State v. Chicago, R. I. & G. Ry. Co.

Decision Date28 June 1924
Docket Number(No. 552-3843.)
PartiesSTATE et al. v. CHICAGO, R. I. & G. RY. CO.
CourtTexas Supreme Court

Action by the State of Texas and another against the Chicago Rock Island & Gulf Railway Company. From a judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals (241 S. W. 255) reversing a judgment for plaintiffs, they bring error. Affirmed.

Ike A. Wynn, of Fort Worth, for plaintiffs in error.

Lassiter & Harrison, of Fort Worth, for defendant in error.

CHAPMAN, J.

During the years 1911 to 1914, inclusive, defendant in error owned two and three-tenths miles of railroad within improvement district No. 1 in Tarrant county. During each of these years this property was rendered and assessed for taxes in the manner prescribed by law at a valuation of $28,950 for 1911 to 1913, inclusive, and $29,200 for 1914, and valuation of said property during each of said years was passed on by the board of equalization of Tarrant county, and approved, and in each of said years the board of commissioners of said improvement district appeared before the equalization board and made all necessary protest against the value placed on said property, but the board refused to heed such protests. The taxes, based on the valuation made by the board of equalization, were promptly paid each year. Said renditions and assessments were made, and the taxes paid thereon on the ratio of the value of the railroad mileage in the said improvement district bore to the value of its entire mileage in Tarrant county. Considering the appellant's mileage in said improvement district by itself and separately, it appears more valuable than the mileage in other parts of Tarrant county, by reason of the fact that there was 57 acres of land owned by appellant on which were located railway yards, roundhouses, numerous switches and sidings, buildings, improvements, and terminal facilities. There is no claim that the railway company, under the provisions of article 7524, Revised Civil Statutes, did not render for taxes each year, all its property in said improvement district.

For a further statement of the case we take this from the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals. It appears that on November 7, 1914, the Fort Worth improvement district No. 1 instituted suit in the district court against the county commissioners' court, the board of equalization and the members thereof, and the tax assessor of Tarrant county, seeking to set aside and declare invalid the valuation and assessments made and approved by the commissioners' court as a board of equalization of appellant's railway within the improvement district made for the years 1911 to 1914, inclusive, and to compel, by writ of mandamus, the said officers to proceed to assess and value all of appellant's property within the improvement district at another and different proportionate value. The petition in that suit alleged that the assessments for the several years were incorrect and invalid; that they were unreasonably and unconscionably less than the true and full value of said property; and that the assessments were arbitrarily and knowingly made at about one-sixth of the true value of the property within the improvement district; and that the assessments were fraudulently made. Upon a hearing of that cause the district court entered the following decree (omitting formal parts):

"It appearing to the court that in making the assessment of the property described in plaintiffs' first amended original petition for the years 1911, 1912, 1913, and 1914, the entire main track mileage of said railway company within the county of Tarrant, including that outside the levee district was considered, and a valuation of so much per mile of the main track within the levee district was arrived at by considering the entire main track mileage within the county as done for county purposes; and it further appearing that such action was arbitrary and resulted in a valuation far less than the true and full value of the property, and in an assessment far less than the proportionate value at which the other property within said district was assessed, and, it further appearing that such arbitrary action and assessment constitute a fraud upon plaintiff's right and deprives it of taxes which it is entitled to collect, it is considered by the court that as to the taxes which it is entitled to collect, it is considered by the court that as to the taxes for the years 1911, 1912, 1913, and 1914 the said plaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed for, and that the assessments for said taxes are invalid and should be set aside.

"It is therefore ordered, adjudged, and decreed by the court that the assessments made upon the property of the Chicago, Rock Island & Gulf Railway Company, within Fort Worth improvement district No. 1, for levee purposes, for the years 1911, 1912, 1913, and 1914, are hereby declared to be invalid, of no force and effect, and are hereby set aside.

"It is further adjudged and decreed by the court that a writ of mandamus issue against the defendants herein, in accordance with law, as prayed for in plaintiff's first amended original petition, directing the said defendants, the board of equalization, Jesse M. Brown, county judge of Tarrant county, R. E. Duringer, H. R. Wall, Olin Gibbins and R. Snow, composing the board of equalization and the assessor of taxes of said Tarrant county, Tex., to proceed to assess at the same proportion of its real and true value as the assessments of other property within said district have been made for the years 1911, 1912, 1913, and 1914 for levee purposes, all the property of the Chicago, Rock Island & Gulf Railway Company located within Fort Worth improvement district No. 1, in Tarrant county, and described in plaintiff's first amended original petition, and further directing each of said defendants to perform his respective duties imposed by law in making said assessments."

The defendants in that particular suit filed a motion for new trial, but the same was overruled, and no further step was taken to appeal. Thereafter a writ of mandamus was duly issued and served on the said defendants, and thereupon, on August 8, 1916, the county commissioners' court at a regular meeting canceled the prior assessments on said property of appellant, ordered a list of the property to be made as required by law, and referred such list to the tax assessor of Tarrant county to be reassessed. The tax assessor, after reassessing the said property for the years 1911, 1912, 1913, and 1914 at the value of $80,000 for each year, submitted such reassessments to the commissioners' court; and it, acting as a board of equalization, after notice to the appellant, and after the appellant by its attorney had appeared and was heard, passed on the assessments and valuations, and fixed and assessed the property at the sum of $80,000 for each of said years, and computed the taxes upon the basis of the tax rate for each of said years. The tax lists were then made up, approved, certified, and returned and delivered to the tax collector of Tarrant county. The taxes on this reassessment are the taxes sued for in the instant suit now on appeal.

The question for decision is an agreed one. "It is agreed," quoting from the decision by the trial court and the appellate court, "that the sole question in this case for the determination of the court is whether the reassessment by the tax assessor and the county commissioners' court as a board of equalization is legal and binding upon the defendant under the facts hereinbefore stated."

The trial court held the reassessment to be legal, and the Court of Civil Appeals of the Sixth District held it to be illegal. 241 S. W. 255.

The right of the district court to require the commissioners' court, by mandamus, to place a different valuation on the property of the railway company other than the value theretofore placed on said property by the commissioners' court is discussed in the case of Dillon v. Bare et al., 60 W. Va. 483, 56 S. E. 390. In a case very similar to the case under consideration, except in that case the mandamus prayed for was to require the equalization board to make a change in the assessment for the current year, the court in discussing that case uses the following language:

"It is further objected that, though there is jurisdiction by mandamus to the extent above stated, the writ cannot go in either of these cases, because the valuation of property is a matter committed by the law to the discretion of the assessors, and is not reviewable otherwise than by the tribunal, and in the manner prescribed by the statute, namely, by the county courts upon applications made by the owners of property, for the corrections of error. The exercise of such discretion is not subject to control by the writ of mandamus, but mandamus is a proper remedy to compel an officer, possessed of discretionary powers, to exercise them. If he refuses to act at all, he may be compelled to proceed, but the court which compels him to do so will not prescribe, in its order, how he shall proceed, or rather what his judgment and determination shall be. In other words, in a case like this, if an assessor should refuse to assess property that is taxable, any court having jurisdiction over him by mandamus will compel him to assess, but will not determine the value at which he shall assess it."

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