State v. Clark

• Decision Date: 16 December 1902
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. CLARK.

71 P. 20

30 Wash. 439

STATE v. CLARK.

Supreme Court of Washington

December 16, 1902

Appeal from superior court, Spokane county; Geo. W. Belt, Judge.

Action by the state against Charlotte Chark, as trustee under the will of James Clark, deceased. From a judgment for plaintiff defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Sullivan, Nuzum & Nuzum, for appellant.

W. B Stratton, E. W. Ross, and C. C. Dalton, for the State.

REAVIS C.J.

James Clark died testate in Spokane county August 8, 1901, owning and possessed of property, real and personal, within the state, of the value of $140,751.40. By his will Charlotte Clark, appellant, was appointed executrix and trustee for the purpose of administering the estate under the provisions of the law. Controversies arose between appellant and the state over the demand by the state for the tax claimed under the provisions of the act relating to the taxation of inheritances. Laws 1901, p. 67. The facts are stated by agreement. Those material for consideration here are, in substance: That all debts owing by deceased at the time of his death for local and state taxes due, and the reasonable sum for funeral expenses, costs of appraisement for assessing the inheritance tax, and costs of administration, amount to $12,333.50. That, after deduction of said sum of $12,333.50 from the estate, the entire residue thereof is devised as follows: To N. Fred Essig, a stranger to the blood of said deceased, $1,500; to E. Kauten, a stranger to the blood of said deceased, $1,000; to Mamie McCoy, a niece of said deceased, $5,000; to Agnes Clark, a stranger to the blood of said deceased, $10,000; to Mrs. Mary Harvey, a sister of said deceased, $2,500; to Mrs. Bessie Casey, a sister of said deceased, $2,500; to Catherine M. Clark, a daughter of said deceased, $52,633.95; to Patrick P. Clark, a son of said deceased, $53,383.95,--total, $128,517.90. Upon these facts the court concluded that the $10,000 exemption mentioned in section 2 of the statute is a single exemption confined to and in favor of the class of heirs composed of father, mother, husband, wife, lineal descendants, adopted child, or the lineal descendants of an adopted child, and must be taken from their portion of the estate, namely Catherine Clark, the daughter, and Patrick P. Clark, the son of deceased; and further concluded that such exemption did not extend to the shares of any of the other legatees mentioned; that there was no authorized exemption of the estate passing to collateral heirs or strangers to the blood that the tax imposed in the statute is laid upon the succession or devolution of the estate and upon the right of passing the estate, and is not a tax upon the estate.

1. The first objection urged to the decree is that the statute under which it is made is invalid, because the legislature was without power to lay such an imposition or tax upon the devolution of an estate. It does not appear from the argument of counsel that they assume the objection to the power of the legislature is sustained by any considerable authority, but an earnest appeal is made to general principles of constitutional construction. It is urged that our state constitution grants to the legislature special and delegated powers, and legislative enactments, to be valid, must come within such grant of powers; but no sanction is found for such principle of interpretation in the numerous authorities referred to in counsel's brief. The two principal cases relied upon by counsel as adverse to the validity of such laws are Black v. State (Wis.) 89 N.W. 522, and Curry v. Spencer, 61 N.H. 624, 60 Am. Rep. 337. In each of these decisions inheritance tax statutes were determined invalid upon construction of provisions existing in the respective state constitutions. In the Wisconsin case the court concluded that a provision in the statute before it exempting estates below $10,000 in value, and without regard to the value of the bequests, and taxing those above the value of $10,000, conferred special privileges on the exempted class, and was forbidden by a constitutional provision against conferring special privileges. It is true the opinion questions the complete control of the state over the devolution of property after the death of the owner. Though conceding that the current of judicial expression is in favor of such power, the concurring opinion in the decision of one of the justices also maintains that the general constitutional declaration of the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness protects the right to inherit or devise property, because such rights are natural ones. But he also concedes that the weight of the highest authority defines such rights as arising from municipal law. In the New Hampshire case an inheritance tax was adjudged void because of a constitutional restriction found to exist in the grant of the taxing power to the legislature. The court observes: 'Nor is it to be questioned that the subject of the taxation in the present case is one within legislative control, because inheritances, distributive shares, and legacies are but creatures of the law. In fact, the only right to take or dispose of property by descent or devise is derived from the sovereign power of the state through its laws. 'Wills, therefore, and testaments, rights of inheritance, and successions are all of them creatures of the civil or municipal laws, and accordingly are in all respects regulated by them.' 2 Bl. Comm. 12. It must be conceded, then, that, in the absence of constitutional prohibition, the legislature has the power to impose conditions by way of a tax upon legacies and successions; and so the only inquiry is whether the taxation in question is excluded either by the express terms of the constitution or by necessary implication, because, if it is not, the power of the legislature must be regarded as having been properly exercised. An answer to the inquiry is readily afforded; for while, by article 5 of our constitution, the legislature is empowered to assess and levy taxes, this grant of power is expressly limited to 'proportional and reasonable assessments, rates, and taxes upon all the inhabitants and residents within the said state, and upon the estates within the same'; and by the bill of rights, art. 12, every inhabitant is bound to contribute only his share, which manifestly, and according to the uniform decisions of this court for more than half a century, cannot be more than his proportional share of the common burden.' Thus these cases in which such taxes were adjudged invalid concede the power of the legislature to enact such statutes unless some express or implied restriction is found in the constitution. The only intimation made in any of the authorities before us of a doubt of the plenary power of the legislature to enact such laws where unrestrained by constitutional provisions seems to have been expressed, though it was not determined, in the Wisconsin case. Counsel refer to two sections of our constitution, which, they contend, by implication support their view that the constitution is to be construed as a delegation of power to the legislature,--the first, section 30, art. 1, which reads, 'The enumeration of certain rights shall not be construed to deny others retained by the people;' and section 1, art. 1: 'Political Power. All political power is inherent in the people and governments derive their just power from the consent of the people.' The latter (section 1) is evidently the statement of a fundamental principle inhering in the formation of the state and federal governments. It has no application to the distribution of the sovereign powers of the government by the people. The legislature represents this sovereignty of the people, except as limited by the constitution. The first (section 30) is apparently the expression that the declaration of certain fundamental rights belonging to all individuals and made in the bill of rights shall not be construed to mean the abandonment of others not expressed,...