State v. City of Stuart

• Decision Date: 30 January 1929
• Citation: 97 Fla. 69,120 So. 335
• Parties: STATE ex rel. DAVIS, Atty. Gen., et al. v. CITY OF STUART.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

120 So. 335

97 Fla. 69

STATE ex rel. DAVIS, Atty. Gen., et al. v. CITY OF STUART.

Florida Supreme Court

January 30, 1929

En Banc.

Original quo warranto by the State, on the relation of Fred H. Davis Attorney General, and others, against the City of Stuart.

Judgment of ouster.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

Information in quo warranto by Attorney General need only allege in general terms usurpation of public office or franchise without lawful authority. The general rule is that where, in quo warranto proceedings instituted by the Attorney General in the name of the state, usurpation of a public office or franchise is claimed by the state, the information filed by the Attorney General need only allege in general terms that the person holding the office or the person or corporation enjoying the franchise does so without lawful authority, and it then devolves upon the respondent to show a complete legal right to the enjoyment of the privileges in question.

General allegation of information in quo warranto of exercise of franchise without lawful authority may be met by setting up legislative act as justification. As against the state, when the information filed by the Attorney General contains only such general allegation of the exercise of a franchise without lawful authority, the respondent may meet this by setting up in its answer as justification an act of the Legislature, complete, valid, and constitutional on its face purporting to authorize the exercise by the respondent of such franchise.

Relators in quo warranto may set up unconstitutionality of legislative act either by replication to answer or in information; legal sufficiency of information in quo warranto alleging unconstitutionality of law is subject to attack by demurrer. Where in quo warranto proceedings the Attorney General, as relator, joined by certain property owners as corelators charges generally a usurpation of a public franchise without lawful authority, and the respondent in its answer seeks to justify under an act of the Legislature apparently valid on its face, if for any reason aliunde the face of the statute the relators deem the act to be invalid because of its unconstitutionality as applied to the facts, they could set this up by replication to the answer, or, if they prefer they may do so to commence with, in the information itself. If they choose to embrace such allegations in the information, the legal sufficiency thereof is as much subject to attack by demurrer as it would be if set up by way of replication; the effect being to advance the pleadings one step.

Legislature has power to establish, alter, extend, or contract municipal boundaries; exercise by Legislature of power to establish alter, extend, or contract municipal boundaries is not entirely beyond reach of judicial review (Const. art. 8, § 8). The Legislature undoubtedly has the power to establish alter, extend, or contract municipal boundaries, but the exercise of this power is not absolutely unlimited and entirely beyond the reach of judicial review.

Arbitrary and unlimited power is not vested in any department of state government. Under our constitutional system, arbitrary and unlimited power is not vested in any department of the state government.

Legislature is supreme in legislative field unless violating express or implied provisions of Constitution; legislation pertaining to municipal boundaries cannot violate express or implied provisions of Constitution (Const. art. 8, § 8). The generally accepted principle is that the Legislature is supreme in the legislative field, which is the most powerful branch of the government, so long as it does not violate any of the express or implied provisions of the state and federal Constitutions. Legislation pertaining to municipal boundaries is no exception to this general rule.

Establishment and extension of municipal boundaries is exclusively legislative power; every reasonable presumption in favor of validity of legislative action extending municipal boundaries must be indulged; legislative action extending municipal boundaries is subject to judicial review when constituting palpably arbitrary, unnecessary and flagrant invasion of property rights (Const. Fla. Declaration of Rights, § 12; art. 8, § 8; art. 9,§§ 1, 5; Const. U.S. Amend. 14). The establishment and extension of municipal boundaries is exclusively a legislative power, one that neither the judicial nor the executive departments can exert, and in the exercise of that power great latitude must necessarily be accorded to the legislative discretion, and every reasonable presumption in favor of the validity of its action must be indulged. But where it is perfectly clear that a boundary extension act constitutes a palpably arbitrary, unnecessary, and flagrant invasion of property rights clearly guaranteed by the Constitution, such an act is as much subject to judicial review, when properly brought in question before the courts as any other class of legislation.

Courts, in case question is properly presented, must accord hearing to determine whether legislative action in establishing municipal limits invades constitutional property rights. The great delicacy and difficulty of judicial review of this class of legislation, by reason of the many and various factors which must be considered--such, for instance, as the undoubted power of the Legislature, in establishing municipal limits, to accommodate not only the present but reasonably anticipated future needs of a growing city--must not deter the courts from according a hearing and enforcing the Constitution in those cases, rare though they may be, where the question is properly presented and it is shown clearly and beyond all reasonable doubt that such act invades property rights that are guaranteed by the Constitution.

Declaration of Rights constitutes limitation on powers of every department of state government. Primacy of position in our state Constitution is accorded the Declaration of Rights; thus emphasizing the importance of those basic and inalienable rights of personal liberty and private property which are thereby reserved and guaranteed to the people and protected from arbitrary invasion or impairment from any governmental quarter. The Declaration of Rights constitutes a limitation upon the powers of every department of the state government.

Courts have duty of observing provisions of Declaration of Rights as well as other constitutional provisions. By the provisions of the Declaration of Rights, the people have invested the right of private property with a certain inviolability which should not be frittered away by specious verbal attacks upon each separate clause, which ignore their plain and essential purpose and meaning, nor should 'the united fagot be broken stick by stick until all its strength is gone.' It is the duty of the courts to observe and preserve these, as well as all other, provisions of the Constitution, in their full force and integrity.

Legislative action subjecting property to taxation is invalid unless for public purpose, and burden is one which should properly be borne by district (Const. Declaration of Rights, § 12). When the Legislature exercises the power to subject the property of the citizen to taxation, there are two questions which may generally be raised: First, whether the purpose of the burden imposed is a public purpose; and, second, if public, whether the burden is one which should properly be borne by the district upon which it is imposed. If either of these questions be answered in the negative, the Legislature assumes an authority not conferred by the general grant of legislative power, and offends against those provisions of the Declaration of Rights which protect private property from arbitrary invasion without just compensation.

Legislature cannot unduly extend municipal boundaries so as to arbitrarily impose heavy tax burden on remote territory without compensating advantages (Const. U.S. Amend. 14; Const. Fla. art. 9, §§ 1, 5). There is no sound reason which would deny the power of the Legislature to unduly extend the boundaries of a special taxing district to cover property which could not conceivably be benefited by the special improvement, and yet admit the power to unduly extend municipal boundaries so as to subject to city taxes for local city purposes property so remotely located as to be entirely beyond the range of municipal benefits, thus arbitrarily imposing on such separate and remote territory heavy burdens without compensating advantages of any kind, in derogation of the same class of constitutional property rights which are protected from invasion in establishing the limits of special taxing districts.

Legislature, in exercising constitutional powers over municipalities, cannot violate other constitutional provisions (Const. art. 8 § 8). In exercising the powers over municipalities vested in the Legislature by section 8 of article 8 of the Constitution, the Legislature is not authorized to violate other provisions of the Constitution, express or implied.

Constitutional prohibition against taking private property without just compensation is not limited to taking in exercise of eminent domain. In some jurisdictions, the courts have held that the clause in the Declaration of Rights which prohibits the taking of private property without just compensation applies only to a taking in the exercise of eminent domain. Others, including this court, have accorded to it a greater significance and a broader effect.

Arbitrary and unreasonable legislative action extending municipal boundaries may amount to taking of private property without just compensation (Const. U.S. Amend. 14; Const. Fla Declaration of Rights, § 12). If under the guise of...