State v. Clark
| Decision Date | 22 March 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-1905.,98-1905. |
| Citation | 608 N.W.2d 5 |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Jerrot Heath CLARK, Appellee. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, David A. Ferree, Special Assistant Attorney General, and Mark Hunacek, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Stephan J. Japuntich, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellee.
Considered en banc.
The State appeals a district court ruling whereby it was determined the prosecution failed to prove the offense of driving while barred, because the Department of Transportation's procedure for adjudicating habitual offenders did not comply with the Iowa Code. We reverse and remand.
On October 7, 1997, defendant, Jerrot Heath Clark, was adjudicated an habitual offender by the Iowa Department of Transportation (DOT). In accordance with Iowa Code section 321.560, Clark was thereafter barred from driving for a period of two years. Defendant's adjudication was preceded by notice from the DOT in which he was informed of the pending agency action and apprised of his right to challenge the determination by requesting a hearing. Clark failed to respond, the decision of the DOT was executed and stood undisputed.
Thereafter, Clark was arrested on two subsequent occasions for driving while barred. Defendant was charged with both offenses and for possession of a controlled substance. The matters were tried on September 2, 1998, whereupon the district court held the DOT procedure for adjudicating habitual offenders did not comply with the notice requirements of Iowa Code section 321.556 (1997). The district court thus dismissed the two counts of driving while barred on the ground that the State failed to meet its burden of proof.
The State claims on appeal: (1) The DOT's procedure for adjudicating an individual an habitual offender does not conflict with the Iowa Code; (2) Any failure by the DOT to abide by the strictures of the Code did not invalidate the proceedings; and (3) The district court exceeded its jurisdictional authority in refuting the propriety of the DOT procedures.
We agree with the State's latter contention, and decline to address the other issues raised.
The State challenges the authority of a district court to rule on a matter presumably beyond its jurisdiction. Questions of jurisdiction, authority, and venue of the district court are legal issues to be reviewed for correction of errors at law. Holding v. Franklin County Zoning Bd., 565 N.W.2d 318, 320 (Iowa 1997); Iowa Dep't of Transp. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 534 N.W.2d 457, 459 (Iowa 1995) [hereinafter Bremer].
At issue in this case is whether the district court overstepped its authority when it ruled the State failed to prove the offense of driving while barred. The basis of that ruling lies in the wording of Iowa Code section 321.556 wherein it is stated:
If, upon review of the record of convictions of any person, the department determines that the person appears to be a habitual offender, the department shall immediately notify the person in writing and afford the licensee an opportunity for a hearing. The notice shall direct the person named in the notice to appear for hearing and show cause why the person should not be barred from operating a motor vehicle on the highways of this state ....
The DOT's present means of fulfilling this statutory obligation is by sending a notice which reads: "You are ordered to surrender your driver's license to the address below unless you request a contested hearing to show cause why you should not be barred as a habitual offender." The district court believed this notification procedure shifted the burden of initiating a hearing to the defendant, and that this was contrary to the Code. The court thus dismissed the charges against Clark in essence holding the DOT's habitual offender adjudication was void for failure to set and conduct a hearing.
The State contends the district court was without authority to review agency procedure in this matter because defendant failed to exhaust the administrative remedies for relief at his disposal, and because he did not file a petition with the court in accordance with the judicial review provisions of Iowa Code section 17A.19 (1997). We agree with the State's position.
In Bremer we remarked that when a party seeks a declaratory judgment on a matter entrusted exclusively in the first instance to an administrative agency, the court must refuse to issue a ruling unless the action is indistinguishable in substance from a petition for judicial review, and all of the jurisdictional prerequisites for judicial review of agency action have been met. Bremer, 534 N.W.2d at 459. "Declaratory relief is not appropriate when there is a complete remedy otherwise provided by law that is intended to be exclusive." Id. (quoting City of Des Moines v. Des Moines Police Bargaining Unit Ass'n, 360 N.W.2d 729, 730 (Iowa 1985)). Similarly, we find an exclusive remedy exists for the relief sought here.
Iowa Code section 321.556(4) provides:
... If the department's findings and conclusions are that the person is a habitual offender, the department shall issue an order prohibiting the person from operating a motor vehicle on the highways of this state for the period specified in section 321.560.
Section 321.560:
A license to operate a motor vehicle in this state shall not be issued to any person declared to be a habitual offender under section 321.555, subsection 1, for a period of not less than two years nor more than six years from the date of the final decision of the department under section 17A.19 or the date on which the district court upholds the final decision of the department, whichever occurs later....
Section 17A.19 is the judicial review provision of the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act (IAPA). A person adversely affected by agency action may seek redress thereunder. Bremer, 534 N.W.2d at 459. Section 17A.19 stipulates in pertinent part:
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