State v. Clark
| Decision Date | 31 July 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 2007-1047.,No. 2007-0983.,2007-0983.,2007-1047. |
| Citation | 2008 Ohio 3748,119 Ohio St.3d 239,893 N.E.2d 462 |
| Parties | The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. CLARK, Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Thomas L. Sartini, Ashtabula County Prosecuting Attorney, and Shelley M. Pratt, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Stephen P. Hardwick, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
{¶ 1} The Eleventh District Court of Appeals has certified this case pursuant to Section 3(B)(4), Article IV, Ohio Constitution and App.R. 25. The court of appeals found its judgment to be in conflict with the judgment of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals in State v. Prom, 12th Dist. No. CA2002-01-007, 2003-Ohio-6543, 2003 WL 22887906, on the following issue: "Is a guilty plea knowing, intelligent, and voluntary when the trial court misinforms the defendant that he or she will be subject to five years post-release control if released and up to nine months in prison for any violation when, in fact, the defendant faces a lifetime of parole and re-incarceration for life for any violation?" We accepted defendant-appellant Ralph E. Clark's discretionary appeal on the same issue.
{¶ 2} For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and hold that for a plea to be knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made the trial judge must substantially comply with Crim.R. 11 in informing the defendant about the applicability of postrelease control and parole to his or her sentence. However, we remand the cause and instruct the court of appeals to determine whether Clark was prejudiced by the trial judge's incorrect statement of the law so as to warrant vacating his guilty plea.
{¶ 3} In 2005, defendant-appellant Ralph E. Clark was indicted for the murder of his wife, Carolyn Clark. Less than one week before trial, Clark agreed to plead guilty to one count of aggravated murder with a gun specification in exchange for the state's dismissal of two counts of murder with accompanying gun specifications and one of the two specifications to the aggravated-murder count. The prosecutor and defense counsel jointly recommended that Clark be sentenced to life imprisonment with parole eligibility after 28 years, i.e., after serving three years for the gun specification and 25 years of the aggravated murder sentence.
{¶ 4} In Clark's appeal, he argued that his plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. He contended that the trial judge failed to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) in his plea colloquy when the judge incorrectly stated that Clark would be subject to postrelease control after serving his sentence. The certified question of law refers to various incorrect statements of law made in the trial judge's colloquy in accepting the agreement. However, the misstatements were not limited to that colloquy; they also permeated the written plea agreement Clark signed and the sentence that the trial judge described and imposed at the sentencing hearing. This series of misstatements appears more fully below.
{¶ 5} After a plea agreement was reached, Clark, his attorney, and the prosecuting attorney signed a written agreement. This document states:
{¶ 6} "I understand that the maximum penalty for the crime of aggravated murder is life imprisonment without parole pursuant to Section 2929.03(A)(1)(a) and that the sentence for the three year gun specification shall be served consecutively to the sentence imposed for aggravated murder.
{¶ 7} "* * *
{¶ 8} "Post-Release Control. I understand that after I am released from prison, I may have a period of post-release control for five (5) years following my release from prison. If I violate a post-release control sanction imposed upon me, any one or more of the following may result.
{¶ 9} "(1) The Parole Board may impose a more restrictive post-release control sanction upon me; and
{¶ 10} "(2) The Parole Board may increase the duration of the post-release control subject to a specified maximum; and
{¶ 11} "(3) The more restrictive sanction that the Parole Board may impose may consist of a prison term, provided that the prison term cannot exceed nine months and the maximum cumulative prison term so imposed for all violations during the period of post-release control cannot exceed one-half of the stated prison term originally imposed upon me; and
{¶ 12} "(4) If the violation of the sanction is a felony, I may be prosecuted for the felony and, in addition to any sentence it imposes on me for the new felony, the Court may impose a prison term, subject to a specified maximum, for the violation." (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 13} The postrelease-control portion of this agreement incorrectly combines the concepts of postrelease control and parole to create a hybrid form of control that conflicts with the precise descriptions of the systems of postrelease control and parole in R.C. Chapter 2967.
