State v. Chunn

• Decision Date: 31 October 1853
• Parties: THE STATE, Appellant, v. CHUNN, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

19 Mo. 233

THE STATE, Appellant,

v.CHUNN, Respondent.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1853.

1. A party who sells a slave with a covenant of warranty of title, knowing that he has no title, is not guilty of such a false pretense as is indictable under the statute. (Sec. 49, art. 3, act concerning crimes and punishments, R. C., 1845.)

2. An indictment which charges that money was obtained by color of a false pretense, is not sufficient. The word “color” in the statute only applles to the words “false token or writing,” and not to the clause immediately following.

Appeal from St. Louis Criminal Court.

L. M. Shreve, for the State.

The indictment describes an offense within the meaning of the statute. The defendant is criminally liable for falsely pretending that he owned the slave when he did not. State v. Newell, 1 Mo. 252. The fact that a warranty was given makes no difference.

N. Holmes, for respondent.

On the point that no indictable offense was charged, cited 2 Russ. on Crimes, 303. Arch. Cr. Pl. 277. Rex. v. Codington, 1 C. & P. 661. 3 Arch. Cr. Pl. by Waterman, 470-1, 473 (note). Rex v. Pyrrell, 1 Stark. N. P. C. 402. The indictment is insufficient in not charging that the defendant obtained the money by means of the false pretense, instead of by color of the false pretense. 2 Russ. on Cr. 311. Archbold Cr. Pl. 275, 279.

RYLAND, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

The defendant, Chunn, was indicted at the May term, 1853, of the Criminal Court of St. Louis, for obtaining money from one Solomon P. Ketcham by false pretenses.

The indictment charges the false pretense to be in the sale of a negro woman named Lucy, for $600, which it charges that defendant sold to said Solomon P. Ketcham, falsely pretending that he, the said defendant, was the owner of said negro woman, and that he had full right and authority to sell her. The indictment sets forth the bill of sale for said negro woman, executed by said defendant to said Ketcham, in which said defendant says: “I have sold to Solomon P. Ketcham my negro woman, Lucy, (slave for life,) for the sum of six hundred dollars, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged. I do warrant and defend the title of said negro slave from the lawful claims of all persons whatsoever.” The indictment negatives the ownership of said slave in said defendant, and denies that he had any property in said slave, or any right, power or authority to sell her, or to make any bill of sale for her to any person; and concludes thus: “All which he said William P. Chunn then and there well knew, and the grand jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, do say, that the said William P. Chunn, then and there, in manner and form aforesaid, feloniously, deceitfully, designedly and by color of the false pretenses and representations aforesaid, did get into his possession, and obtain from the said Solomon P. Ketcham, the sum of six hundred dollars,” &c.

The defendant moved to quash this indictment, because it did not show a case of obtaining money under false pretenses, within the true meaning and intent of the act in such case made and provided. The court sustained this motion, quashed the indictment, and the State brings the case here by appeal.

The only questions involved arise on the validity of the indictment. Is the transaction set forth in the indictment, such a false pretense as is embraced by our statute? And is the indictment sufficient on its face?

The 49th section of art. 3 of the act concerning crimes and punishments, R. C. 1845, p. 363, declares that, “Every person who, with intent to cheat or defraud another, shall, designedly, by color of any false token or writing, or by any other false pretense, obtain the signature of any person to any written instrument, or obtain from any person any money, personal property, right in action, or other valuable thing or effects, whatsoever, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished in the same manner, and to the same extent, as for feloniously stealing the money, property or thing so obtained.”

This statute has provisions very similar to the British statute of Henry VIII, ch. 1, and of 30 Geo. II, chap. 24. The first one of these statutes uses the words “by color and means of any such false token or counterfeit letter,” &c. It has been held, that this statute of 33 Henry VIII, ch. 1, required a false seal or token to be used, in order to bring the person imposed upon in the confidence of the other, and this statute being found too narrow and insufficient, the statute 30 Geo. II. ch. 24, was enacted. The words of this are very general: “All persons who, knowingly, by false pretenses, shall obtain from any person money, goods, &c., with intent to cheat or defraud,” &c. Justice Buller said in the case of Young and others against The King, in error, 3 T. R. 98, “that the ingredients of this offense are the...