State v. City of Jacksonville

• Decision Date: 24 March 1931
• Citation: 133 So. 114,101 Fla. 1241
• Parties: STATE ex rel. TAYLOR v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

133 So. 114

101 Fla. 1241

STATE ex rel. TAYLOR v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE et al.

Florida Supreme Court

March 24, 1931

En Banc.

Original proceeding in mandamus by the State of Florida, on the relation of S. C. Taylor, against the City of Jacksonville and another. On respondents' motion to quash the alternative writ.

Mortion granted.

Syllabus by the Court.

SYLLABUS

The subject-matter of an act may be expressed in the title though such title be verbose and loosely constructed.

The mere incidental exercise of the functions of one department of government by another is not an impairment of the doctrine of the nondelegation of powers.

It is not a delegation of legislative power to authorize a city commission through its inspector of buildings to execute the policy as expressed by the Legislature.

When a city ordinance appears on its face to have been regularly enacted, all presumptions will be indulged in favor of its validity. The burden of establishing its invalidity is on him who makes the attack on it.

If the application of a zoning ordinance has the effect of completely depriving an owner of the beneficial use of his property, it would become the duty of the zoning board to relax its restrictions so as to prevent confiscation of a complainant's lands without compensation, otherwise the ordinance would be held bad.

The determination of public officials as to the application of a zoning ordinance will not be disturbed by the courts unless it clearly appears that their action has no foundation in reason and is a mere arbitrary or irrational exercise of power having no substantial relation to the public health morals, safety, or welfare.

COUNSEL

P. H. Odom and George C. Bedell, both of Jacksonville, for petitioner.

Austin Miller, Gov. Hutchinson, Emmet Safay, and Harvey Mabry, all of Jacksonville, for respondents.

OPINION

TERRELL J.

Petitioner S. C. Taylor, submitted plans and specifications to the commissioner of buildings of the city of Jacksonville and requested a permit to construct a building for business purposes on a lot described therein. The permit was refused because the lot so described was located in a district zoned as 'Residence A District' under city Ordinance S-35.

In February, 1930, this court granted its alternative writ of mandamus directed to the city of Jacksonville and its commissioner of buildings commanding them to issue said permit to the petitioner or to show cause why they refuse so to do. The case is here to be considered on a motion to quash the alternative writ.

It is first contended by the petitioner that chapter 9783, Special Laws of Florida, Acts of 1923, empowering the city of Jacksonville to enact a zoning ordinance, is invalid because the subject-matter thereof is not briefly expressed in the title.

This question has been so fully discussed in prior decisions of this court we do not feel that a lengthy treatment of it here would serve any useful purpose. We have examined both the title and body of the act, and, while the title is afflicted with verbosity and is loosely constructed, we think we may reasonably hold that its terms are sufficient to put one on notice that power to pass a zoning ordinance may be embraced therein. State ex rel. Moodie v. Bryan, 50 Fla. 293, 39 So. 929; Gainesville Gas & Electric Power Co. v. City of Gainesville, 63 Fla. 425, 58 So. 785; Ex parte Pricha, 70 Fla. 265, 70 So. 406; Hayes v. Walker, 54 Fla. 163, 44 So. 747.

It is next contended that section 15 of chapter 9783 Acts of 1923, Special Laws of Florida, is void and unconstitutional because it creates an administrative body or board and delegates to it general legislative power.

Section 13 of chapter 9783, Special Act of 1923, authorizes the city of Jacksonville to pass zoning ordinances, and section 14 of the same act in effect provides that, before such ordinance is passed, a comprehensive plan for zoning the city shall be prepared and submitted to the mayor and city council by the city commission. It is also rpovided that notice shall be advertised and a public hearing be held thereon, and that during the period the notice runs the proposed plan and ordinance shall be on file in the office of the city recorder for public examination. Section 15 provides that all zoning regulations be enforced and administered by the inspector of buildings under rules and regulations of the city commission, and that said city commission shall hear and decide appeals and review any order, decision, requirement, or determination made by the inspector of buildings in the enforcement of zoning regulations.

We do not think this provision amenable to the assault made on it. In taking such a position, we do not renounce the doctrine of the nondelegability of powers which has become so firmly embedded in our tripartite scheme of government, but on account of the inability of the three branches to respond to the demands of a changing social order, the Legislatures have created and the courts, both state and federal, have approved what the law-writers choose to call the fourth power in government, the administrative, which for practical purposes co-ordinates the other three departments and makes for a more flexible and efficient administration. The Supreme Court of the United States early held that no fundamental or whole power could be delegated, but that the power to supply the details and apply the policy as expressed by the Legislature to changing factual conditions could be. Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U.S. 307, 6 S.Ct. 334, 388, 1191, 20 L.Ed. 636; Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 6 L.Ed. 253; Hampton v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 48 S.Ct. 348, 72 L.Ed. 624; Express Co. v. Railroad Co., 111 N.C. 463, 16 S.E. 393; Burlington, C. R. & N. Ry. Co. v. Dey, 82 Iowa, 312, 48 N.W. 98, 12 L. R. A. 436, 31 Am. St. Rep. 477; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Jones, 149 Ill. 361, 37 N.E. 247, 24 L. R. A. 141, 41 Am. St. Rep. 278; Georgia R. R. Co. v. Smith, 70 Ga. 694.

It cannot be said that administrative boards such...