State v. Christy

• Citation: 87 S.E. 499,170 N.C. 772
• Decision Date: 12 January 1916
• Docket Number: 309.
• Parties: STATE v. CHRISTY ET AL.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina

87 S.E. 499

170 N.C. 772

STATE v. CHRISTY ET AL.

No. 309.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

January 12, 1916

Appeal from Superior Court, Forsyth County; Cline, Judge.

Samuel Preston Christy and Ida Ball Warren were convicted of murder and Stone-street of the accessory after the fact. Christy and Warren appeal. No error.

Fred M Parrish and Gilmer Körner, Jr., both of Winston-Salem, for appellant Christy.

Jones & Clement, of Winston-Salem, for appellant Warren.

The Attorney General and T. H. Calvert, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

CLARK C.J.

There were 70 exceptions taken, but in their briefs the counsel for Christy group their exceptions under 8 heads, and the counsel for Warren group theirs under 17 heads.

The court permitted the solicitor to ask certain jurors whether or not they belonged to the Society of Friends without challenging them for cause. The object of the inquiry was to ascertain whether or not the jurors had conscientious objections to capital punishment. The prisoners except because this was not treated as a challenge for cause. It has always been very questionable practice whether when the state asked questions for information on which to base the challenge for cause the defendant could "admit the cause." One of the objections to the state being denied the right to appeal is that this and other practices could not be brought up on exception by the state. Under this practice the solicitor dare not ask a single question to give him information about a juror, lest the juror be summarily set aside. This was one of the methods in addition to the great disparity in the number of peremptory challenges (23 to 4) which practically placed the selection of the jury in the hands of the counsel for the prisoner. Now, however, section 6, c. 31, Laws 1913, has put an end to this practice and warranted the action of the judge.

Another exception is to the admission of a letter purporting to have been written by the deceased to Ida Ball Warren on October 22, 1914. While the contents of the letter were immaterial to the issue, its admission was competent to show that she had in her possession a letter which she claimed was from her husband, when she knew at the time he had been dead for several months, and as it tended to show that she had sent out letters ostensibly to locate her husband when at the time she wrote them she knew he was dead.

The prisoners except that the court did not warn the jury that any statement made by one of the prisoners not in the presence of the others could not be considered except against the one making it, and was no evidence against the others. It is not necessary in this case to recall the rule of practice set out by this court in 164 N.C. 548, 80 S.E. 405, "Nor will it be ground of exception that evidence competent for some purposes, but not for all, is admitted generally, unless the appellant asks, at the time of the admission, that its purpose shall be restricted;" for the record shows that the judge, on the admission of the evidence, and again in the charge, called the attention of the jury to the fact that the admission or statements of one of the prisoners was competent only against the party making it, and should not be considered as against the others.

The defendant's counsel strenuously insist that declarations made by the prisoners while in custody or in jail is incompetent, though the court found upon evidence that they were made voluntarily and without any inducement of hope or fear. This court has repeatedly held that such statements are competent. State v. Drakeford, 162 N.C. 667, 78 S.E 308, and cases there cited.

It is also well settled that whether a statement is voluntary is a preliminary question of fact, and that the finding of the judge cannot be reviewed if there is any evidence to sustain it. State v. Page, 127 N.C. 512, 37 S.E. 66. A confession is deemed to be voluntary unless the party against whom it is offered show facts to the contrary. State v. Sanders, 84 N.C. 728. This rule is also followed in Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, South Carolina, and Texas, and some other states, though in some states the presumption is that confessions are involuntary, and the state must offer evidence to the contrary. But in all the states when the court finds the question of fact that the confessions were voluntary this is conclusive if there is evidence to sustain it.

The prisoner Christy objected to a statement made by him, but the...