State v. Chimenti

Decision Date23 June 2009
Docket NumberNo. 28535.,28535.
Citation972 A.2d 293,115 Conn.App. 207
CourtConnecticut Court of Appeals
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Joseph CHIMENTI.

Richard E. Condon, Jr., senior assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Timothy J. Sugrue, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, and Gary W. Nicholson, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

FLYNN, C.J., and McLACHLAN and PELLEGRINO, Js.

McLACHLAN, J.

The defendant, Joseph Chimenti, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a trial to the court, of reckless assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60(a)(3).1 On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the state presented insufficient evidence to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) his fifth amendment right against double jeopardy was violated when he was acquitted of assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59(a)(1) and subsequently convicted of the lesser included offense of reckless assault in the second degree. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the defendant's appeal. The defendant was charged in the first count of a two count substitute information with intentional assault in the first degree in violation of § 53a-59(a)(1) and in the second count with reckless assault in the first degree in violation of § 53a-59(a)(3). The case was tried to the court over three days in September, 2006. On September 11, 2006, the final day of trial, the defendant requested that the court consider the lesser included offense of assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-61(a)(3). The state consequently requested that the court consider the lesser included offense of assault in the second degree in violation of § 53a-60(a)(3).

On September 12, 2006, the court issued a memorandum of decision with the following findings of fact. On July 28, 2005, the defendant resided at 73 Whitney Avenue, New Haven, apartment 10. Also residing at that address were William Blakeslee and Robert Esposito. The three men shared the rent. The handle of the door to their apartment was broken, and the men often needed to use a knife to manipulate the mechanism to open the door from the inside. All three men were present in the apartment on July 28, 2005. During the course of the evening, an argument developed between the defendant and Blakeslee, the victim, concerning the victim's payment of rent to the defendant. During the argument, the defendant was holding the knife, intending to use it to open the apartment door. The argument intensified to the point that the victim struck the defendant twice. During the course of the argument, the defendant "wielded the knife in such a manner that he stabbed [the victim] in the area of the right side of [his] heart, causing a piercing wound three to five inches deep...." The wound was life threatening.

The court found that state did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the intent to cause serious physical injury to the victim by means of a dangerous instrument, as alleged in the first count of the information, and rendered judgment of acquittal. The state did, however, prove beyond a reasonable doubt the charge of reckless assault in the first degree pursuant to § 53a-59(a)(3), as alleged in the second count of the information.

As to the second count, the court found the following facts. There is no question that the victim suffered a serious physical injury. There is no question that the injury was suffered at the hands of the defendant. The evidence discloses that the victim was stabbed in the right side of his heart, so that the defendant must have been holding the knife pointed toward the victim and at the victim's chest. The defendant is shorter than the victim, which means that the defendant was holding the knife higher than his own chest level. The defendant also held the knife with a degree of firmness that caused it to pierce three to five inches into the victim's chest, nearly the length of the blade. The court concluded that the defendant, under circumstances evincing an extreme indifference to human life, recklessly engaged in conduct that created a risk of death to the victim and thereby caused serious physical injury to him. Accordingly, the court found the defendant guilty of reckless assault in the first degree. The court also granted the defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal as to count one of the information.

On October 4, 2006, the defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal on the second count, claiming insufficient evidence and requesting that the court vacate its finding of guilt on the charge of reckless assault in the first degree and render judgment as to any lesser included offense that was supported by the evidence. On November 28, 2006, the court rendered judgment of acquittal as to the second count of the information because it found insufficient evidence that the circumstances evinced an extreme indifference to human life and instead found the defendant guilty of reckless assault in the second degree pursuant to § 53a-60(a)(3), a lesser included offense of the first count of intentional assault in the first degree pursuant to § 53a-59(a)(1). The defendant timely appealed.

I

First, we address the defendant's claim that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient for his conviction of reckless assault in the second degree in violation of § 53a-60(a)(3).2 Specifically, the defendant claims that the court improperly found that he acted recklessly in causing the victim's injury.3 We disagree.

Detective Mark Harkins of the New Haven police department testified that he responded to the defendant's apartment on July 28, 2005, to document the scene and to identify and to collect evidence. Harkins stated that he observed what appeared to be blood in the area of the doorway leading toward the couch along the wall. Harkins also testified that he observed apparent blood on the couch itself, on the rug in front of the couch and on a wool blanket next to the couch. Harkins testified that the largest concentrations of apparent blood in the apartment were along the door, along the front of the couch and on the blanket on the couch. In addition, Harkins testified that he discovered a knife approximately midway underneath the couch and that the knife had what appeared to be blood on the blade. Harkins also stated that he observed that the inside of the door leading out of the apartment was missing a doorknob and that he discovered a doorknob on the floor of the apartment.

