State v. Clayton
Decision Date | 29 August 1983 |
Citation | 656 S.W.2d 344 |
Parties | STATE of Tennessee, Appellee, v. Perry CLAYTON, III, Appellant. 656 S.W.2d 344 |
Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Walker Gwinn, Asst. Public Defender, Memphis, for appellant; A.C. Wharton, Jr., Shelby Co. Public Defender, Memphis, of counsel.
William M. Leech, Jr., Atty. Gen., Jennifer Helton Small, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, Joseph L. Patterson, Sidney P. Alexander, Asst. Dist. Attys., Memphis, for appellee.
The Defendant, Perry Clayton, III, appeals a conviction of first degree murder for which he received a life sentence in the state penitentiary. At trial, the Defendant relied upon the defense of insanity. The primary issue on appeal is whether the evidence supports the jury verdict that the Defendant was sane at the time the offense was committed. Both the jury and a majority of the Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Clayton's insanity defense.
The actual facts of the crime itself are undisputed. On July 2, 1979, the Defendant observed the 12-year-old victim, Preston Porter, and two other children walking by an apartment complex. The victim was separated from his two friends and, for no apparent reason, the Defendant approached the young boy and fatally stabbed him eleven times. The victim was heard to yell, "Hey, man, what you doing?" At one time the knife blade bent and the Defendant placed it on the ground to straighten it out. Then he stabbed the victim again. The Defendant committed the acts in broad daylight, in the presence of witnesses, both children and adults. When shouted at, the Defendant fled until he suddenly stopped and surrendered to the adults who pursued him. He dropped the murder weapon and stood with his foot over it. He told his pursuers that he was "sick, call the police" and Once apprehended, he obeyed instructions, sat quietly and was no longer violent. His peaceful behavior continued once he was in the custody of the police, where he waived his Miranda rights and gave a signed statement concerning the crime.
While the State is not bound to establish the defendant's sanity in the first instance, if the defendant's or the State's evidence raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's sanity, such evidence relieves the defendant of further proof upon that issue and shifts the burden of proof to the State [Dove v. State, 50 (3 Heis.) 348, 370-374 (1871) ], Stuart v. State, 60 (1 Baxt.) Tenn. 178 (1873); King v. State, 91 Tenn. 617, 648, 20 S.W. 169 (1892).
Whenever testimony is introduced countervailing the presumption of sanity and raising a question of the accused's insanity, the State must then establish his sanity to the satisfaction of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Jordan v. State, 124 Tenn. 81, 89, 135 S.W. 327 (1910); Davis v. United States, 165 U.S. 373, 378, 17 S.Ct. 360, 362, 41 L.Ed. 750, 754."
506 S.W.2d at 183-184; Covey v. State, 504 S.W.2d 387, 390-391 (Tenn.Cr.App.1973); Accord, Graham v. State, 547 S.W.2d 531, 544 (Tenn.1977). Sanity thus becomes an element of the crime.
In Graham v. State, 547 S.W.2d 531 (Tenn.1977), an opinion authored by the late Justice Joe Henry, this Court adopted the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code formulation of insanity:
"(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
(2) As used in this Article, the terms 'mental disease or defect' do not include any abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct. [emphasis added]." 547 S.W.2d at 543.
To prove sanity, the State must show that the Defendant could appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and had the capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.
Since Clayton has challenged the sufficiency of the State's evidence to convict him, a detailed review of the lay and expert testimony concerning Defendant's lack of mental capacity is deemed necessary because of the reviewing standards mandated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Under Jackson and Rule 13(e), T.R.A.P., we must find sufficient evidence upon which any rational trier of fact could be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the Defendant's sanity. We feel Judge Daughtrey, in her dissenting opinion, accurately and objectively outlined the evidence offered by the defense and the State on the principal issue of Clayton's sanity at the time of the offense. We quote from her dissenting opinion:
He also had approached relatives with obscene talk of sex and asked his own sisters to have sexual relations with him. He was talking to himself, refusing to bathe or change clothes, thinking that everyone turned against him; had withdrawn to his room, sitting on his bed with his head down staring for hours. He had not been taking medication for five months and his condition got progressively worse.... He admitted, upon admission, to having thoughts of hurting people.... He admitted to hearing voices and was obsessed with the thought of sex ... his main concern was hearing female voices making derogatory remarks about him.
Clayton was diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenic; he was put on an increased dosage of Haldol, and was later switched to Prolixin. The attending physician thought he 'should do well if he continues taking his medicine.' He was discharged after five weeks hospitalization.
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