State v. Church
| Decision Date | 23 December 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. CR,CR |
| Citation | 4 Conn.Cir.Ct. 220,229 A.2d 379 |
| Court | Circuit Court of Connecticut. Connecticut Circuit Court, Appellate Division |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Harold O. CHURCH. 17-4671. |
Julius Watstein, Bristol, for appellant (defendant).
Francis M. McDonald, Deputy Chief Pros. Atty., for appellee (state).
The defendant was convicted of policy playing in violation of § 53-298 of the General Statutes in a trial to the jury and has appealed from the judgment. He has assigned error in the court's failure to correct the finding; in certain rulings on evidence; in the charge to the jury; in the legality of the sentence; and in the denial of the defendant's motion for a directed verdict, motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and motion to set aside the verdict. At the conclusion of the state's case the defendant rested.
The defendant first seeks to have the finding corrected in numerous particulars, claiming that sixteen paragraphs should have been stricken because the facts appearing therein were remote and were found without credible evidence and in language of doubtful meaning. A finding in a jury case in the Circuit Court serves a limited purpose. It is a mere narrative of the facts which are claimed to have been proved and is designed to test the correctness of the charge. It should not be detailed or voluminous but confined strictly to the facts bearing on the questions raised. Practice Book §§ 996, 999, 1006; State v. McCoy, 4 Conn.Cir. 109, 111, 226 A.2d 116. 'If there is no evidence affording a reasonable basis for a claim of proof, the claim may be stricken out; * * * but a correction will not be made merely to secure meticulous accuracy as to details in the claims of proof.' State v. Whiteside, 148 Conn. 208, 215, 169 A.2d 260; Maltbie, Conn.App.Proc. § 145. There was competent evidence to support the paragraphs attacked. The defendant also seeks to add numerous paragraphs claiming that the facts appearing therein were admitted or undisputed or necessary properly to present the questions of law claimed as error. In examining this assignment of error, we conclude that the finding furnished a fair and adequate basis for testing the errors in law claimed to have been made by the court in the charge, and therefore no corrections are warranted. See Turner v. Scanlon, 146 Conn. 149, 151, 148 A.2d 334; Daly Brothers, Inc. v. Spallone, 114 Conn. 236, 243, 158 A. 237; State v. Gargano, 99 Conn. 103, 106, 121 A. 657.
The state offered evidence to prove and claimed to have proved that Edward Suhovski was employed by the Bristol Brass Company. On December 17, 1965, he was arrested. At the time of his arrest, he had in his possession a notebook containing a record of payments for number bets by fellow employees. He also had in his possession $80 which he had collected from people betting on the numbers. On the same day, he gave the Bristol police a blue notebook containing a record of the numbers played since 1963 by fellow employees. The blue notebook also contained the names of bettors and the numbers upon which they bet. Such numbers consist of three digits, and the winning number was determined by the last three digits of the daily treasury balance published in the newspaper. The bets were accepted by Suhovski for a five-day bet, from Monday through Friday in each week. Suhovski had collected the $80 on December 17, 1965, from fellow employees, and the money was for the defendant. It represented bets to be made for the following week. On the Monday prior to December 17, Suhovski had turned over to the defendant his collections for number bets being played during the week ending December 17. The money so turned over to the defendant amounted to $161, which represented the amount collected less the 10 percent received by Suhovski for collecting the bets. Suhovski had been collecting for the defendant for over two years. During this period, the defendant gave Suhovski the moneys with which to pay off a winner. Suhovski also played the numbers and, eight months prior to December, 1965, had a winning bet and had been paid off by the defendant. Suhovski's nickname was 'Bullett,' and this name appeared in the blue notebook next to the numbers he had bet on. Sergeant Stanley Barton is a police officer of the Bristol police department and for the prior fourteen months had been in vestigating gambling in Bristol. He was familiar with the game of chance known as the treasury balance lottery and, after examining both the brown and the blue notebooks, he was of the opinion that they contained treasury balance records, a form of lottery. He was further of the opinion that Suhovski was a runner. A runner is one who collects money played upon the numbers and then turns it over to a lieutenant, who in turn transfers the money to a banker or higher-up. The defendant, after his arrest, denied that Suhovski was working for him in the treasury balance lottery. No promise of leniency was made to Suhovski in his making of a confession implicating the defendant or in his testifying at the trial.
