State v. Clay

• Decision Date: 07 April 1982
• Docket Number: No. 38218,38218
• Citation: 290 S.E.2d 84,249 Ga. 250
• Parties: The STATE v. Frances CLAY.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 84

290 S.E.2d 84

249 Ga. 250

The STATE v. Frances CLAY.

No. 38218.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

April 7, 1982.

Art Mallory, Dist. Atty., LaGrange, Gerald S. Stovall, Asst. Dist. Atty., Newnan, for the State.

A. Vernon Belcher, Greenville, for Frances Clay.

CLARKE, Justice.

Frances Clay was indicted and tried for the murder of her husband. She was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for voluntary manslaughter. We granted certiorari to address the issue of whether a conviction of a lesser included offense may be reversed on the general grounds when the defendant requested a charge on that offense.

1. The dilemma presented by this case is the result of the difference in the standard used by the trial court in charging a particular offense to the jury and the standard used by an appellate court in reviewing the verdict. In State v. Stonaker, 236 Ga. 1, 222 S.E.2d 354 (1976), we held that if the accused made a request to charge on a lesser offense included in the crime charged in the indictment it is error for the court to fail to so charge where the evidence warrants such a charge. In murder trials we have held that where slight evidence of voluntary manslaughter is presented the court in its discretion may charge on that offense, see Morgan v. State, 240 Ga. 845, 242 S.E.2d 611 (1978), and that if the accused requests such a charge it should be given where there is slight evidence of voluntary manslaughter. Gillespie v. State, 236 Ga. 845, 225 S.E.2d 296 (1976); Henderson v. State, 234 Ga. 827, 218 S.E.2d 612 (1975).

The appellate courts, in reviewing the evidence necessary to sustain a conviction, are bound by the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Prior to Jackson v. Virginia the test on appeal for sufficiency of evidence was whether there was "any evidence to support the verdict of guilty." Eubanks v. State, 240 Ga. 544, 242 S.E.2d 41 (1978). The standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia is "... whether after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson, supra 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789.

We agree with the state's contention that the Jackson standard and the slight evidence standard require different degrees of evidence. We do not agree that the two rules may not coexist. However, the opinion of the Court of Appeals in the present case presents a hole in the criminal trial process. The hole is the escape route for the defendant in a case where the evidence of the more serious crime satisfies the Jackson standard while the evidence of the lesser offense on which a charge is requested satisfies the slight evidence standard and the defendant is convicted of the lesser offense.

One solution to the problem would be to apply the Jackson v. Virginia standard to requests to charge. We do not believe this is appropriate. Jackson established a standard for review, and on review the court has the opportunity to deliberately study the record in order to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court is not blessed with this luxury. Its decision of a request to charge must be based upon and adjusted to the evidence, but the burden of determining the conclusive weight of the evidence at that point of the trial would be too great.

In the present case the Court of Appeals found insufficient evidence to support a conviction of voluntary manslaughter, there being no evidence of provocation resulting in a sudden and irresistable passion. Their holding that a defendant's request to charge does not relieve the state from proving the commission of the crime is based upon the decision in Conley v. State, 146 Ga.App. 739, 247 S.E.2d 562 (1978). Conley was indicted and tried for murder and convicted of voluntary manslaughter. The defense had made a request to charge on that offense. The Court of Appeals on review held that there was no evidence of voluntary manslaughter and reversed the conviction because the evidence did not authorize a conviction of murder as charged in the indictment. We agree that if the state's evidence fails to prove the crime charged in the indictment or a lesser included offense, the conviction must be reversed.

We hold that if the evidence supports a verdict of guilty in the more serious offense, and if there is slight evidence of the lesser included offense, a defendant who requests a charge on and is convicted of the lesser offense may not successfully urge the general grounds on appeal. We do not depart from the proposition that the state must prove commission of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt, but we conclude that when this burden is met and a defendant affirmatively requests a charge of a lesser included offense, he presents to the jury a choice of verdicts.

The Court of Appeals did not determine if the jury would have been authorized to convict Mrs. Clay of murder under the evidence presented at the trial. Once the lesser included offense is ruled out on the evidence, the appellate court must focus on whether there was sufficient evidence to authorize a conviction of the indicted offense.

Mrs. Clay and the victim, Lamar Clay, had been married several weeks. The evidence showed that on the night of the shooting both of them were highly intoxicated. Mrs. Clay and her husband were at home alone. She had been arrested earlier in the day on a drunk driving charge and Mr. Clay had bailed her out of jail that evening. Mrs. Clay called the sheriff's office around 2:30 A.M. to report the shooting. Mr. Clay was found dead on the bedroom floor. Death was caused by a single gunshot wound in the neck which had severed an artery, causing him to bleed to death.

The principal witnesses for the state were employees of the state crime laboratory and the GBI. Tests showed the fatal bullet was fired from a 22 caliber rifle which was kept in the Clay home. In the opinion of the investigators the victim was on the bed when the shot was fired. There were two bullets found in the wall of the bedroom; one was below the surface of the bed, and the one...