State v. Clark

• Decision Date: 19 May 1911
• Citation: 114 Minn. 342,131 N.W. 369
• Parties: STATE v. CLARK.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

114 Minn. 342

131 N.W. 369

STATE

v.CLARK.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

May 19, 1911.

Appeal from District Court, Martin County; James H. Quinn, Judge.

Almon B. Clark was convicted of crime, and appeals from the judgment, and from an order denying a new trial. Reversed, and new trial granted.

Syllabus by the Court

A prosecuting attorney in a criminal case is not bound to make his argument to the jury colorless, or argue both sides of the case, if defendant is represented by counsel, and he may present forcibly the state's side of the case.

He is not, however, justified in thrusting his personality into the case and expressing his opinion that the defendant is guilty, or stating as a fact anything except what the evidence tends to prove, or which he expects in good faith to prove. If he violates this rule, he is guilty of misconduct.

Evidence considered, and held, that the prosecuting attorney was guilty of misconduct, which was prejudicial to the substantial rights of the defendant. Albert R. Allen, for appellant.

George T. Simpson, Lyndon A. Smith, and J. E. Palmer, for the State.

START, C. J.

The defendant was convicted, upon a verdict of guilty, in the district court of the county of Martin, of the crime of carnally knowing a female child under 14 years of age, and sentenced to hard labor in the state's prison for the term of 7 years. He appealed from a judgment and order denying his motion for a new trial.

His alleged errors are numerous, but the here important ones fall within two general groups: (a) Those relating to the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to justify his conviction of the felony; and (b) those relating to the charge of misconduct on the part of the counsel for the state. The direct evidence on the question of his guilt was radically conflicting; the complaining witness testifying to the commission of the offense, and he denying it. There was evidence of collateral facts of much probative force, indicating private motives for the prosecution. No charge was made against defendant for two years and four months after the alleged offense was claimed to have been committed, and not until civil litigation was pending between the defendant and the complaining witness' foster father.

We have considered the whole evidence, and reached the conclusion that, if the alleged misconduct of the prosecuting attorney be eliminated, the evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict, within the rule applicable to such questions when raised in this court. Nevertheless, so far as we are able to judge from the record, if the jury had found the defendant not guilty, the verdict could not have been fairly criticised. Therefore, if the defendant, by reason of the conduct of the prosecuting attorney, did not have a fair trial, there must be a new trial, for the defendant's guilt was not so clearly shown that we could say that, if the prosecuting attorney was guilty of misconduct, it was not prejudicial.

The state was not represented on the trial by any public officer, but by private attorneys appointed by the court, for the reason that there was then a vacancy in the office of county attorney. No objection was made to such appointment, and presumably it was a proper one, and we here refer to it only for the purpose of disclosing the relation of the appointees to the case. Complaint is made of the conduct of only one of the appointees, a member of the bar of Freeborn county, who is hereafter referred to as the prosecuting attorney.

[1] Where an attorney is appointed by the court to represent the public in the prosecution of a criminal case, in the absence of the county attorney, he owes the same duties to the public and to the accused as the county attorney would, if personally conducting the prosecution. The duties and obligations of a prosecuting officer are not simply those...