State v. Churchill

• Decision Date: 04 March 2014
• Docket Number: No. ED99261,ED99261
• Parties: STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent, v. BRENDA CHURCHILL, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent,
v.
BRENDA CHURCHILL, Appellant.

No. ED99261

Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION III

FILED: March 4, 2014

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Monroe County Honorable Rachel Bringer Shepherd
Introduction

Brenda Churchill ("Churchill") appeals from the judgment of the trial court following a bench trial in which Churchill was convicted of perjury. Churchill was charged with the class D felony of perjury for false testimony she gave under oath during a protective custody hearing before the Juvenile Division of the Monroe County Circuit Court ("juvenile court"). The trial court found Churchill guilty of perjury and sentenced her to four years' imprisonment. On appeal, Churchill asserts that her perjurious testimony in the juvenile court proceeding should have been suppressed in her criminal trial because such testimony was obtained in violation of her constitutional and statutory rights to counsel and her constitutional right against self-incrimination. Churchill also alleges that insufficient evidence exists to support her conviction

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because her false statements were not material, and because she effectively retracted the statements during the course of the juvenile court proceeding.

Although the trial court violated Churchill's right to counsel under Missouri statute, lying under oath is not a permissible response to such violation. Because the violation of Churchill's statutory right to counsel does not immunize her false testimony from prosecution for perjury, the trial court did not commit error in denying Churchill's motion to suppress her juvenile court testimony. Churchill's juvenile court testimony provides sufficient evidence to support the judgment of the trial court. Accordingly, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural History

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence adduced at trial is as follows. On June 9, 2011, Churchill was served with a summons ordering her to appear at a protective custody hearing on June 10, 2011, before Judge Michael Wilson ("Judge Wilson") of the juvenile court. The purpose of the hearing was to establish the identity and location of a child, known as Christian Churchill, believed to be Churchill's son, and to further determine whether the child was in need of protection from the court. The summons instructed Churchill to bring the child to the hearing.

Churchill appeared at the protective custody hearing alone. Counsel for the Juvenile Office called Churchill's daughter, Trista Churchill ("Trista") and Churchill's father, Marvin McSparren ("McSparren"), to testify about the child in question. Trista testified that she knew of a child named Christian Churchill, and that she understood the boy was Churchill's son. Similarly, McSparren testified that he knew of a child named Christian Churchill, who he understood to be Churchill's son. McSparren further testified that Churchill told him Christian

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Churchill was her son, and that he had last seen Christian in Churchill's home about month before the hearing.

Churchill was next called to the stand and sworn in as a witness. Once on the stand, Churchill immediately requested legal counsel. The juvenile court informed Churchill that although she had a right to counsel, the court was going to proceed with the protective custody hearing and that counsel for the Juvenile Office was free to ask Churchill questions. Churchill repeated her request for an attorney at various times throughout the hearing. Counsel for the Juvenile Office examined Churchill about the child in question. In response to said questioning, and without being provided an opportunity to contact legal counsel, Churchill denied that she had a child living with her in her home. She also denied giving birth to any children since her parental rights to her youngest child were terminated. Churchill acknowledged that the summons directed her to bring the child in question to the hearing, but she testified that she could not "produce a child that I don't have."

At the end of the hearing, the juvenile court renewed its order for Churchill to produce any children living in her home. Churchill again told the juvenile court that she could not comply with the order because she had no children. The juvenile court warned Churchill that if there was a child in her home, she could be held in contempt of court and prosecuted for perjury. Churchill confirmed that she understood these consequences.

On June 27, 2011, Churchill brought her son, whose legal name is Joshua Churchill, to an arranged meeting at the juvenile offices in Boone County. Thereafter, the State charged Churchill with the class D felony of perjury for denying the existence of her son while under oath at the protective custody hearing. Before trial, Churchill moved to suppress her juvenile court testimony on the ground that the testimony was given in violation of her right to counsel.

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The trial court denied her motion, and the matter was tried in a bench trial on July 5, 2012. Churchill moved for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State's evidence and at the close of all evidence. Both motions were denied. The trial court convicted Churchill of perjury and sentenced her to four years in the Missouri Department of Corrections. This appeal follows.

Points on Appeal

In her first point on appeal, Churchill alleges that the trial court erred when it denied her motion to suppress and admitted her juvenile court testimony into evidence. Churchill argues her testimony should have been suppressed because it was obtained in violation of her constitutional right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment and Sections 10 and 18 of the Missouri Constitution, her statutory right to counsel under Section 211.211,¹ and her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. In her second point on appeal, Churchill asserts that the trial court erred in overruling her motions for judgment of acquittal because the State failed to present sufficient evidence that her perjurious testimony was material and because Churchill later retracted her false statements.

Standard of Review

Our review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is limited to determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court's decision. State v. Umphfrey, 242 S.W.3d 437, 441 (Mo. App. E.D. 2007). We will reverse only if the ruling is clearly erroneous. Id. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, giving deference to the trial court's factual findings and credibility determinations. Id. However, we review questions of law de novo. Statutory interpretation is an issue of law that this Court reviews de novo. State ex rel. Wolfrum v. Wiesman, 225 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Mo. banc 2007).

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In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence in a court-tried case, we are limited to determining whether the state presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty. State v. Vandevere, 175 S.W.3d 107, 108 (Mo. banc 2005). We view all evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict, ignoring all contrary evidence and inferences. Id.

Discussion

I. The trial court did not err in admitting Churchill's juvenile court testimony into evidence.

Churchill's first point on appeal challenges the admission of her juvenile court testimony on both constitutional and statutory grounds. Specifically, Churchill maintains that her juvenile court testimony was procured in violation of her right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Sections 10 and 18 of the Missouri Constitution, Section 211.211, and Missouri Supreme Court Rules 115.01 and 123.05.² Churchill also contends that the statements should have been suppressed because they were obtained in violation of her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.

A. Constitutional Right to Counsel

Churchill first asserts that her perjurious testimony should have been suppressed because it was obtained in violation of her constitutional right to counsel. In response, the State contends that only criminal defendants enjoy a constitutional right to counsel, and the juvenile court hearing at which Churchill appeared and perjured herself was not a criminal proceeding.

The Sixth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This mandate is paralleled by section 18(a) of the Missouri Constitution,

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which provides that "in criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend, in person and by counsel. . . ." MO. CONST. art. 1, sec. 18(a) (emphasis added). The Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies in state proceedings by virtue of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963). As an aspect of due process, the right to counsel turns not on whether a proceeding may be characterized as "criminal" or "civil," but on whether the proceeding may result in a deprivation of liberty. State ex rel. Family Support...