State v. City of Sarasota
| Decision Date | 06 August 1926 |
| Citation | 92 Fla. 563,109 So. 473 |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. JOHNSON, Atty. Gen. v. CITY OF SARASOTA. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Original proceeding in quo warranto by the State, on the relation of J. B. Johnson, Attorney General, against the City of Sarasota.
Demurrer of the relator to the respondent's answer overruled.
Syllabus by the Court
In locating boundaries, it is permissible to begin at any definite corner or monument, and to run a reverse course, if necessary, to harmonize all the calls in a description.
Description of municipal boundaries, enabling surveyor to locate and identify land, is sufficient. If a surveyor, by applying the recognized rules of surveying, can locate and identify the land as described in a deed, the description will be held sufficient, and, by analogy, the description of municipal boundaries contained in a legislative act will not be held void for uncertainty, if, by applying the same rule, the description incloses an area of land which could thus be located.
Superfluous words in description of municipal boundaries, which is complete without such words, will be treated as harmless surplusage (Acts Sp. Sess. 1925, c. 11724). Where the description of municipal boundaries in an act of the Legislature (chapter 11724, Acts Special Session 1925) contains superfluous words, which describe a dead end line running out at right angles from the boundary, inclosing nothing, and the description is otherwise definite and complete, describing a definite area which is completely inclosed by an unbroken boundary line, such superfluous words describing such dead end line will be treated as harmless surplusage, and their presence in the act will not be permitted to defeat the legislative intent or affect its validity.
Where description of territory incorporated is not so uncertain as to render determination of territory impossible, act is not void for uncertainty of description. The recognized rule in this jurisdiction is that where the description of territory incorporated within municipal limits by a special law does not utterly fail to inclose or cover some area, and the description is not so uncertain as to make it impossible to determine the territory intended to be included in the municipality, the law is not void for uncertainty of description.
Right to be municipal corporation or to exercise municipal franchise cannot be challenged by individual citizen in his own name or right; proceedings to arrest usurpation of municipal franchise must run in name of state, on relation of Attorney General, by filing information in nature of quo warranto, and institution of such proceeding is within discretion of Attorney General (Rev. Gen. St. 1920, §§ 3581-3584). The right to be a municipal corporation or to exercise a municipal franchise cannot be challenged by the individual citizen in his own name or right. Such franchise can be granted or withheld by the state at its pleasure, and proceedings to arrest the usurpation of such a franchise must run in the name of the state on the relation of the Attorney General, by the filing of an information in the nature of a quo warranto, and the institution of such proceeding is within the discretion of the Attorney General.
General common-law rule is that private individual, without interventionof Attorney General, cannot file information in nature of quo warranto to test existence of public franchise under statute, informations in nature of quo warranto were permitted to be filed on relation of any person interested in such matter of proceeding; in proceedings in nature of quo warranto, distinction is made between usurpation affecting only public rights and those primarily affecting private rights, though they at same time involved usurpation of public franchise. The general common-law rule is that a private individual, without the intervention of the Attorney General, cannot file an information in the nature of a quo warranto, to test the existence of a public franchise, but under the Statute of Anne, 9, chapter 20, such informations were permitted to be filed upon the relation of any person interested in the subject-matter of the proceeding. A distinction is made between usurpations which affect public rights alone and those which primarily affect private rights though they at the same time involve the usurpation of a public franchise.
Constitutionality of act cannot be questioned by party whose rights are not affected thereby. The rule is well settled that the constitutionality of an act cannot be questioned by a party whose rights are not affected by its enforcement. One who is not himself denied some constitutional right or privilege cannot be heard to raise constitutional questions on behalf of some other person, who may at some future time be affected.
To protect personal constitutional rights, individuals affected by usurpation of public franchise must secure institution of quo warranto proceedings in name of state, or proper amendment of proceedings already pending, if permissible. In order to protect their personal constitutional rights, if any, individuals affected by the usurpation of a public franchise must secure the institution of quo warranto proceedings in appropriate form, in the name of the state, or the proper amendment of proceedings already pending, where such is permissible in quo warranto proceedings, so as to bring their rights before the court for adjudication.
Where information charging usurpation of corporate rights by city runs in name of state, by Attorney General, no individuals being corelators, answer of city setting up statute extending city limits to include certain territory, valid on its face is sufficient, although it shows such territory contains considerable body of unimproved and uninhabited rural lands (Sp. Acts 1913, c. 6768; Acts Sp. Sess. 1925, c. 11724; Const. Declaration of Rights, §§ 1 and 4, and article 9, §§ 1, 5). Where, as here, the information runs in the name of the state by its representative, the Attorney General, no individuals being joined as corelators, and charges in general terms the usurpation by a municipality of corporate rights and privileges without authority of law over certain described territory, the presumption is that the state, by its Attorney General, is acting for the state in vindication of public rather than private rights, nothing to the contrary appearing; and where the respondent city sets up by its answer as justification a legislative enactment extending its limits so as to include such territory, valid on its face such answer will be held to be sufficient, although it also appears therefrom that such territory contains a considerable body of unimproved and uninhabited rural lands, it not being shown that the owners of such lands are objecting to their inclusion within the city limits or are asserting in any way their personal constitutional rights or privileges, if any, as against the validity of such act.