The defendant offered evidence to prove and claimed to have proved the following facts: At the time Suhovski testified, he had a balance of fifty-six days of a sixty-day jail sentence to serve and a fine of $500 to pay. Suhovski, following his arrest, was charged with policy playing, entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced. Prior to testifying in this case, Suhovski attended a conference with his attorney and three prosecuting attorneys for fifteen or twenty minutes, at which time this case was discussed and Suhovski's appeal, sentence and fine were claimed not to have been discussed. Suhovski claimed that at no time had the police made any promises to him or threatened him and that he signed a statement of his own free will. Suhovski was not represented by an attorney until he filed his appeal. He denied telling his attorney that his plea of guilty was induced by promises of leniency, reward or immunity, but he did tell his attorney that his sentence was unreasonable in view of his cooperation with the police. When he testified at this trial, he was represented by an attorney. A defendant's exhibit is a motion to open the judgment in State v. Edward Suhovski, Circuit Court, Seventeenth Cir., No. CR 17-4677 (Apr. 14, 1966), signed by Suhovski's attorney, and the motion sets forth that Suhovski's confession was induced by promises and was not a product of a free and unconstrained choice and further that his sentence was harsh, unfair and unreasonable in view of his cooperation with the police. Another exhibit of the defendant is the appeal taken by Suhovski, incorporating much of the matter set forth in his motion to open. Suhovski claimed that he saw the defendant every Monday during the summer of 1965, although he did not write action for fourteen weeks during this period. While Suhovski's attorney stated in the motion to open that Suhovski had no record, he had in fact been convicted of breach of the peace. When the defendant was apprehended, nothing was found on his person and he denied that Suhovski worked for him. During the trial, Suhovski sat in court with Vincent Palais, a fellow employee whom the state announced it would call as a witness. Suhovski claimed that he did not testify against the defendant in the hope that his sentence or fine would be modified.
The defendant claims numerous errors in the court's rulings on evidence. In many instances, the defendant has failed to conform with the requirements of §§ 1006 and 989 of the Practice Book. Under our rules, an assignment of error relating to rulings made during the trial on the admission or rejection of testimony shall refer to an exhibit which shall be annexed and which shall set forth the question, the objection, the answer, if any, and the exception. The defendant has merely set forth, in narrative form, without questions and answers, his version of what he claims occurred. Furthermore, where questions and answers do appear, they are frequently so limited that a proper understanding of the ruling is difficult. We have, however, reviewed the errors which were properly assigned, set forth in the defendant's brief and seriously argued.
Two notebooks belonging to Suhovski and purporting to contain records of bets taken by Suhovski were received in evidence over the defendant's objection. The defendant's basic claim is that the recorded betting activities antedated the date charged in the information and therefore the evidence was remote and prejudicial, since it tended to show other crimes. As a general rule, conviction of other crimes is inadmissible to prove guilt of the crime charged. State v. Fredericks, 149 Conn. 121, 125, 176 A.2d 581; State v. Ferrone, 96 Conn. 160, 173, 113 A. 452. But there are exceptions. Evidence which may tend to show the commission of crimes other than the one in issue is not objectionable if the evidence is relevant and material in proving the accused guilty of the crime charged. State v. Gilligan, 92 Conn. 526, 530, 103 A. 649, 651; State v. Chapman, 103 Conn. 453, 481, 130 A. 899; State v. Fredericks, supra, 149 Conn. 124, 176 A.2d 581; 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (12th Ed.) § 240. Furthermore, it is not essential in a criminal prosecution that the crime be proved to have been committed on the precise date alleged, for ordinarily the prosecution...
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