State v. Chenoweth
| Citation | 158 P.3d 595,160 Wn.2d 454 |
| Decision Date | 24 May 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 77615-6.,77615-6. |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Randal Lee CHENOWETH and Barbara Joyce Wood, Petitioners. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Washington |
Oliver Ross Davis, Washington Appellate Project, David Bruce Koch, Nielson Broman & Koch PLLC, Jennifer L. Dobson, Seattle, WA, for Petitioner.
Kimberly Anne Thulin, Whatcom County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, Philip James Buri, Buri Funston Mumford PLLC, James T. Hulbert, Hilary A. Thomas, Whatcom County Prosecutor's Office, Bellingham, WA, for Respondent.
¶ 1 The State obtained a telephonic search warrant based on an informant's uncorroborated tip that Randal L. Chenoweth was operating a methamphetamine lab on his property. Chenoweth and his codefendant, Barbara J. Wood, challenged the validity of the search warrant, contending that the State omitted material facts concerning the informant's background in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution. The trial court denied the suppression motion after finding that the warrant affiants did not recklessly or intentionally fail to disclose the information. On appeal, Chenoweth and Wood argued that a search warrant is invalid under article I, section 7 if an affiant negligently fails to disclose material facts to the issuing magistrate. They further argued that the trial court's finding regarding recklessness is not supported by the record and that the search warrant is facially invalid because the supporting affidavit lacked adequate indicia of the informant's reliability. The Court of Appeals rejected each contention. We affirm the Court of Appeals.
¶ 2 On February 5, 2003, Nicholas Parker called the Lynden Police Department and reported that Randy Chenoweth was operating a methamphetamine lab at a specific address in Lynden. The tip was relayed to Whatcom Interagency Narcotic Detective Ryan King of the Blaine Police Department, who then contacted Parker. Parker gave King his full name and address and agreed to come to the police department for an interview. Based on the information Parker gave during the interview, King sought and obtained a telephonic search warrant with the assistance of Whatcom County prosecutor Rosemary Kaholokula.
¶ 3 After the magistrate placed King under oath, the prosecutor elicited information from him through a series of questions. The prosecutor asked King to relate what he knew of Parker's criminal history. King said that Parker told him he had spent a year and a day in prison for unlawful possession of cocaine and delivery of a controlled substance. The prosecutor then asked King whether he had verified the information through a criminal records check. King replied that he had not.
¶ 4 King also told the magistrate that Parker said he went to Chenoweth's property earlier that day to try to get his car back. Chenoweth refused to return the car and ordered Parker off the premises. During the visit, Parker went inside the garage and saw various chemicals and equipment that he recognized as components of a methamphetamine lab, including glass flasks containing liquids, ephedrine, canning jars, red phosphorous, tincture of iodine, acetone, coffee filters, Red Devil lye, Drâno, a gas generator, a bottle with a hose, coffee filters, and kerosene.
¶ 5 Parker said that during earlier visits to the property Chenoweth admitted to making methamphetamine in the garage, that he had watched Chenoweth make methamphetamine and actually assisted him by handing him chemicals and equipment, and that Chenoweth gave him and Wood some methamphetamine while he was at the house three or four days earlier.
¶ 6 In concluding, the prosecutor said, "Your Honor, the only thing I would add is that as far as Mr. Parker's criminal history, although Officer King hasn't verified what he said, I can tell the court that I was the prosecutor on that prior criminal case and so I know that to be accurate that he was convicted of a delivery of a drug." Suppl. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 254. The magistrate asked her to swear to the accuracy of that information, and she replied, "I do, I don't remember the time he served, although I do remember that he went to prison for it." CP at 254.
¶ 7 The commissioner issued the search warrant. The next day, the prosecutor sought and obtained an addendum to the search warrant. She stated, "I would just like to put on the record that I had confirmed Nicholas Parker's criminal history from what I recalled yesterday and further thought I would like to ask if the Commissioner would have found probable cause in the absence of that statement." The prosecutor explained that she wanted to avoid being a witness in a proceeding to challenge the warrant. The commissioner replied that Parker's admission of a criminal conviction was somewhat "self-authenticated" because "there is no reason to say that you have a criminal record unless you do," making the prosecutor's confirmation of that record superfluous. CP at 257.
