State v. Clark
| Decision Date | 04 April 2000 |
| Citation | 14 S.W.3d 719 |
| Parties | (Mo.App. W.D. 2000) State of Missouri, ex rel., Robert and Jennet Riggs, Relators, v. Hon. Thomas Clark, Respondent. WD57641 0 |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal From: Circuit Court of Jackson County
Counsel for Appellant: Gerard Eftink
Counsel for Respondent: Alan B. Gallas
Opinion Summary: Defendants made a written offer of judgment in a lawsuit they were involved in with the Riggs. The Riggs accepted the offer and filed with the court. Before the court entered judgment on the offer and acceptance, Defendants filed a motion to vacate the offer and acceptance with the court, which was sustained. The Riggs filed a petition for a writ in mandamus and/or prohibition with this court.
Court holds: The court did not have discretion to refuse to enter judgment on the offer and acceptance. The case is remanded with an order to enter judgment thereon.
Harold L. Lowenstein
This court previously entered an alternative rule in mandamus and prohibition relating to the trial court setting aside an offer and acceptance of judgment entered into by parties in their underlying lawsuit. Rule 77.04.1 Relators Robert and Jennet Riggs are involved in a pending action against Ford Motor Company, Ford Motor Credit Company and Bob Sight Ford, Inc. (the "Defendants"), before Circuit Judge Thomas Clark ("Respondent"). Relators brought that claim for damages against Defendants after experiencing mechanical difficulty with the Ford Explorer that Relators leased from Ford.
On June 25, 1999, Defendants made to Relators, under Rule 77.04, a written offer of judgment in the amount of $6,000.00, and filed the offer with the court. Relators accepted the offer of judgment and on June 29, 1999, filed an acceptance with the court. However, the court never entered judgment on the offer and acceptance. On July 2, 1999, Defendants filed a "Motion to Vacate the Offer and Acceptance of Judgment."2 After receiving briefs from the parties and hearing oral arguments, Respondent issued an order sustaining Defendants' motion, finding there was "no clear understanding by counsel or the parties respecting the terms of the Offer and Acceptance of Judgment." Thereafter, Relators filed a petition for a writ in mandamus and/or prohibition with this court claiming Respondent had no jurisdiction to vacate an offer of judgment once accepted.
In their petition, Relators assert Respondent had no authority to vacate the offer and acceptance of judgment because under the language of Rule 77.04, once an offer is accepted the court "shall" enter judgment. Respondent, on the other hand, asserts the vacation of the offer was within his jurisdiction because the court retains control to vacate judgments pursuant to Rules 73.01 and 75.01.
Each party here submits an argument inapplicable to the fact pattern before this court. The problem in this case is that, after Defendants' offer of judgment and Relators' acceptance were filed with the trial court, the court never entered a final judgment to be acted upon under Rules 73.01 or 75.01. Rule 77.04, in pertinent part, reads:
[A] party defending against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment...If...the adverse party serves written notice that the offer is accepted, either party may then file the offer and notice of acceptance together with proof of service thereof and thereupon judgment shall be entered.
Emphasis added. The language of Rule 77.04 leaves no discretion with the trial court as to whether or not to enter judgment after an offer and acceptance of judgment. "Rule 77.04 was designed simply to permit a defendant to avoid court costs by making an offer of judgment which, if accepted, would result in a consent judgment." Katz Drug Co. v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 647 S.W.2d 831, 840 (Mo. App. 1983) (). Relators are correct in their assertion that the trial court was required to enter judgment upon the offer of judgment and acceptance. However, Relators attempt to argue that because Rule 77.04 requires the court to enter judgment after an offer and acceptance, that the court had no jurisdiction to ever vacate that judgment after its entry. This argument, in addition to being incorrect3, is irrelevant to these proceedings since here no judgment has been entered by the trial court.
Additionally, Respondent's argument that the trial court retains jurisdiction to vacate a consent judgment...
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Caldwell v. Heritage House Realty, Inc., et al
...of judgment is made and accepted in accordance with Rule 77.04, the circuit court must enter a judgment thereon. State ex rel. Riggs v. Clark, 14 S.W.3d 719, 721 (Mo. App. 2000). Conversely, logic would dictate that if the offer is not made and accepted in accordance with Rule 77.04, the tr......
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American Family Insurance v. Hart et al
...was required to enter judgment pursuant to the agreement, with the judgment constituting a consent judgment. See State ex rel. Riggs v. Clark, 14 S.W.3d 719, 721 (Mo. App. 2000). The second judgment was titled "Payout Order and Judgment Disposing of Remaining Issues and Parties." It recogni......
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Gabriel v. St. Joseph, LLC
...to avoid court costs by making an offer of judgment which, if accepted, would result in a consent judgment.” State ex rel. Riggs v. Clark, 14 S.W.3d 719, 721 (Mo.App.W.D.2000) (citing Katz Drug Co. v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 647 S.W.2d 831, 840 (Mo.App.W.D.1983)). “The rule provides t......
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Gabriel v. St. Joseph, LLC
...to avoid court costs by making an offer of judgment which, if accepted, would result in a consent judgment." State ex rel. Riggs v. Clark, 14 S.W.3d 719, 721 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000) (citing Katz Drug Co. v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 647 S.W.2d 831, 840 (Mo. App. W.D. 1983)). "The rule prov......