State v. Chi., M. & St. P. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 06 April 1911
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. CO.

152 Iowa 317

130 N.W. 802

STATE

v.CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 6, 1911.

Appeal from District Court, Polk County; Hugh Brennan, Judge.

Action in equity to require the defendant company to obey an order of the Railroad Commissioners of the State. The defendant appeals from a judgment for the plaintiff. Affirmed.William Ellis and Cook, Hughes & Sutherland, for appellant.

H. W. Byers, Atty. Gen., and George Cosson, for the State.

SHERWIN, C. J.

The controlling facts in this case are as follows: The Clark Coal & Coke Company and other companies doing a wholesale coal business in Davenport, Iowa, had for a number of years shipped coal from points in Illinois to themselves as consignees at Davenport, and, upon receipt of orders for said coal, they would pay the freight charges of the initial carrier in full, have the cars of coal placed on the interchange track, and thereafter tender a written billing for said coal to the defendant company to be shipped to various points in Iowa under the Iowa distance tariff. The defendant company finally refused to receive said coal under such billing, unless the same was unloaded and reloaded in its own equipment. Complaint was thereupon made to the Board of Railroad Commissioners of the State, and upon a hearing an order was made requiring the defendant to accept said coal for transportation in whatever equipment loaded without requiring a reloading in its own equipment. The defendant railway company refused to comply with the order of the commissioners, and this action was thereupon brought to compel compliance therewith. The defendant answered the petition and also filed a cross-petition asking that the said order of the Board of Railroad Commissioners be set aside; the substance of the answer and the cross-petition being that the order was an attempt on the part of the board to regulate commerce between the several states, that it relates to shipments between the states and not to a shipment originating within the state of Iowa, and further alleging that the Board of Railroad Commissioners was and is without authority to make said order because it is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution of the United States.

It was also alleged that the board was without authority to require the defendant to accept the cars mentioned and contemplated by said order, because the statutes of the state only require it to accept cars from the connecting carrier itself, and not from an individual or private person not operating a line of railway. It should first be determined whether, under the facts presented, the shipment tendered to the defendant was an interstate shipment. That the shipment from Illinois to Davenport was such a shipment is unquestioned, but it does not necessarily follow that the shipment tendered to the defendant was merely a continuation of such interstate shipment. There could be an ending of its interstate character by a delivery to the consignee, and thereafter its transportation over the defendant's road from Davenport to some other point within the state would be an intrastate shipment only, so that the primary question for determination is whether there was, in fact, a delivery by the initial carrier to the consignees in Davenport. [1] The agreed statement of facts shows that the coal was originally consigned to the coal companies in Davenport; that it was held there until sales of the same were made, and that then the consignee paid the freight to the initial carrier, and had the cars placed on the interchange track for the purpose of shipping the coal to the purchasers thereof on the line of the defendant's road. The initial carrier had thus surrendered all control over the cars, and the consignees had themselves assumed full possession and control over them. The responsibility of the carrier was ended by these acts of the consignees, and thereafter they assumed the risks incident to their possession. We are of the opinion that there was a delivery of the coal to the consignees in Davenport, and that its transportation under another billing governed by the Iowa distance tariff between two points in the state is not an interstate shipment, but is an intrastate one that is subject to the laws of the state. The case of Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Texas, 204 U. S. 403, 27 Sup. Ct. 360, 51 L. Ed. 540, is directly in point, and is decisive of the question. See, also, Merchants' Transfer Co. v. Board of Review, 128 Iowa, 732, 105 N. W. 211, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 662, and cases cited therein.

The appellant contends that the decision in R. Co. v. Texas is not controlling here, because there the carrier accepted the shipment, but it is clear that the carrier cannot fix the character of a shipment by its act of accepting or rejecting it. The cases relied upon by the appellant to sustain...