State v. Chillingworth

• Decision Date: 13 April 1928
• Citation: 116 So. 633,95 Fla. 699
• Parties: STATE ex rel. FIRST AMERICAN BANK & TRUST CO. OF WEST PALM BEACH v. CHILLINGWORTH, Circuit Judge.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

116 So. 633

95 Fla. 699

STATE ex rel. FIRST AMERICAN BANK & TRUST CO. OF WEST PALM BEACH v. CHILLINGWORTH, Circuit Judge.

Florida Supreme Court

April 13, 1928

En Banc.

Original proceeding by the State, on the relation of First American Bank of West Palm Beach as receiver for Farmers' Bank &amp Trust Company, for mandamus to be directed to C. E Chillingworth, as Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit.

Alternative writ of mandamus quashed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

Judge depositor in closed bank, properly refused to take jurisdiction of proceeding looking to confirmation of comptroller's action in holding bank insolvent and appointing receiver (Rev. Gen. St. 1920, § 2525). A judge who was a depositor of a bank at the time of its closing, and a creditor of said bank at the time application was made to him to take judicial action looking to a confirmation of the comptroller's action in holding such bank insolvent, and appointing a receiver therefor, is without error in ruling himself as disqualified and in declining to assume jurisdiction to act upon such application; such judge having a direct pecuniary interest in the result of the proceeding and of the proposed receivership.

Judge's disqualification in cause for pecuniary interest rests on maxim that one should not sit as judge in own case; maxim that one should not sit as judge in own case applies to all cases and in all courts (Rev. Gen. St. 1920, § 2525). Disqualification to adjudicate a cause rests on the ancient maxim that no man should sit as a judge in his own case. This maxim is applicable to all classes of cases and in all courts, and appeals so strongly to one's sense of justice that it was said by Lord Coke to be a natural right, so inflexible that an act of Parliament seeking to subvert it would be declared void. Our statute (section 2525, Rev. Gen. Stats. Fla. 1920) prescribing disqualifications inhibits a judge from sitting in any case in which he is a party or in which he is interested or in which he would be excluded from being a juror by reason of interest, consanguinity, or affinity to either of the parties.

Conditions disqualifying judge for interest in litigation seeking to accomplish one purpose might not disqualify him in litigation brought for another purpose (Rev. Gen. St. 1920, § 2525). The conditions shown to exist might disqualify a judge in litigation brought to accomplish one purpose when the same conditions would not disqualify the same judge in litigation brought for another purpose.

Judge, majority stockholder of corporation owning shares of bank stock, held disqualified in suit in which receiver seeks to collect assets of bank (Rev. Gen. St. 1920, § 2525). The case now pending, in which the receiver is suing Skipper, was instituted for the purpose of collecting assets of the bank. The result of this suit will affect the value of the assets of the bank, and will necessarily affect the value of the shares of the capital stock of the bank. The circuit judge is a majority stockholder of a corporation which owns certain shares of this bank stock. The value of the shares of the bank stock directly affects the value of the shares of the stock of the corporation, of which the judge is a majority stockholder.

If judge is pecuniarily interested in case, degree of interest disqualifying him is immaterial (Rev. Gen. St. 1920, § 2525). The degree in which the value of the stock of the corporation in which the judge is a majority stockholder will be affected may be very small, but the degree of the interest of the judge is immaterial.

Interest disqualifying judge is direct pecuniary or direct property interest or one involving individual right or privilege in subject-matter of litigation whereby liability or pecuniary gain must occur on event of suit; if disqualifying pecuniary interest of judge in suit exists, it need not be large to bar him from sitting (Rev. Gen. St. 1920, § 2525). The interest which disqualifies a judge is a direct pecuniary or a direct property interest or one which involves some individual right or privilege in the subject-matter of the litigation whereby a liability or pecuniary gain must occur on the event of the suit. If the interest is of such a nature, he is disqualified, and the degree of the interest is immaterial; it need not be large; it will debar him from sitting in the cause no matter how small or trifling it may be; the court will not inquire into the effect it will have upon his rulings.

COUNSEL

Wideman & Wideman, of West Palm Beach, for relator.

C. E. Chillingworth, of West Palm Beach, in pro. per.

OPINION

BUFORD J.

This case comes to this court on an original petition for alternative writ of mandamus to order the respondent, Hon. C E. Chillingworth, judge of the circuit court of the Fifteenth judicial circuit of Florida, to take jurisdiction of an action in which First...