State v. Clark

Decision Date28 June 2016
Docket NumberNo. SC 94959,SC 94959
Citation490 S.W.3d 704
PartiesState of Missouri, Respondent, v. Adriano Raphael Clark, Sr., Appellant.
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Clark was represented by Samuel Buffaloe of the public defender's office in Columbia, (573) 777–9977.

The state was represented by Andrew C. Hooper of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City, (573) 751–3321.

Patricia Breckenridge

, Chief Justice

Adriano Clark appeals his conviction of the class C felony of possession of a controlled substance. Section 195.020.1 Following a bench trial, Mr. Clark was found guilty and sentenced to ten years in prison as a prior and persistent offender. On appeal, Mr. Clark contends the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. The state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Clark, with knowledge of the presence and nature of the substance, had possession of two closed pouches containing methamphetamine. Accordingly, this Court reverses the trial court's judgment and remands the case to the circuit court with instructions to discharge Mr. Clark.

Factual and Procedural Background

On February 6, 2013, Officer Jeffrey Ford responded to a 911 hang-up call from a residence in Marshfield. The call had been reported as an assault in progress. Upon his arrival at the residence, Officer Ford made contact with A.D., who appeared to have been assaulted. When Officer Ford asked her if anyone else was present in the residence, A.D. motioned with her head toward the rear of the house. Sergeant Richard Neal arrived at the residence shortly thereafter.

During the investigation of the residence, Officer Ford found Adriano Clark sitting on the side of a bed in the residence's small east bedroom, which also appeared to be the residence's main living area. Officer Ford and Sergeant Neal observed large men's tennis shoes next to the bed. A cell phone and a closed black velvet pouch were on a nightstand that was right next to Mr. Clark. The top of the nightstand was cluttered with numerous other items, including a desk lamp, two television remote controls, a coaster, a mouse pad, a used ashtray, a bottle of medication, and a glass filled with pens and other items. A larger closed brown pouch was hanging on the wall near photographs of A.D. and Mr. Clark. The contents of the two pouches were not visible to the officers, and they did not observe any drugs in plain sight.

As the officers entered the bedroom, Mr. Clark stood up and moved toward the foot of the bed. Officer Ford handcuffed and arrested Mr. Clark and then searched him.2 The officers did not find any drugs on him. He was carrying $560, consisting of five $100 bills and three $20 bills. Before being removed from the residence, Mr. Clark requested his belongings from the west bedroom of the residence. He stated that all the belongings in the west bedroom were his. According to Officer Ford, the officers later found “numerous clothes, a toolbox, [and] things of that nature” in the west bedroom.

After Mr. Clark was placed in a patrol car, A.D. gave the officers written consent to search the residence, which she said was her residence. She said Mr. Clark was her boyfriend. Detective Joseph Taylor, who obtained A.D.'s consent for the search, testified that A.D. was holding a cell phone when he spoke to her.

During their search of the east bedroom, the officers opened the two pouches and found plastic bags with crystalline substances that appeared to be methamphetamine, scales, and numerous items of drug paraphernalia. The state highway patrol crime laboratory later confirmed that the crystalline substances were methamphetamine. Police did not find Mr. Clark's wallet, any identification with Mr. Clark's name on it, or any other items identified as his property in the east bedroom.

Mr. Clark was subsequently charged with the class C felony of possession of a controlled substance, punishable as a class A felony due to his status as a prior and persistent offender. Following a bench trial, the trial court found him guilty as a prior and persistent offender and sentenced him to ten years in prison. Mr. Clark appeals, contending there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had knowledge and control over the drugs in the pouches. This Court granted transfer after opinion by the court of appeals. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10

.