Officer Jason Minardi of the New Haven police department testified that when he arrived at the defendant's apartment on July 28, 2005, the defendant kept saying: "I did it. I did it, but it wasn't on purpose." Minardi also testified that after he secured the scene, he heard the defendant say that the defendant had used a knife to open the door and that when the defendant turned, the victim lunged at him and the defendant stabbed the victim. Minardi further testified that the defendant told police officers that the knife was in the room but that the defendant did not know the exact location.

Detective Donald Harrison testified that he interviewed the defendant at the New Haven police department following the incident. Harrison testified that the defendant waived his Miranda rights4 and gave a statement, recorded on an audiotape, concerning the stabbing of the victim. Harrison testified that the defendant appeared nervous but that "everybody normally that comes up [to be interviewed] is nervous."

The defendant made his statement concerning his altercation with the victim between 9:20 and 9:32 p.m. on July 28, 2005. The defendant's statement was entered into evidence. In his statement, the defendant admitted that he had ingested a "bag" of heroin at 2 p.m. that day but that he understood everything that was happening and that his mind was clear.5 The defendant stated that he rented apartment 10 at 73 Whitney Avenue in New Haven and that the victim and Esposito also lived in the apartment.

In his statement, the defendant first recounted the following story. On July 28, 2005, he was standing at the door of his apartment with the knife in his hand, trying to unlock the door from the inside with the knife. The defendant turned to the victim and said, "let me have your key." The victim was reluctant to turn over the key, and the defendant turned toward the victim. The victim lunged toward the defendant, then retreated. The defendant and the victim continued talking, until "all of a sudden [the victim] noticed the blood, [the defendant] noticed the blood and [the victim] said to [the defendant], `call an ambulance.'" The victim became faint and the defendant helped him lie down on the floor. The victim called out to Esposito for something to help stop the bleeding. The defendant applied a towel to the victim's knife wound and applied pressure while talking to the victim and reassuring him that an ambulance was on the way. The defendant stated that when the victim lunged at him, the knife entered the victim's chest.

Upon further questioning, the defendant stated that when he arrived home at approximately 7 p.m., he had an argument with the victim. The defendant was attempting to collect money for rent, and the victim said that he was "doing [his] best" to pay the rent. The argument lasted for less than one minute. After "ten minutes, maybe," the defendant used a knife to try to open the door to leave6 because the doorknob was broken and sometimes a knife7 was needed to release the lock mechanism from the inside. After the defendant had opened the door, he was standing there holding the knife and the victim lunged at him. The defendant stated that he "flinched and that's when it happened that's when it...

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12 cases
  • State v. Porter
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • August 2, 2016
    ...state argues that silence in this context amounts to implicit waiver and, thus, Golding review is unavailable. In State v. Chimenti, 115 Conn.App. 207, 230, 972 A.2d 293, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 909, 978 A.2d 1111 (2009), however, we stated: “[T]here are two lines of cases involving princip......
  • State v. Bellamy
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • October 25, 2016
    ...“knowing, intelligent, and voluntary standard,” by which waivers of other constitutional rights are evaluated); State v. Chimenti , 115 Conn.App. 207, 230 n.19, 972 A.2d 293 (same), cert. denied, 293 Conn. 909, 978 A.2d 1111 (2009). Several rationales have been suggested for this age-old ru......
  • State v. Nelson
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • January 19, 2010
    ...time on appeal, these claims are reviewable"), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1254, 111 S.Ct. 2898, 115 L.Ed.2d 1062 (1991); State v. Chimenti, 115 Conn.App. 207, 230, 972 A.2d 293 (noting double jeopardy claims arising in context of single trial are amenable to review pursuant to Golding), cert. d......
  • State v. Porter
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • August 2, 2016
    ...state argues that silence in this context amounts to implicit waiver and, thus, Golding review is unavailable. In State v. Chimenti, 115 Conn. App. 207, 230, 172 A.2d 293, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 909, 978 A.2d 1111 (2009), however, we stated: "[T]here are two lines of cases involving princi......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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