Inclusion within municipal boundaries of rural lands does not per se render act void, in absence of showing that constitutional rights of owners are invaded (Const. art. 8, § 8). The mere inclusion within municipal boundaries, by legislative enactment, of a considerable body of rural lands, does not per se render such act unconstitutional and void, in the absence of any proper showing that the constitutional rights of the owners of such lands are invaded thereby.
Legislature's prescribing boundaries of municipalities will not be disturbed, if in harmony with state and federal Constitutions, and not in violation of individual constitutional rights; though Legislature's power over municipal corporations and their boundaries is not unlimited, its limitations must be found in either national or state Constitution, and not in opinion of courts as to wisdom or policy of such legislation (Const. art. 8, § 8). The Legislature is vested by the Constitution with the power to prescribe the territorial boundaries of municipalities, and the exercise of such power will not be disturbed so long as it is done in harmony with other applicable provisions of the state and federal Constitutions, and not in violation of properly asserted individual constitutional rights. The supremacy of the Legislature over municipal corporations and their boundaries is not in all respects unlimited, but the limitations must be found in either the national or state Constitution, and not in any mere opinion the courts might entertain as to the wisdom or policy of such legislation in any particular case.
Mabry, Reaves & Carlton, of Tampa, for relator.
Sawyer, Surrency, Carter & Keen, Burket & Fish, and King & Barringer, all of Sarasota, for respondent.
This is an original proceeding by quo warranto, the writ having been granted by this court upon a petition or information filed by the Attorney General, to test the validity of chapter 11724 being 'an act to enlarge the territorial limits and jurisdiction of the city of Sarasota,' etc., approved November 30, 1925, and appearing on pages 1978-1982 of the Acts of the Extra Session of the Legislature held in November, 1925. The respondent filed an answer to the writ, and to this answer the relator interposed demurrer.
The writ calls upon the respondent to forthwith answer to the state of Florida by what warrant or authority it claims to have and exercise corporate powers and privileges over the territory described in the writ, being the territory set forth in said act, except that part of such territory which constituted the corporate limits of said city prior to said Act of November 30, 1925.
The city answered that it was exercising such corporate powers over the territory described in the writ by virtue of the legislative act...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Northwest Magnesite Co.
... ... p. 412 ... This ... rule is particularly applicable to public contracts ... State v. City of Pullman, 23 Wash. 583, 63 P. 265, ... 83 Am.St.Rep. 836; Brougham v. Seattle, 194 Wash. 1, ... 76 P.2d 1013 ... 186, 59 Am.St.Rep. 381; State ... ex rel. Davis v. City of Eau Gallie, 99 Fla. 579, 126 ... So. 124; State v. City of Sarasota, 92 Fla. 563, 109 ... So. 473; State ex rel. Davis v. City of Clearwater, ... 106 Fla. 761, 139 So. 377, 146 So. 836 ... ...
-
State Ex Rel. Harrell v. Cone
... ... 183; Adams v. American ... Agricultural Chemical Co., 78 Fla. 362, 82 So. 850; ... Land v. State, 77 Fla. 212, 81 So. 159; State v ... City of Sarasota, 92 Fla. 563, 109 So. 473; City of ... Sebring v. Wolf, 105 Fla. 516, 141 So. 736; [130 Fla ... 161] State ex rel. Alderman v ... ...
-
Pembroke v. Peninsular Terminal Co.
... ... by the trustees of the internal improvement fund of the state ... of Florida, and which was in turn conveyed to the complainant ... by deed dated April 18, ... period; that two causeways have been constructed across ... said Bay connecting the City of Miami with the City of ... Miami Beach; and that various islands have [108 Fla. 52] ... been ... 87, 861; State v. City of Sarasota, 92 Fla. 563, 109 ... So. 473; West v. Town of Lake Placid, 97 Fla. 127, ... 120 So. 361; ... ...
-
State Ex Rel. Harrington v. City of Pompano
... ... municipal purposes, and cannot be benefited by the ... municipality or its public facilities or improvements, and ... cannot be needed for a reasonably expected growth of the ... municipality or the needs of the municipality. State v ... City of Sarasota, 92 Fla. 563, 109 So. 473; State v ... Stuart, 97 Fla. 69, 120 So. 335, 64 A.L.R. 1307; ... State v. Avon Park, 108 Fla. 641, 149 So. 409; ... State v. Town of Lake Placid, 109 Fla. 419, 147 So ... 468; State v. Pompano, 113 Fla. 246, 151 So. 485; ... State v. Fort Lauderdale, 102 ... ...