State v. City Council of City of Camden

• Decision Date: 20 February 1896
• Citation: 33 A. 846,58 N.J.L. 515
• Parties: STATE (ANDERSON et al., Prosecutors) v. CITY COUNCIL OF CITY OF CAMDEN et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

33 A. 846

58 N.J.L. 515

STATE (ANDERSON et al., Prosecutors)

v. CITY COUNCIL OF CITY OF CAMDEN et al.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Feb. 20, 1896.

(Syllabus by the Court)

Certiorari, on the prosecution of Abraham Anderson and others, against the city council of the city of Camden and another, to review an ordinance. Writ dismissed.

Argued November term, 1895, before DEPUE, VAN SYCKEL, and GUMMERE, JJ.

E. G. C. Bleakly and D. J. Pancoast, for prosecutors.

J. Willard Morgan, for defendants.

GUMMERE, J. The writ in this case brings up for review an ordinance of the city of Camden, establishing the office of transcribing clerk in the office of the collector of delinquent claims, passed June 6, 1895, at a special meeting of the city council held on that day. The validity of this ordinance is attacked by the prosecutors upon numerous grounds, which will be considered in their order.

The first ground relied upon is that the city council of Camden had no legal power or authority to pass the ordinance. Section 17 of the charter of the city of Camden (Pamph. Laws 1871, p. 220) empowers the city council to elect and appoint, and also to prescribe the duties of, all the subordinate officers of the said city, as well those who are named in the charter as those who are not named therein, but who may, in the opinion of council, be necessary for the better ordering and government of the city. The office which has been created by the ordinance under review is a subordinate one. Whether its creation was necessary for the better ordering and government of the city was a question which the legislature left to be determined by the city council. That body, by the passage of this ordinance, has declared that, in its opinion, it was necessary, and its decision must be accepted as finally settling the question.

But it is said that council has overstepped the authority conferred upon it by the charter: (1) Because the ordinance provides that the incumbent of the newly-created office shall hold the same for a term of two years; and (2) because the duties imposed by the ordinance upon this new official are imposed by the city charter upon certain other officials.

As to the first of these reasons, the contention is that the city council, being a yearly body, cannot regulate the appointment of its officers for more than one year; that to hold otherwise would be to detract from the power of future city councils. This contention is without force. While it is true that one council cannot by ordinance bind a subsequent council, it is not true that for that reason, an ordinance which, by its terms, continues in force after the council which passed it has ceased to exist is invalid. On the contrary, every such ordinance is valid and effectual until it expires by its own limitation, or is repealed either by the council which passed it or by a subsequent council.

Nor is there anything in the objection made to the validity of the ordinance because it imposes upon the new official, created by it, duties which the charter requires to be performed by other officials; for an examination of the charter, and a comparison of it with the ordinance under review, will disclose that the objection rests upon a misapprehension of facts. The charter does not impose upon other officials the duties which this ordinance requires to be performed by the transcribing clerk in the office of the collector of delinquent claims.

The next objection urged against the ordinance is that it was introduced at a special meeting of council, which, it is insisted on behalf of the prosecutors, was not called in the manner required by law; and, further, that it was finally passed at the same meeting, in violation of the city charter, which, it is said, forbids the passage of an ordinance at the same meeting at which it was introduced. The return to the writ shows that the meeting was called in accordance with the provisions of an act of the legislature entitled "An act concerning cities," approved March 22, 1895 (Pamph. Laws 1895, p. 646). That act provides that, in all cities of this state, it shall be the duty of the president of the city council, board of aldermen, or other governing body, on the request of one-fourth of the total membership of such body, in writing, addressed to him, to call a special meeting thereof. The meeting in question was called by the president of council upon the written request, addressed to him, of 5 of the members of the city council out of a total membership of 19; and it is not denied that this was a compliance with the requirement of the act of 1895, but it is contended that this statute is unconstitutional, and that the only method in which a special meeting of the city council can be legally called is in the manner specified in the city charter, which authorizes the president to call such meeting only when requested, in writing, to do so by at least eight of the members. The objection made to the law of 1895 is that it fails to comply with the constitutional requirement that "every law shall embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed in the title," because the title of the act fails to express its object. In the case of State v. Hammer, 42 N. J. Law, 435, decided in this court, it is stated that it is only in perfectly plain cases that it is proper for the courts to vacate statutes on the ground now in question; and this declaration is quoted with approval by the court of errors and appeals in Payne v. Mahon, 44 N. J. Law, 216. The criticism upon the title is that "An act concerning...