¶ 8 Based on evidence obtained during the searches, the State charged Chenoweth and Wood with possession of precursor materials with intent to manufacture methamphetamine1 and unlawful manufacture of methamphetamine.2 The State also charged Chenoweth with two counts of possession of a controlled substance3 and Wood with one count possession of a controlled substance.
¶ 9 Chenoweth and Wood moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that King and Kaholokula recklessly and/or intentionally omitted facts about Parker's background that would have precluded the magistrate's determination of probable cause, including: (1) Parker's criminal history included several crimes of dishonesty, (2) Parker had been a paid informant for the Bellingham police department, but his contract was terminated because of concerns about his reliability, (3) four years previously, Kaholokula charged Parker with intimidating a witness, (4) two years previously, Kaholokula was aware that Parker made unsubstantiated allegations that his attorney accepted cocaine as payment for his defense, (5) Parker was motivated by revenge in that he was angry with Chenoweth for failing to return his car, (6) Parker was motivated by self-interest in that he expected the police to help him retrieve his car, (7) Parker provided the information in the expectation that the police would pay him. In the alternative, Wood argued that the search warrant is invalid under our state constitution even if the omissions resulted from negligent rather than reckless or intentional conduct.
¶ 10 The trial court held several hearings to explore the defendants' allegations. Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) (Apr. 2, 2003); VRP (May 12, 2003); VRP (May 14, 2003); VRP (June 5, 2003). Following these hearings, the trial court concluded that the omitted facts would have negated probable cause.4 However, the trial court concluded that the defendants failed to carry their burden of proving that King or Kaholokula recklessly failed to disclose the full extent of Parker's criminal history or his unsuccessful career as a paid informant to the issuing magistrate. The trial court also concluded that Parker was acting as a citizen informant when he informed the police about the methamphetamine lab. Accordingly, the trial court denied the suppression motion.
¶ 11 Chenoweth and Wood appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions in all respects pertinent here.5 State v. Chenoweth, 127 Wash.App. 444, 111 P.3d 1217 (2005). We granted review at 156 Wash.2d 1031, 134 P.3d 232 (2006).
¶ 12 The first question we must answer is whether a warrant is valid under article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution when a warrant affiant negligently fails to disclose facts that, if known, would have negated a probable cause determination. The construction of our state constitution is a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Norman, 145 Wash.2d 578, 589, 40 P.3d 1161 (2002).
¶ 13 Under the Fourth Amendment, factual inaccuracies or omissions in a warrant affidavit may invalidate the warrant if the defendant establishes that they are (a) material and (b) made in reckless disregard for the truth. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978); State v. Cord, 103 Wash.2d 361, 366-67, 693 P.2d 81 (1985). A showing of mere negligence or inadvertence is insufficient. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171, 98 S.Ct. 2674; State v. Seagull, 95 Wash.2d 898, 908, 632 P.2d 44 (1981). Wood contends that a negligence standard is required to protect the privacy interests guaranteed by the state constitution, rather than the reckless or intentional standard for material omissions required to invalidate a warrant under the Fourth Amendment.6
¶ 14 It is well established that article I, section 7 qualitatively differs from the Fourth Amendment and in some areas provides greater protections than does the federal constitution.7 State v. McKinney, 148 Wash.2d 20, 29, 60 P.3d 46 (2002). Thus, a Gunwall8 analysis is unnecessary to establish that this court should undertake an independent state constitutional analysis. State v. Jackson, 150 Wash.2d 251, 259, 76 P.3d 217 (2003).
¶ 15 In determining the protections of article I, section 7 in a particular context, "the focus is on whether the unique characteristics of the state constitutional provision and its prior interpretations actually compel a particular result." City of Seattle v. McCready, 123 Wash.2d 260, 267, 868 P.2d 134 (1994). This involves an examination of the constitutional text, the historical treatment of the interest at stake as reflected in relevant case law and statutes, and the current implications of recognizing or not recognizing an interest. State v. Walker, 157 Wash.2d 307, 317, 138 P.3d 113 (2006). An analysis under article I, section 7 consists of...
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... ... Thus, a Gunwall analysis is no longer necessary ... ¶ 20 The question instead is whether our state constitution precludes admission of the 911 tape. Construction of the state constitution is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. State v. Chenoweth, 160 Wash.2d 454, 462, 158 P.3d 595 (2007). In determining the meaning of a state constitutional provision, the "`focus is on whether the unique characteristics of the state constitutional provision and its prior interpretations actually compel a particular result.'" Id. at 463, 158 P.3d 595 ... ...