State v. Clair

• Decision Date: 04 February 1892
• Citation: 84 Me. 248,24 A. 843
• Parties: STATE v. CLAIR.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

24 A. 843

84 Me. 248

STATE

v. CLAIR.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Feb. 4, 1892.

(Official.)

Exceptions from superior court, Kennebec county.

Indictment of Noah Clair for an assault with intent to kill. There was a judgment of conviction, and he excepts. Exceptions overruled.

C. E. Littlefield, Atty. Gen., and L. T. Carleton, Co. Atty., for the State.

S. S. Brown, for defendant.

PETERS, C. J. The respondent was found guilty of an assault with Intent to kill, on an indictment which alleges that he assaulted one Roundy, "with intent him, the said Roundy, willfully, feloniously, and of his malice aforethought to kill and murder."

The facts are not reported, and the respective counsel do not quite agree in their recollection of them. The counsel for the respondent represents that the act complained of was the pushing of the complainant from a boat into a river, while opposite counsel affirms that it was more the act of beating him after he got him into the river. There is not, however, that we can perceive, any materiality in this difference, as far as the law questions are concerned.

Several propositions of law were given by the judge in his charge to the jury, which, as a whole, are considered by the defense to be objectionable. We quote them in the order as delivered :

"There is, however, another kind of homicide known to the criminal law, and that is the killing of a human being in the heat of passion, on sudden provocation, without express or' implied malice aforethought.

"The crime then committed 1b manslaughter at common law.

"Manslaughter at common law is the killing of a person on sudden provocation, in heat of blood, without any intention to kill him.

"An assault with intent to murder, and to kill and murder, means an assault with intent to murder either in the first or second degree.

"But there may be a killing under provocation and in the heat of passion, or an attempt to kill under provocation or in the heat of passion, without express or implied malice, as in case of voluntary manslaughter, when the intention is formed without time for deliberation.

"Now, our statutes have made a distinction between that class of assaults which are denominated 'assaults with intent to kill and murder,' and a class which are denominated 'assaults with intent to kill.'

"But where, in the heat of blood, an assault is made, the result of sudden provocation, the act so closely follows the intent as to preclude the presumption of design or deliberation, and it may also exclude the presumption of malice; and yet it may be an assault with intent to kill.

"If you shall find that he is guilty of an assault with intent to kill, or, rather, if you shall find that in the heat of passion, under sudden provocation, he Intended to kill...