{¶ 14} At the plea hearing, the trial judge orally addressed Clark in the process of accepting his agreed-upon plea. First, the judge informed him of the maximum sentence for aggravated murder: "The Court can order life imprisonment without the possibility of parole eligibility or I can order life imprisonment with parole eligibility after 20 years, after a full 25 years, or after a full 30 years." The trial court also informed Clark that he faced a mandatory three-year sentence for the gun specification. That portion of the plea colloquy was correct and did not prejudice any of Clark's rights.
{¶ 15} Unfortunately, after accurately explaining those penalties, the trial judge incorrectly explained postrelease control and parole. As in the plea agreement, the trial judge used the terms interchangeably, telling Clark that he would be subject to postrelease control, which was contrary to R.C. 2967.28.
{¶ 16} The trial court said: That statement is correct.
{¶ 17} However, the trial court elaborated on that correct statement with a discussion of postrelease control and parole: "After you serve your prison term, you'll be eligible for release under post-release control. And I believe in your case, if you do receive parole, your post-release control will be mandatory. And that means that there will be certain conditions that you're going to have to live up to after you're released, if you're released after 28 years.
{¶ 18} "The maximum period of time you could be on post-release control would be five years. And I would expect you'd probably get the full five years.
{¶ 19} "There would be certain conditions that you'd have to fulfill. One condition, obviously, would be that you'd have to remain law abiding. But there would be other conditions.
{¶ 20} "Now, if you're placed on post-release control and if you violate any of those conditions of post-release control, you'd be charged with a violation and you would have a hearing before the Parole Board, and if it were determined at the hearing that you had violated one or more conditions of your post-release control, you could have a new prison term imposed of up to nine months in duration; however, the total of all such new prison terms could not exceed one-half of your original sentence." (Emphasis added.) These statements are not correct.
{¶ 21} The trial court further explained postrelease control and parole at Clark's sentencing hearing by using the terms interchangeably and incorrectly informing Clark that he would have a mandatory period of control "for at least five years" if he were released from prison. The trial court then reiterated the same potential consequences for violating postrelease control that it explained at the plea hearing. The final sentencing entry correctly imposed the sentence of life in prison with parole eligibility after 28 years and incorrectly stated that "the offender will be subject to a period of post-release control pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(F) and R.C. 2967.28(B) & (C)."
{¶ 22} The court of appeals determined that the trial court erred in discussing postrelease control and that it provided a deficient explanation of the parole process. State v. Clark, Ashtabula App. No. 2006-A-0004, 2007-Ohio-1780, 2007 WL 1113968, ¶ 15-19. However, it held that the trial court substantially complied with the mandates of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) because Clark was informed of the maximum prison sentence he faced. Id. at ¶ 26. It also discussed whether Clark had demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the trial court's errors and suggested that he had not. Id. at ¶ 28.
{¶ 23} The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court on this issue. It subsequently determined that its decision conflicted with a decision of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals, State v. Prom, 12th Dist. No. CA2002-01-007, 2003-Ohio-6543, 2003 WL 22887906, and certified the case as a conflict to this court. We accepted Clark's discretionary appeal and recognized the certified conflict.
{¶ 24} Clark argues that his plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made because the trial judge informed him that he would be subject to a limited period of postrelease control and that a violation of postrelease control would result in a resentencing of no more than nine months, when actually he could face lifetime monitoring and the reimposition of his original sentence for a parole violation. It is necessary to review the law on the submission of pleas of guilty and pleas of no contest to address this argument.
{¶ 25} A criminal defendant's choice to enter a plea of guilty or no contest is a serious decision. The benefit to a defendant of agreeing to plead guilty is...
To continue reading
Request your trial
- Bryan v. Bobby
-
Driggins v. Lazaroff
...a different judge at a later date placed defendant twice in jeopardy by his later trial." (Emphasis in original.){¶ 47} In State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 27, the Ohio Supreme Court held the following:Under [Crim.R. 11(C) ], the trial judge may not acce......
-
Hartsook v. Miller
...information to the defendant so that the defendant can understand the consequences of his decision and enter a valid plea. State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, ¶ 26, 893 N.E.2d 462.[*P13] A guilty plea is invalid if the trial court does not strictlycomply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2......
-
State v. Miller
...mandatory post-release control. Post-release control does not apply to unclassified felonies, such as aggravated murder. See State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 36 (individual sentenced for aggravated murder is not subject to post-release control as that cr......