State v. Clark

Decision Date03 November 2014
Docket NumberNo. 5–13–34.,5–13–34.
Citation23 N.E.3d 218
PartiesSTATE of Ohio, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. John M. CLARK, Defendant–Appellant.
CourtOhio Court of Appeals

Kenneth J. Rexford, Lima, for Appellant.

Alan D. Hackenberg for Appellee.

OPINION

WILLAMOWSKI

, P.J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, John Clark (Clark), brings this appeal from the judgment of the Findlay Municipal Court in Hancock County, Ohio, finding him guilty of OVI (operation of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol) in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a)

, and sentencing him accordingly. On appeal, Clark challenges the trial court's entries denying his motion to suppress and his motion to dismiss for speedy trial violations. For the reasons that follow, we reverse in part and affirm in part the trial court's judgment.

{¶ 2} The facts relevant to this appeal, as stipulated by the parties, are as follows.

1) On October 13, 2011, Defendant John Clark was found off of South River Road in Findlay, Ohio underneath his motorcycle having crashed as a result of a deer crossing his path unexpectedly.1 The Hancock County Sheriff's Office first received a report of this crash at 1:47 A.M.
2) As a result of the accident, Defendant Clark was transported to the Blanchard Valley Hospital and then later by Life Flight t[o] Mercy St. Vincent's Medical Center in Toledo, Ohio.
3) On October 13, 2011 at 3:30 AM, St. Vincent's Medical Center drew Defendant Clark's blood, apparently for medical purposes, and tested same, discovering a blood alcohol content of 0.174%. Defendant was discharged from the medical center the next day.
4) On December 20, 2011, Deputy Thomas Miller of the Hancock County Sheriff's Office sent a request to the St. Vincent's Medical Center pursuant to Ohio Rev.Code 2317.02

and 2317.022 requesting Defendant's Clark [sic] medical records for the date of the accident. Although the form utilized by Deputy Miller was not identical to that contained in R.C. 2317.022, it was substantially similar.

5) St. Vincent's Medical Center complied with Deputy Miller's request and provided the medical records of the Defendant from the date of the accident. Based in part upon those medical records, Deputy Miller issued a citation to Defendant Clark for the offense of Operating a Motor Vehicle Impaired with a blood alcohol content of .174% in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), (c)

.

(R. at 25, J. Entry, June 5, 2013.)

{¶ 3} Deputy Miller did not obtain a warrant prior to obtaining Clark's medical records from St. Vincent's Medical Center. Instead, he utilized R.C. 2317.02(B)(2)(a)

and R.C. 2317.022. R.C. 2317.02(B)(2)(a) states, in relevant part:

If any law enforcement officer submits a written statement to a health care provider that states that an official criminal investigation has begun regarding a specified person or that a criminal action or proceeding has been commenced against a specified person, that requests the provider to supply to the officer copies of any records the provider possesses that pertain to any test or the results of any test administered to the specified person to determine the presence or concentration of alcohol, a drug of abuse, a combination of them, a controlled substance, or a metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's whole blood, blood serum or plasma, breath, or urine at any time relevant to the criminal offense in question, and that conforms to section 2317.022 of the Revised Code

, the provider, except to the extent specifically prohibited by any law of this state or of the United States, shall supply to the officer a copy of any of the requested records the provider possesses. If the health care provider does not possess any of the requested records, the provider shall give the officer a written statement that indicates that the provider does not possess any of the requested records.

R.C. 2317.02(B)(2)(a)

.

{¶ 4} Revised Code 2317.022

, which is referenced in R.C. 2317.02(B)(2)(a), contains the following language detailing how the request for medical records should be made.

If an official criminal investigation has begun regarding a person or if a criminal action or proceeding is commenced against a person, any law enforcement officer who wishes to obtain from any health care provider a copy of any records the provider possesses that pertain to any test or the result of any test administered to the person to determine the presence or concentration of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or alcohol and a drug of abuse in the person's blood, breath, or urine at any time relevant to the criminal offense in question shall submit to the health care facility a written statement in the following form:
“WRITTEN STATEMENT REQUESTING THE RELEASE OF RECORDS
To: .................... (insert name of the health care provider in question).
I hereby state that an official criminal investigation has begun regarding, or a criminal action or proceeding has been commenced against .................... (insert the name of the person in question), and that I believe that one or more tests has been administered to that person by this health care provider to determine the presence or concentration of alcohol, a drug of abuse, a combination of them, a controlled substance, or a metabolite of a controlled substance in that person's whole blood, blood serum or plasma, breath, or urine at a time relevant to the criminal offense in question. Therefore, I hereby request that, pursuant to division (B)(2) of section 2317.02 of the Revised Code

, this health care provider supply me with copies of any records the provider possesses that pertain to any test or the results of any test administered to the person specified above to determine the presence or concentration of alcohol, a drug of abuse, a combination of them, a controlled substance, or a metabolite of a controlled substance in that person's whole blood, blood serum or plasma, breath, or urine at any time relevant to the criminal offense in question.[”]2

R.C. 2317.022(B)

.

