State v. Childress

• Decision Date: 16 July 2012
• Docket Number: No. 66577–4–I.,66577–4–I.
• Citation: 169 Wash.App. 523,280 P.3d 1144
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Quincy Tyree CHILDRESS, Appellant.

169 Wash.App. 523

280 P.3d 1144

STATE of Washington, Respondent,

v.Quincy Tyree CHILDRESS, Appellant.

No. 66577–4–I.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.

July 16, 2012.

Lila J. Silverstein, Wash. App. Project, Seattle, WA, for Appellant.

Mary K. Webber, Sno. Co. Pros. Att., Everett, WA, for Respondent.

OPINION PUBLISHED IN PART

DWYER, J.

[169 Wash.App. 524]¶ 1 In Washington, a juvenile court may decline jurisdiction, thus transferring the matter for adult criminal prosecution, where the court determines by a preponderance of the evidence that declination would be in the best interest of the juvenile or the public. In making this determination, the court must consider the eight Kent¹ factors originally set forth by the United States Supreme Court. The juvenile court's declination decision is a jurisdictional determination, not a sentencing determination. Indeed, as the juvenile must be found guilty of the alleged offense beyond a reasonable doubt prior to receiving any sentence, the declination decision itself does not subject the juvenile to any sentence whatsoever. Accordingly, neither the state nor federal constitution requires the facts supporting declination to be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 2 Here, the juvenile court determined that declining jurisdiction over Quincy Childress would be in the best interest of Childress or the public. In so doing, the court properly considered the eight factors set forth in Kent. Childress's constitutional rights were not thereby violated. Because Childress's additional contention, that the juvenile court abused its discretion in declining jurisdiction, is also without merit, we affirm.

I

¶ 3 Quincy Childress was charged in juvenile court with rape in the second degree based upon a November 12, 2009 incident involving A.P., a counselor working at Cypress House. Cypress House is a home for juvenile sex offenders where Childress was living at that time. A.P. reported to police that “she was sitting on a couch in Cypress House when Childress put his thumbs on her throat and attempted to choke her.” She further reported that Childress sat on top of her and put his hand under her shirt and bra. Childress “then put his hand down A.P.'s ... pants and penetrated her vagina with his finger.” A.P. was able to escape when a co-worker entered the house. Childress was 15 years old at the time of the incident.

¶ 4 The State filed a motion requesting that the juvenile court decline jurisdiction and transfer the case for adult criminal prosecution.In its decline of jurisdiction report, the probation department recommended that the trial court decline jurisdiction. Childress filed a memorandum in opposition to declination, contending that the community could be adequately protected without a decline of jurisdiction by the juvenile court.

¶ 5 At an April 14, 2010 hearing, the court considered the eight factors set forth in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966). Based upon its consideration of those factors, the juvenile court declined jurisdiction. Childress moved for reconsideration of the juvenile court's declination order; the court denied his motion. Childress was thereafter convicted of rape in the second degree in the superior court and sentenced to a term of incarceration of 84 months to life.

¶ 6 He appeals, assigning error only to the juvenile court's declination of jurisdiction.

II

¶ 7 Childress contends that the declination procedure violated his federal constitutional rights to due process and to a jury trial because the juvenile court found the facts necessary to decline jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Such facts, he asserts, are facts essential to punishment that must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. We have previously rejected this contention. We now do so once more.

[169 Wash.App. 526]¶ 8 Striking down a hate crime statute that permitted a defendant to be sentenced beyond the statutory maximum based upon a factual finding made by the trial court, the United States Supreme Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey held that, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Whether the fact is labeled an “element” or a “sentencing factor,” the Court explained, is not of consequence. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494, 120 S.Ct. 2348. “[T]he relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect—does the required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict?” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494, 120 S.Ct. 2348. The statute invalidated therein, the Court determined, violated the defendant's constitutional rights to due process and to a jury trial, which, collectively, entitle the accused to have a jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt every element of a charged offense. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348.

