State v. Claude Michael Meade, 86-LW-1529
| Decision Date | 22 May 1986 |
| Docket Number | 50678,86-LW-1529 |
| Parties | STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Claude Michael MEADE, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Criminal appeal from Common Pleas Court, No. CR-196454.
John T Corrigan, Cuyahoga County Prosecutor, Cleveland, Ohio, for plaintiff-appellee.
David A. Snow, Cleveland, Ohio, for defendant-appellant.
JOURNAL ENTRY and OPINION
Appellant was indicted in CR-196454 on one count of felonious assault against Joseph Naoum, with a firearm specification and a second count of felonious assault based on a separate assault of Timothy Taylor. In CR-198181, appellant was indicted for yet another count of felonious assault, on Kevin Mayer.
Appellant originally entered a plea of not guilty, but on the advice of his attorney, changed his plea to guilty of both counts in CR-196454. The other case, CR-198181, was then nolled.
After appellant's plea had been accepted, but prior to sentencing, appellant retained new defense counsel and filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. After a full hearing on the motion, it was denied by the trial court. Appellant was subsequently sentenced to a term of imprisonment.
On appeal to this court, appellant contends that "the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant-appellant permission to withdraw his guilty pleas prior to sentencing."
Crim.R. 32.1, governing withdrawal of guilty pleas, provides:
"A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his plea."
Various aspects of the Rule have been construed recently by the courts of this state.®1¯
Generally speaking, a motion to withdraw filed before sentencing will be freely allowed. Eastlake v. DeNiro (1984), 21 Ohio App.3d 102, citing State v. Petersheim (1980), 68 Ohio App.2d 211. This does not mean, however, that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea will be granted automatically; a mere change of heart, for instance, is insufficient justification. See State v. Walton (1981), 2 Ohio App.3d 117.
When the trial court fails to comply with Crim.R. 11, the plea may not be knowingly and voluntarily entered, and plea withdrawal should be allowed. See DeNiro, supra; Toledo v. Chiaverini (1983), 11 Ohio App.3d 43; see, also, State v. Dickey (1984), 15 Ohio App.3d 151. Otherwise, the decision to allow or deny a motion for plea withdrawal is committed to the discretion of the trial court, and appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the trial court abused its discretion. Petersheim, supra. The term "abuse of discretion" is defined as connoting "more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable." State v. Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157.
Whether the denial of a motion for plea withdrawal constitutes an abuse of discretion depends on the circumstances of the individual case. Walton, supra. In the case at bar, appellant does not allege any flaw in the plea hearing. He admits he was fully apprised of his rights and was not threatened or deceived. Appellant initially accepted the advice of his first lawyer, who, after conducting discovery and conferring with appellant and the assistant prosecutor, advised appellant that he had little or no chance for acquittal and recommended entering into a plea bargain. After appellant had done so, he obtained new counsel. With new counsel he argued for the first time, that he had acted in self-defense in the attack on Naoum, that he had acted in self-defense in the attack on Taylor, and that he had not been present at the time of the assault on Mayer. Appellant contended that his original attorney had not followed up on potential witnesses and had improperly induced appellant to plead guilty.
If such representations were believed, they might well be adequate to justify the granting of a motion for plea withdrawal. However, it is the trial court's function to "determine[] the credibility of a defendant's claim in support of the motion." State v. Caraballo (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 66, 67. In the instant case, the trial court described appellant's claim as "uncorroborated self-serving declarations only." Tr. 34.
Considering that the trial court complied fully with Crim.R. 11 and afforded appellant a complete and fair hearing on the motion to withdraw,®2¯ and because the trial court deemed appellant's representations unworthy of belief, we are not convinced that the trial court abused its discretion by denying appellant's plea withdrawal motion.
Accordingly, the judgment of the court below is affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution....
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