{¶ 5} Subsequently, Clark was charged with OVI, in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a)

, and failure to maintain control, in violation of R.C. 4511.202. (R. at 1.) On December 27, 2011, Clark appeared in the trial court for arraignment and requested a continuance. (R. at 3.)

He was released on his own recognizance and the matter was continued until January 10, 2012, with the delay charged against Clark pursuant to R.C. 2945.72(C)

. (Id. ) Prior to the next arraignment, attorney Kenneth J. Rexford entered an appearance on behalf of Clark and filed a Demand for Discovery and Inspection, Motion for a Bill of Particulars, Request for Intention To Use Evidence, Demand for Exculpatory Material, Demand for Preservation of Evidence, Motion Pursuant to Rule 801(D)(2), Motion for Production of 404(B) Information, and a Reciprocal Discovery Notice. (R. at 5.) On January 10, 2012, Clark appeared before the trial court, entered a plea of Not Guilty, and requested a pretrial conference, which was scheduled for January 31, 2012. (R. at 6–8.) The delay was again charged against Clark pursuant to R.C. 2945.72(E). On January 31, 2012, at the pretrial conference, Clark “requested additional time to consider the Prosecutor's Recommendation.” (R. at 9.) The Pre-trial Report, signed by the prosecutor and Clark's attorney, stated that “time limits pursuant to ORC 2945.71 –73 are hereby waived without limitation.” (Id. )

{¶ 6} On February 1, 2012, Clark filed his Motion to Suppress and to Declare R.C. § 2317.02

in Part Unconstitutional. (R. at 10.) Clark requested the suppression of “physical and testimonial evidence resulting from an unlawful and warrantless search of Mr. Clark's personal medical records, which violated his rights to privacy.” (Id. ) He further requested that the court declare unconstitutional the part of R.C. 2317.02 that permits such a warrantless search. (Id. ) There was a handwritten annotation on this filing stating 2/9/12 Set for Hearing Speedy Trial Tolled pursuant to R.C. 2945.72(E).” (Id. )

{¶ 7} The motion to suppress was scheduled to be heard on May 15, 2012, but prior to that hearing, on May 11, 2012, the trial court denied the part of the motion that requested to declare R.C. 2317.02

unconstitutional. (R. at 13.) The denial was based on the trial court's determination that it had no jurisdiction to rule upon the constitutionality of the statute due to Clark's failure to serve a copy of the motion upon the Attorney General, as required by R.C. 2721.12. (Id. ) The rest of the motion remained scheduled for the May 15, 2012 hearing. On May 14, 2012, Clark filed a motion to reconsider the trial court's judgment entry dismissing the challenge to the constitutionality of R.C. 2317.02, asserting that service upon the Attorney General was not required under the circumstances of this case.

{¶ 8} On May 15, 2012, the date scheduled for a hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court held a conference at which both parties “requested additional time to respond to the issue.” (R. at 15.) The suppression hearing was then rescheduled to a later date, which was July 25, 2012. (R. at 16.) On May 22, 2012, Clark filed Supplemental Memorandum Re: Motion to Suppress. (R. at 17.) On July 23, 2012, the State requested a continuance of the hearing date, stating that Clark's attorney was aware of the motion and had no objection, and requesting that the delay not be charged against the State under R.C. 2945.71

. (R. at 19.) The hearing was continued, and the time from July 25, 2012, to the next suppression hearing date of October 3, 2012, was not charged against the State. (R. at 20–21.)

{¶ 9} On October 3, 2012, the parties appeared before the trial court and agreed upon the facts of the case, except for the cause of the crash. (R. at 23.) The parties requested that the trial court rule on Clark's motion to reconsider, which had been filed in May 2012. (Id. ) The issue of the suppression was then deemed heard and submitted. (Id. ) Yet, on January 28, 2013, Clark...

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