State v. Christel
| Decision Date | 12 November 1973 |
| Docket Number | Nos. S,s. S |
| Citation | 61 Wis.2d 143,211 N.W.2d 801 |
| Parties | STATE of Wisconsin, Respondent, v. Karl Patrick CHRISTEL, Appellant. STATE of Wisconsin, Respondent, v. William Richard SUZOR, Appellant. tate 108, 109. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
Edward G. Krueger, Madison, for appellants.
Robert W. Warren, Atty. Gen., Robert D. Martinson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Madison, for respondent.
Three issues are raised by this appeal:
1. Did defendants have standing to challenge the allegedly illegal search of the package at the REA office prior to delivery of the package?
2. Is the evidence sufficient to support a finding that the defendants believed or knew the substance in their possession was marijuana?
3. Is the evidence sufficient to support a finding that the defendants had the intent to sell marijuana?
In its written opinion, the trial court ruled with respect to the motion to suppress as follows: 'The real question involved on this motion is whether the search of the package by the police while in the hands of REA is a search which infringes on the right of the defendants to be free of unlawful searches and seizures.' The trial court concluded that 'for the reasons expressed in Corngold v. U.S. (9 Cir.) 367 F.2d 1, the search was an illegal one at least as against the sender or anyone else who had standing to question the search.' But the trial court ruled, however, that Suzor, Christel, and Tetzlaff did not have the requisite standing.
Suzor and Christel contend they have 'automatic' standing to challenge the search of the package at the REA office prior to its delivery by REA. They rely on the decision in Jones v. United States. 1 Jones involved a prosecution for violation of federal narcotics laws. Possession of narcotics was the basis of the government's case against Jones. Federal narcotics agents arrested Jones in an apartment in the course of executing a warrant to search for narcotics. The agents found narcotics in a bird's nest in an awning just outside a window in the apartment and secured an admission from Jones that he was living in the apartment and that some of the narcotics were his.
Jones moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the execution of the search warrant on the ground that no showing of probable cause had been made to obtain the warrant. The government opposed Jones' standing to bring the motion because Jones had failed to allege either ownership of the seized contraband or any interest in the apartment greater than that of a mere invitee. The district court denied Jones' motion to suppress solely on the ground of Jones' lack of standing. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's ruling on the motion to suppress. The United States Supreme Court reversed.
The Court began its analysis by noting:
'In order to qualify as a 'person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure' one must have been a victim of a search or seizure, one against whom the search was directed, as distinguished from one who claims prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a search or seizure directed at someone else. . . .
'Ordinarily, then, it is entirely proper to require of one who seeks to challenge the legality of a search as the basis for suppressing relevant evidence that he allege, and if the allegation be disputed that he establish, that he himself was the victim of an invasion of privacy. . . .' 2
The Court observed that to establish standing it had generally been required that the movant claim either to have owned or possessed the seized property or to have had a substantial possessory interest in the premises searched. 3 This created an inescapable self-incrimination dilemma in narcotics prosecutions charging possession. A defendant attempting to comply with the conventional standing requirement was obliged to allege facts attesting to possession, the proof of which at trial would tend to convict him. The other traditional standing requirement that the movant establish a substantial possessory interest in the premises searched greater than the interest of an invitee or guest had also proved troublesome. Courts had been obliged to draw exceedingly subtle distinctions among the various classes of possessors in determining whether a particular movant had the requisite dominion over the premises searched to object. 4
In order to remedy this situation, the Court announced alternative grounds of standing in 'possession' cases, which amounted to a relaxation of the traditional standing requirements. The Court held, first, when possession of the seized evidence is itself an essential element of the offense charged, the government is precluded from denying the movant has the requisite possessory interest to challenge the admission of the evidence, and, second, the movant need have no particular possessory interest in the searched premises in order to have standing so long as he is legitimately on those premises when the search takes place. 5
Suzor and Christel argue the principle of 'automatic' standing enunciated by Jones should be broadly construed to confer standing to challenge and allegedly illegal search on anyone charged with a crime of possession as a result of the search. The state maintains, however, that Jones only applies where the accused's possession of the contraband at the time of the search is the subject of the prosecution and not where the prosecution is founded on possession at some time after the challenged search, as in the instant case. The state argues that since Suzor and Christel did not come into possession of the package until sometime after the challenged search occurred and were prosecuted for that subsequent possession, they cannot claim the benefit of the Jones rule of automatic standing. The state submits Suzor and Christel were required to meet the traditional standing requirement of establishing a possessory interest in the package as of the time of the search at the REA office. In making this latter argument, the state maintains Suzor and Christel did not demonstrate they had the requisite possessory interest in the package as of the time of the challenged search and thus could not predicate standing on this basis either.
Since the decision in Jones, the United States Supreme Court has three times discussed the doctrine of 'automatic' standing. Under the current prevailing interpretation, the state is correct in its limitation of Jones. In Simmons v. United States 6 the Court reaffirmed the Jones doctrine but went a long way toward eliminating the need for such a rule by declaring that a prosecutor may not use against a defendant at trial any testimony given by that defendant at a pretrial hearing to establish standing to suppress evidence. Thus, Simmons virtually cured the self-incrimination dilemma which prompted the institution of the automatic standing rule in the first place. In Combs v. United States 7 the Court once again reaffirmed the Jones rule. A very recent case, however, considerably undercuts the viability of the Jones standing doctrine. Brown v. United States 8 involved a federal prosecution for transporting stolen goods and conspiracy to transport stolen goods in interstate commerce. The petitioners had stolen goods from the warehouse of their employer and stored them in a warehouse owned by a co-conspirator. In the course of taking yet another truckload of stolen goods to the warehouse of their fellow-conspirator, the petitioners were stopped by the police, placed under arrest and taken into custody along with the contents of the truck. The police then searched the warehouse where they were headed pursuant to a warrant and discovered the stolen goods which had previously been transported there. The warrant was defective, however. The petitioners moved to suppress the stolen goods found at the warehouse but were unsuccessful. The court held they lacked standing. Petitioners claimed automatic standing predicated on Jones. The court grounded its ruling on petitioners' failure to allege any proprietary or possessory interest in the premises searched or the goods seized there. At trial, the stolen goods found at the warehouse were introduced in evidence and the petitioners were convicted. On appeal, the question was raised whether petitioners were entitled to the automatic standing conferred by Jones in possession cases. In holding that Jones did not apply and that petitioners were bound to comply with traditional standing rules, the Court announced the following rule for the guidance of lower courts:
'. . . Here, unlike Jones, the government's case against petitioners does not depend on petitioners' possession of the seized evidence at the time of the contested search and seizure. The stolen goods seized had been transported and 'sold' by petitioners to Knuckles approximately two months before the challenged search. The conspiracy and transportation alleged by the indictment were carefully limited to the period before the day of the search.
'In deciding this case, therefore, it is sufficient to hold that there is no standing to contest a search and seizure where, as here, the defendants: (a) were not on the premises at the time of the contested search and seizure; (b) alleged no proprietary or possessory interest in the premises; and (c) were not charged with an offense that includes, as an essential element of the offense charged, possession of the seized evidence at the time of the contested search and seizure. The vice of allowing the government to allege possession as part of the crime charged, and yet deny that there was possession sufficient for standing purposes, is not present. The government cannot be accused of taking 'advantage of contradictory positions.' Jones v. United States, supra, 362 U.S., at 263, 80 S.Ct., (725) at 732 (4 L.Ed.2d 697). See United States v. Allsenberrie, 424 F.2d 1209, 1212--1214 (CA 7, 1970); United States v. Cowan, 396 F.2d...
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