State v. Clappes, 82-565-CR

• Decision Date: 28 February 1984
• Docket Number: No. 82-565-CR,82-565-CR
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, v. Douglas H. CLAPPES, Defendant-Respondent.

Page 141

344 N.W.2d 141

117 Wis.2d 277

STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, v. Douglas H. CLAPPES, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 82-565-CR.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Argued Jan. 5, 1984.

Decided Feb. 28, 1984.

David J. Becker, Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), for plaintiff-appellant-petitioner; Bronson C. La Follette, Atty. Gen., on brief.

Nila Robinson, Appleton (argued), for defendant-respondent; Mary Lou Robinson and Robinson, Smith & Robinson, Appleton, on brief.

STEINMETZ, Justice.

The issue in this case is whether statements made by the defendant in response to questions asked by a police officer are inadmissible because the questions were not preceded by Miranda warnings. ¹ The defendant made the statements after he had been brought from the scene of an automobile accident to a hospital and was on an emergency room table.

Both the trial court, the Honorable Fredrick W. Fleishauer, circuit court judge for Portage county assigned to the Waupaca county circuit court, and the court of appeals concluded that the defendant was subjected to custodial interrogation, and, therefore, any statements he made without being apprised of his Miranda rights were subject to suppression.

The defendant is charged with one count of operating a motor vehicle after revocation, sec. 343.44(1), Stats., and two counts of homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle in violation of sec. 940.09.

The facts which are undisputed are that there was a single-car accident which occurred at about 11:30 p.m. on May 20, 1980, on a county trunk highway, north of the City of Waupaca, Wisconsin. Two people were pronounced dead at the scene of the accident. The defendant was taken to an emergency room at Riverside Hospital in Waupaca where he was treated for lacerations, a ruptured bladder, a dislocated elbow, a compound fracture of the left femur, and shock.

Officer Gerald Jorgenson and Sgt. Donald Morey of the Waupaca County Highway Patrol had been to the scene of the accident to investigate and then had gone to the hospital. They testified their purpose in going to Riverside Hospital was to identify the dead and to obtain other information which they needed in order to complete their reports. Officer Jorgenson testified: "[M]yself and Sgt. Morey left the scene to go to Riverside Hospital to try to get some positive identification on the two individuals that were transported at that time." Sgt. Morey testified: "[M]yself and Officer Jorgenson went to Riverside Hospital to complete our reports and obtain the identification of one of the people in the accident," and "I was trying to find the relative, the positions, the firm positions of all the people in the vehicle and find who the driver was for the accident report."

By the time they arrived at the hospital, the officers knew that the accident car was owned by the defendant and that he did not have a driver's license. This, along with the physical circumstances of bodies at the accident scene, made them suspect that the defendant was the driver.

Once at the hospital, the officers attempted to identify the two deceased persons. Initially, they were successful only in identifying one of the victims and therefore, among other questions, they wished to ask the defendant about the identity of the other victim. They entered the emergency room where the defendant was being treated and Sgt. Morey began the questioning.

The questioning, which was not preceded by Miranda warnings, occurred at a time when the defendant was being treated by at least two doctors, two aides, two lab technicians, and a nurse. Sgt. Morey testified in respect to whether he asked a doctor if he could question the defendant as follows: "As I recall, I did ask 'Is it all right if I talk to him?' when I wanted to find out the identity of the girl." (One of the deceased victims.)

The officer who questioned the defendant stood at the head of the examining table and used a louder than normal voice which he likened to the same level of his voice used while he was testifying in court. In the course of the questioning, which lasted only two to three minutes, the defendant identified the two deceased victims and their positions in the car before the accident, and acknowledged he had been the driver of the car. Officer Jorgenson stood at the other side of the head of the table during the time Sgt. Morey asked the defendant the questions. He summarized the questioning as follows:

"Officer Morey was in a very loud voice asking the defendant, Mr. Clappes, if he could hear him, and he stated he could; and he had asked who the girl was, and his reply was Stacy, and he said, ... 'Where does Stacy live?' and he said, 'On the back road to King;' and he asked if, where Stacy was sitting, and he said the front passenger side. He asked where Mike was sitting. He said in the back seat; and then he said, made it a statement more or less, 'And you were driving; is that right?' and he repeated that, as I recall, once again, 'And you were driving; is that right?' and he said 'Yes.' "

Immediately following this questioning, the defendant was arrested and was issued a citation charging him with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant. Pursuant to Officer Jorgenson's direction, a nurse, after conferring with one of the doctors, drew a sample of blood, which later was analyzed and indicated a blood alcohol level of .162.

The testimony of the officers was received at a preliminary examination. Subsequently, the defendant brought a motion to suppress his statements and admission of driving. The trial court granted the motion finding this case to be controlled by Scales v. State, 64 Wis.2d 485, 219 N.W.2d 286 (1974).

The state filed a notice of appeal. The court of appeals, in an unpublished opinion, 112 Wis.2d 670, 332 N.W.2d 313, concluded that the defendant was subjected to "custodial interrogation" applying the Scales decision, and, therefore, Miranda warnings were required.

There are no disputed facts and therefore this court will review the trial court and court of appeals legal conclusion ab initio since only a question of law is presented as to whether the defendant was in custody. As we said in State v. Felton, 110 Wis.2d 485, 504, 329 N.W.2d 161 (1983): "In this case, ... the facts and the inferences to be drawn therefrom are undisputed. This court is not bound by a determination of the trial court which is based on undisputed facts, for, under those circumstances, only a question of law is presented." Earlier in Compton v. Shopko Stores, Inc., 93 Wis.2d 613, 616, 287 N.W.2d 720 (1980): "[T]his court has repeatedly held that on review this court is not bound by a finding of the trial court which is based upon undisputed evidence when that finding is essentially a conclusion of law." Since the facts are undisputed, the legal significance of those circumstances will be independently determined by this court. The conclusion arrived at by the trial court and the court of appeals was that in applying Scales, the defendant was, due to his physical condition, deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way, which was virtually the same as being in custody.

In the forerunner case to Miranda, Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 1764-65, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964), the court held:

"[T]hat where, as here, the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied 'the Assistance of Counsel' in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as 'made obligator upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment,' Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. at 342 [83 S.Ct. 792, 795, 9 L.Ed.2d 799] and that no statement elicited by the police during the interrogation may be used against him at a criminal trial."

Miranda was not based on the sixth amendment as was Escobedo, but rather on the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. The issue resolved in Miranda, as stated by that court was: "the admissibility of statements obtained from a defendant questioned while in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 384 U.S. at 445, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. The court decided that statements of the defendant obtained from questions asked while in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way could not be used as evidence against him, unless preceded by the Miranda warnings.

The Supreme Court in Miranda dealt in main with the restricted and coercive atmosphere when the defendant is accompanied only by the police and is in isolation from others and the world in general and the psychological pressures thus placed on the defendant. Id. at 448-49, 86 S.Ct. at 1614. The Court considered and reported with disapproval police interrogation techniques and summarized them as follows:

"From these representative samples of interrogation techniques, the setting prescribed by the manuals and observed in practice becomes clear. In essence, it is this: To be alone with the subject is essential to prevent distraction and to deprive him of any outside support. The aura of confidence in his guilt undermines his will to resist. He merely confirms the preconceived story the police seek to have him describe. Patience and persistence, at times relentless questioning, are employed. To obtain a confession, the interrogator must 'patiently maneuver himself or his quarry into a position from which the desired objective may be attained.' When normal procedures fail to produce the needed result, the police may resort...