State v. Chisenhall
| Decision Date | 19 May 1890 |
| Citation | 11 S.E. 518,106 N.C. 676 |
| Parties | STATE v. CHISENHALL. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from superior court, Durham county; ARMFIELD, Judge.
The defendant is charged with the abduction of Eloise Chisenhall a female under the age of 14 years, who resided with her father, James Chisenhall, with intent to prostitute the said Eloise. Martha Chisenhall, a witness for the state, testified that she was the mother of the defendant, and also of Eloise who left witness' house, upon a certain day, with defendant. Witness went to defendant's house, about two hours after the alleged abduction, and found the door locked and then went to the house of one Mag Bush. Defendant was there. Witness asked Mag to put Eloise out of her house, and was told she was not there. After some altercation between the parties, the defendant told witness that Eloise was in the house, and she stayed there all night. The solicitor for the state asked witness if her husband knew that she was going for Eloise, and she stated (the defendant objecting) that he did. He told her to go for Eloise. The state proposed to prove by this witness the general reputation of Mag Bush's house, and, upon objection of defendant being overruled, the witness stated it was bad, being a house of ill fame. Eloise had, before this, left home with defendant and stayed away all night. Eloise lived with her father and mother. Defendant lived in another part of the town of Durham. Eloise testified for the state that she went off with defendant at the time alluded to. She wanted to go, but defendant did not tell her what was wanted with her. She saw Rhodes Herndon at Mag's that night. Heard her mother when she came, and told Mag to put witness out. She did not want to go home. W. M. Busbee, a justice of the peace, testified that he tried Mag Bush upon a warrant charging her with abduction, and that said Martha Chisenhall and this defendant (Carrie Chisenhall) were witnesses for the state upon that trial; and he told these witnesses to go to the solicitor's office, where Carrie Chisenhall was examined, with a view of preparing a bill of indictment against Mag Bush, and Busbee stated that he remembered the statement made by defendant upon that occasion, which was as follows, (defendant objected to the evidence:) "Defendant said she was at the house of Mag Bush, and was asked by her and Herndon if she could get Eloise to come to Mag's house to see Herndon, and she replied that she could not get her that night, but would the next day, when she did go to her mother's, and got Eloise to go with her to Mag Bush's, where she stayed all night; that she knew that Mag's house was a house of ill fame." The defendant introduced no evidence, but requested the court to charge the jury that upon the evidence the defendant was not guilty. This was declined, and the court told the jury that if they believed, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant went to her father's house, where Eloise lived, and induced her to leave, and took her to Mag Bush's house, under a previous arrangement with Herndon and Bush, for an immoral purpose, and the father did not consent, then the defendant would be guilty. Defendant excepted. Verdict of guilty; judgment; appeal by defendant.
On indictment for abduction, it appeared that defendant took her sister, who was under 14 years of age, from her father's house to the house of a prostitute. Preparatory to indicting the prostitute for the abduction, the committing magistrate before whom defendant had testified, no proceedings having been taken against defendant at the time, sent her to the solicitor's office to be examined by him. Held, that her declarations to the solicitor were voluntary, and were admissible in subsequent proceedings against her.
J. S. Manning, for appellant.
The Attorney General and E. C. Smith, for the State.
SHEPHERD J., (after stating the facts as above.)
The statute (Code, § 973[1]) under which the defendant is indicted is different from the English and some of the American enactments upon the subject, in that fraud and force are not necessarily constituent elements of the offense, and it is silent as to the taking being against the consent of the parent or other custodian of the child. Many of the refinements of construction to be found in the text-books illustrated by the various decisions, have therefore but little application to the case before us. Our statute (says ASHE, J., in State v. George, 93 N.C. 567) "is broad and comprehensive in its terms, and embraces all means by which the child may be abducted." The crime is defined in the statute by the term "abduction," which is a term of well known signification, and means in law "the taking and carrying away of a child, a ward, a wife, etc., either by fraud, persuasion, or open violence." Webst. Dict. It clear that the consent of the child, obtained by means of persuasion, is no defense, since the result of such persuasion is just as great an evil as if it had been accomplished by other means. Even under the English statutes, where a "taking" is required, it was said by WIGHTMAN, J., (in Reg. v. Handley, 1 Fost. & F. 648,) that "a taking by force is not necessary;...
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