State v. Clark

• Decision Date: 17 May 1994
• Citation: 642 A.2d 159
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. Gregory CLARK.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 159

642 A.2d 159

STATE of Maine v. Gregory CLARK.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Submitted on Briefs March 14, 1994.

Decided May 17, 1994.

David W. Crook, Dist. Atty., Paul Rucha, Asst. Dist. Atty., Augusta, for the State.

C.H. Spurling, Augusta, for defendant.

Before WATHEN, C.J., ROBERTS, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, RUDMAN and DANA, JJ., and COLLINS, A.R.J. ^*

CLIFFORD, Justice.

Gregory Clark appeals from an order of the Superior Court (Kennebec County, Chandler, J.) revoking Clark's sentence being served pursuant to intensive supervision (ISP) and requiring him to serve his remaining seventeen months in institutional confinement. Clark contends that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the motion to terminate ISP when it held the hearing after the statutory seven-day time limit. We affirm the order.

In September of 1991, after having entered pleas of guilty to counts of robbery, theft, burglary, and criminal threatening with a dangerous weapon, Clark was sentenced in the Superior Court (Chandler, J.) to serve ten years in prison, with all but five of those years suspended, and the final eighteen months of the unsuspended portion to be served with intensive supervision. See 17-A M.R.S.A. §§ 1261-1267 (Supp.1993). ¹ Conditions of Clark's ISP included abiding by a curfew, remaining at his residence except for travel approved in advance by his ISP officer, refraining from possession or use of alcohol, and not violating any federal, state, or municipal laws.

Approximately two weeks into the intensively supervised portion of his sentence, Clark left his home without approval, drank alcohol, drove in violation of his habitual offender status, and stole alcohol and money from a safe, all in violation of his ISP conditions. On July 16, 1993, a motion was made for termination of ISP and a hearing in the Superior Court was scheduled for July 27, 1993. On the morning of July 27th, the court met with counsel and, because the court was occupied with a jury trial, the hearing was postponed for two days over Clark's objection. Clark then moved to dismiss the motion to terminate ISP, contending, as he does in this appeal, that the delay placed the hearing beyond the seven-court-day statutory time limit between notice of violation and the hearing to terminate ISP, and thus deprived the court of jurisdiction to hear the matter and terminate his ISP. The court did hear the motion to terminate on July 29. Following the hearing, the court denied Clark's motion to dismiss and also ordered that his ISP be terminated and that he serve the remaining portion of his unsuspended sentence in institutional confinement. Clark's appeal followed.

17-A M.R.S.A. § 1265 (Supp.1993) governs termination of ISP, providing that

1. Upon probable cause to believe that a prisoner on [ISP] has violated any condition of that program, that prisoner may be immediately apprehended. Notice of the violation shall be filed with the sentencing court or any Superior Court within 2 court days[.] ...

2. A hearing shall be held within 7 court days of the filing of notice of violation....

We are unpersuaded by Clark's contention that the seven-court-day period imposed by section 1265(2) is jurisdictional in nature, and that, because the hearing was not held within seven court days of the filing of the notice of violation, the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to terminate Clark's ISP.

Section 1265(2) was designed to afford a person serving a sentence pursuant to the intensive supervision program a prompt hearing on revocation of ISP because the...