Standard of Review

“To determine whether the evidence presented was sufficient to support a conviction and to withstand a motion for judgment of acquittal, this Court does not weigh the evidence but rather accept[s] as true all evidence tending to prove guilt together with all reasonable inferences that support the verdict, and ignore[s] all contrary evidence and inferences.” State v. Ess, 453 S.W.3d 196, 206 (Mo.banc 2015)

(internal quotations omitted). This Court, however, “may not supply missing evidence, or give the [state] the benefit of unreasonable, speculative or forced inferences.” State v. Whalen, 49 S.W.3d 181, 184 (Mo.banc 2001) (internal quotations omitted). Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction when “there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable [fact-finder] might have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Coleman, 463 S.W.3d 353, 354 (Mo.banc 2015) ; see also

Musacchio v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 709, 715, 193 L.Ed.2d 639 (2016).

Insufficient Evidence to Support the Conviction

Mr. Clark contends that the state did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed the methamphetamine found in the pouches in the residence's east bedroom. Mr. Clark asserts that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he “knew about the drugs” or “that he exercised control over them” because the “drugs were found in closed pouches and there was no further evidence presented connecting Mr. Clark to the drugs.”

Section 195.020 makes it “unlawful for any person to possess or have under his control a controlled substance.” [P]ossessed” or “possessing a controlled substance” is defined by the legislature as:

[A] person, with the knowledge of the presence and nature of a substance, has actual or constructive possession of the substance. A person has actual possession if he has the substance on his person or within easy reach and convenient control. A person who, although not in actual possession, has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over the substance either directly or through another person or persons is in constructive possession of it. Possession may also be sole or joint. If one person alone has possession of a substance possession is sole. If two or more persons share possession of a substance, possession is joint.

Section 195.010(34) (emphasis added). “When interpreting a statute, the primary goal is to give effect to legislative intent as reflected in the plain language of the statute.” Stiers v. Dir. of Revenue, 477 S.W.3d 611, 615 (Mo.banc 2016)

. By the plain language of the statute, a person must have knowledge of the presence and nature of the substance to have actual or constructive possession. Section 195.010(34). In accordance with this statutory definition, this Court has long held that possession itself requires a defendant to have “conscious and intentional possession of the [controlled] substance, either actual or constructive[.]. State v. Zetina–Torres, 482 S.W.3d 801, 807 (Mo.banc 2016)

(internal quotations omitted). “Possession without knowledge of such possession is not possession in the legal sense of the word. Knowledge of the existence of the object is essential to physical control thereof with the intent to exercise such control and such knowledge must necessarily precede the intent to exercise or the exercise of such control.” State v. Burns, 457 S.W.2d 721, 724 (Mo.1970) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).3

A person has actual possession of a controlled substance if the person, “with the knowledge of the presence and nature of the substance,” has the substance either “on his person or within easy reach and convenient control.” Section 195.010(34). Here, the officers did not find any drugs on Mr. Clark when they patted him down following his arrest. Moreover, because the drugs were concealed in closed pouches, mere proximity to the drugs does not create a reasonable inference that Mr. Clark had knowledge of the presence and nature of the methamphetamine in the pouches. See Whalen, 49 S.W.3d at 184

; see also

State v. Withrow, 8 S.W.3d 75, 80 (Mo.banc 1999) (finding a defendant did not have actual possession of methamphetamine found in a bedroom when the police had observed the defendant exiting the bedroom). The statutory definition of “possessing a controlled substance” requires knowledge of the presence and nature of the substance as a condition precedent to a person's actual or constructive possession of the controlled substance. Section 195.010(34). Plainly stated, a person cannot control a substance if he or she is not conscious of its existence. Accordingly, Mr. Clark did not have “actual possession” of the two pouches.

“Absent proof of actual possession, constructive possession may be shown when other facts buttress an inference of defendant's knowledge of the presence of the controlled substance.” State v. Purlee, 839 S.W.2d 584, 588 (Mo.banc 1992)

. The state, therefore, had the burden to prove that Mr. Clark constructively possessed the methamphetamine found in the closed pouches.

To have constructive possession of a controlled substance, a person must have both “knowledge of the presence and nature of a substance” and “the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over the substance either directly or through another person or persons[.] Section 195.010(34). Proof of constructive possession requires:

[A]t a minimum, evidence that the defendant had access to and control over the premises where the [controlled substances] were found.
...

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