Chenoweth came into the room, put C.C. face down on the bed and anally raped him. C.C. was 19 years old at the time. C.C. did not report the incident to anyone until he disclosed it to Jainni.

¶ 8 After the disclosure, Jainni advised C.C. to contact Adult Protective Services. Following a mental health evaluation, Adult Protective services referred C.C.'s case to the police and assigned him a social worker. A deputy from the county sheriff's office took the initial report from C.C., and the social worker interviewed C.C. about the incident. The social worker determined that C.C. was a vulnerable adult.

¶ 9 The State ultimately charged Chenoweth with one count of third degree rape by lack of consent and one count of first degree incest. The State also sought an exceptional sentence.

¶ 10 The case proceeded to trial and the jury heard testimony from C.C., his mother, his sister, the investigating deputy, the social worker, and the mental health assessor. Chenoweth did not testify. At the close of evidence, the court dismissed the third degree rape charge for insufficient evidence of lack of consent. The jury found Chenoweth guilty of first degree incest. The jury also returned special verdicts finding that Chenoweth knew or should have known C.C. was particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistance and that Chenoweth used his position of trust to facilitate commission of the crime. The court sentenced Chenoweth to 102 months, the top of the standard range.

¶ 11 Chenoweth appeals.

DISCUSSION

Spousal Privilege

¶ 12 Chenoweth contends that the trial court's admission of Jainni's testimony violated the spousal privilege. Chenoweth argues that because C.C. was not a minor, the exception to the privilege for proceedings involving a crime committed against “any child” of either spouse did not apply. We disagree.

¶ 13 Testimonial privileges are creatures of statute and should be strictly construed.² The spousal privilege statute is designed to encourage marital harmony.³ The statute both limits the competence of a spouse of a party to testify and provides a privilege for confidential communications between spouses.⁴ One exception is for testimony in “a criminal action or proceeding for a crime committed by said spouse or domestic partner against any child of whom said spouse or domestic partner is the parent or guardian.”⁵

¶ 14 Here, Jainni testified that C.C. told her about the alleged rape approximately a year after it occurred. She also confirmed that she was hospitalized during the time the rape allegedly occurred. Jainni did not testify about what C.C. disclosed. She only testified to the fact that he disclosed “the allegations” and that his demeanor was “[k]ind of down” during the disclosure.⁶

¶ 15 Chenoweth moved in limine to exclude Jainni's testimony, contending that “child,” as used in the exception to the spousal privilege, includes only minor children and did not apply to C.C., who was over age 18 at the time of the crime. The trial court disagreed, acknowledging that “there is no case law involving an adult child in this specific application,” and noting that its ruling was “based on an interpretation that the child is not limited to someone under the age of 18 in this particular language.”⁷

¶ 16 “Child” is not defined in chapter 5.60 RCW, which provides for the spousal privilege. And, as the parties acknowledge, there is no case law addressing whether “child” as used in Washington's spousal privilege statute is limited to minors. Chenoweth points to RCW 9A.42.010(3), which defines “child” as “a person under eighteen years of age.” But that definition applies “[a]s used in this chapter,” i.e., chapter 9A.42, “Criminal Mistreatment.”⁸ There is no other definition of “child” in Title 9A, the Washington criminal code. The definitions for sex offenses in chapter 9A.44 RCW do not define “child.” Rather, sex offenses that relate to child victims specify a particular age of the victim.⁹ The incest statute under which Chenoweth was charged, RCW 9A.64.020, does not use the term “child.” It defines the offense as one involving a victim who is related to the perpetrator “as an ancestor, descendant, brother, or sister.”¹⁰

¶ 17 The interpretation of a statute is a question of law reviewed de novo.¹¹

Courts first examine the language of the statute and determine the plain meaning “from the ordinary meaning of the language at issue, the context of the statute in which that provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole.”¹² Statutes must be interpreted to give effect to all language used, rendering no portion meaningless or superfluous.¹³

¶ 18 Here, viewed in context, RCW 5.60.060 evidences an intent that “any child” in section (1) is not limited to minors because “minor child” is specified elsewhere in the statute. Section (2)(b) specifically refers to a “minor child”: “A parent or guardian of a minor child arrested on a criminal charge may not be examined as to a communication between the child and his or her attorney if the communication was made in the presence of the parent or guardian.” Because the legislature saw the need to specifically use the term “minor child” in section 2(b), it would be inconsistent to conclude that the legislature meant the term “child” in section (1) to mean the same thing. Such a reading would render the term “minor” in section (2)(b) superfluous.¹⁴

¶ 19 Chenoweth contends that the dictionary definition supports his interpretation of “child” in section (1) to apply only to minors. “When a statutory term is undefined, the words of a statute are given their ordinary meaning, and the court may look to a dictionary for such meaning.¹⁵ Black's Law Dictionary provides multiple definitions of “child,” some in terms of age—“under the age of majority,” “not reached the age of 14,” “a young person,” “baby or fetus”—and others in terms of a family relationship—“son or daughter.”¹⁶ Chenoweth cites Black's Law Dictionary online, which also recognizes these two meanings of “child” in law:

(1) In the law of the domestic relations, and as to descent and distribution, it is used strictly as the correlative of “parent,” and means a son or daughter considered as in relation with the father or mother. (2) In the law of negligence, and in laws for the protection of children, etc., it is used as the ... opposite of “adult,” and means the young of the human species, (generally under the age of puberty,) without any reference to parentage and without distinction of sex.^{[ 17 ]}

¶ 20 Chenoweth contends that “child” as used in the exception to the spousal privilege statute relates to laws for the protection of children, citing case law recognizing that this exception seeks to protect against child abuse.¹⁸ Therefore, he argues, the second definition of “child” applies, i.e., the opposite of adult, or a minor.

¶ 21 While the cases cited by Chenoweth recognize that the exception to the privilege promotes the protection of children from abuse, those cases all involved minor children and do not specifically address any age limit for a “child” in such contexts.¹⁹ Nor do they limit the exception to...