¶ 9 The Court has since applied the rule set forth in Apprendi to invalidate various sentencing schemes, in each case determining that the facts authorizing the imposition of a sentence greater than that authorized by a jury verdict or guilty plea were required to be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 127 S.Ct. 856, 166 L.Ed.2d 856 (2007) (holding that California's indeterminate sentencing law, which authorized the trial court judge to find facts exposing a defendant to an elevated upper term sentence, violated the right to a jury trial); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (holding that facts triggering an elevated sentence under the then-mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004) (invalidating a Washington statute authorizing the imposition of a sentencebeyond the standard range for the offense based upon findings made by the sentencing judge); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002) (invalidating an Arizona statute that authorized the imposition of the death penalty based upon aggravating factors found by the trial court judge).

¶ 10 We have previously addressed the application of the Apprendi rule to our state's declination procedure. State v. H.O., 119 Wash.App. 549, 81 P.3d 883 (2003). There, H.O. contended that the Supreme Court's decisions in Apprendi and Ring “require that a juvenile court use the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard to determine whether to decline jurisdiction over a juvenile charged with a crime.” H.O., 119 Wash.App. at 552, 81 P.3d 883. Distinguishing Apprendi and Ring, we rejected that contention:

We do not read Apprendi and Ring as broadly as does H.O. In those cases, either the guilt or the sentence of an accused was at issue. Neither guilt nor sentencing is at issue at the decline hearing. Rather, the hearing is designed to determine whether the case should be heard in juvenile or adult court. Neither of these cases requires that this jurisdictional determination, intended only to determine the appropriate forum for trial, must be supported by the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. All that is required is sufficient evidence for a judge to make the discretionary determination whether to retain or transfer jurisdiction of the case.

H.O., 119 Wash.App. at 554–55, 81 P.3d 883 (footnote omitted). We similarly rejected H.O.'s assertion that In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), required such a result. That case “present [ed] the single, narrow question whether proof beyond a reasonable doubt is among the ‘essentials of due process and fair treatment’ required during the adjudicatory stage when a juvenile is charged with an act which would constitute a crime if committed by an adult.” Winship, 397 U.S. at 359, 90 S.Ct. 1068. Because, we determined, “[a] declination hearing is not an adjudicatory proceeding,” Winship was inapplicable. H.O., 119 Wash.App. at 555, 81 P.3d 883.

[169 Wash.App. 528]¶ 11 Thereafter, Division Two relied on our decision in H.O. in holding that neither Apprendi nor Blakely apply to a juvenile decline proceeding. In re Pers. Restraint of Hegney, 138 Wash.App. 511, 528, 158 P.3d 1193 (2007). Acknowledging that Washington courts had not yet decided whether Blakely required that “a jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant is not amenable to treatment as a juvenile before the juvenile court may decline juvenile jurisdiction,” Hegney, 138 Wash.App. at 527, 158 P.3d 1193, the court followed the “ ‘overwhelming weight of authority,’ ” which concluded “ ‘that Apprendi does not apply to a juvenile waiver proceeding because it is not a sentencing proceeding, but rather a determination of the court's jurisdiction.’ ” Hegney, 138 Wash.App. at 527–28, 158 P.3d 1193 (quoting State v. Kalmakoff, 122 P.3d 224, 227 (Ct.App.Alaska 2005)). The court agreed with the Alaska Supreme Court that the reasoning of these decisions “ ‘foreshadow[ed] that courts will not arrive at a different decision following Blakely.’ ” Hegney, 138 Wash.App. at 528, 158 P.3d 1193 (quoting Kalmakoff, 122 P.3d at 227).²

[169 Wash.App. 529]¶ 12 Notwithstanding the fact that we have previously determined that the Apprendi rule is not implicated by our state's juvenile decline procedure, Childress asserts that intervening case law renders our prior decisions no longer authoritative. He contends that the rule set forth in Apprendi and Blakely—that all facts legally essential to a defendant's punishment must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt—is sufficientlyexpansive to apply to the facts supporting a juvenile court's order of decline.

¶ 13 Recent United States Supreme Court precedent limiting the scope of that rule...