State v. Chi., R. I. & P. R. Co.
| Decision Date | 20 March 1901 |
| Citation | 85 N.W. 556,61 Neb. 545 |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE v. CHICAGO, R. I. & P. R. CO. |
1. An injunction issued by the circuit court of the United States cannot lawfully forbid the attorney general from suing for penalties claimed by the state under section 9 of the maximum freight law (chapter 72, art. 12, Comp. St. 1899).
2. It is a maxim of general jurisprudence that a party is not concluded by a judgment or decree rendered in an action to which he was not a party.
3. The judicial power of the United States does not extend to actions brought by individuals or corporations against a state.
4. A party is not released from his obligation to A. because B. has, by injunction on otherwise, prevented him from performing that obligation.
Action by the state against the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Company. Motion for judgment denied.The Attorney General, for the State.
Woolworth & McHugh, M. A. Low, and W. F. Evans, for defendant.
This is an action instituted in this court by the state to recover of the defendant company certain penalties claimed to be due under the act of 1893 known as the “Maximum Freight Law.” The defendant answered, alleging that the attorney general had been enjoined by the circuit court of the United States for the district of Nebraska from commencing or prosecuting any action under the provisions of said law. This allegation was constructively admitted, and thereupon the defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings. The motion was submitted on the 5th inst., and taken under advisement. We have given the question in controversy considerable attention, and we are all of opinion that the application for judgment should be denied. The preliminary order of the federal court is binding only on the parties to the action in which it was issued. To the extent that it assumes to forbid the institution and prosecution of actions like the present one, it is utterly and absolutely null. The judicial power of the United States does not extend to any suit in law or equity brought either by a natural person or a corporation against a state. The circuit court was therefore without power or authority to enjoin the state, either directly or indirectly, from suing in its corporate capacity to recover a sum of money claimed to be due it as penalties under the maximum freight law. It is not only an unquestioned rule of the common law, but a maxim of general jurisprudence, that no one is concluded by a judgment or decree rendered in a case to which he was not a party. The state, in its corporate character, had no interest whatever in the suit in the federal court; and consequently the provisional injunction was ineffectualas to it, and equally ineffectual as to the attorney general and other officers or agents through which it must necessarily act in asserting its rights in courts of justice. The attorney general was not enjoined on the theory that he was acting as the agent of the state, but on the theory that he was acting without lawful authority from any source; that in attempting to enforce, for the benefit of the general public, the schedule of charges prescribed by the act of 1893, he was proceeding under color of an unconstitutional law, and was therefore individually liable as a wrongdoer. The writ operated upon him personally, and not upon him as an organ of the state. The eleventh amendment to the federal constitution would be effectually emasculated if it were permissible to enjoin or coerce the...
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- State v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company
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Wemmer v. Young
...of the parties to that case. What was decided or adjudicated in that case did not affect or bind appellant. State v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 61 Neb. 545, 85 N.W. 556, stated on this subject: 'It is a maxim of general jurisprudence that a party is not concluded by a judgment or decree r......