State v. Clemons
| Decision Date | 25 April 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 2647,2647 |
| Citation | 110 Ariz. 555,521 P.2d 987 |
| Parties | STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Paul CLEMONS, Appellant. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., Phoenix, William Michael Smith, Yuma County, Atty., by Steven B. Jaynes, Deputy Co. Atty., Yuma, for appellee.
Jeffrey R. Fritz, Yuma, for appellant.
This is an appeal by Paul Clemons from convictions for violation of A.R.S. §§ 36--1002.07, offering to sell marijuana, and 36--1002.06, possession of marijuana for sale. From the judgments of conviction and sentences thereon, he brings this appeal.
About midnight on December 16, 1971, at Yuma, Arizona, the appellant and two others were arrested for attempting to sell 150 kilos of marijuana to a Los Angeles, California police officer. Appellant admitted at his trial that he tried to sell the 150 kilos of marijuana (of the value of $17,500.00) as charged in the information, but testified to other facts from which he raised the defense of entrapment. The essence of his defense was that he owed $200.00 to a police informer called 'Ron' and that Ron demanded $300.00 in repayment, which the appellant did not have. Appellant testified that Ron
Appellant argues that the State's case only presented evidence proving facts which the appellant conceded, and that no evidence was introduced to refute his claim that he was coerced into entering into the transaction by the informer, Ron. He urges that there was entrapment as a matter of law because his uncontradicted testimony established that the law enforcement officers or their agent, the informer, supplied the buyer, the seller, the plan, the marijuana, and the purchase money.
We think there are inferences from the State's evidence which tend to refute the testimony that appellant was coerced into selling marijuana. See, e.g., the testimony, Infra, that appellant traded stolen cars for dope. But, irrespective, we do not think that entrapment was necessarily established by appellant's testimony.
No rule is better established than that the credibility of the witnesses and the weight and value to be given to their testimony are questions exclusively for the jury. For a few of the most recent cases so holding, See State v. Ganter, 102 Ariz. 490, 433 P.2d 620 (1967); State v. Anderson, 102 Ariz. 295, 428 P.2d 572 (1967); State v. Spencer, 101 Ariz. 529, 421 P.2d 886 (1966); State v. Berry, 101 Ariz. 310, 419 P.2d 337 (1966); State v. Valenzuela, 101 Ariz. 230, 418 P.2d 386 (1966); State v. Sneed, 98 Ariz. 264, 403 P.2d 816 (1965); State v. Chavez, 98 Ariz. 236, 403 P.2d 545 (1965); State v. Pearson, 98 Ariz. 133, 402 P.2d 557 (1965).
The principle applies equally to the testimony of an accused because, being an interested witness, the jury is not compelled to accept his story or believe his testimony. State v. Sedig, 235 Iowa 609, 16 N.W.2d 247 (1944); Commonwealth v. Cavedon, 301 Mass. 307, 17 N.E.2d 183 (1938); Metz v. State, 127 Tex.Cr.R. 126, 74 S.W.2d 1025 (1934); Boggs v. Commonwealth, 153 Va. 828, 149 S.E. 445 (1929). The jury, in accepting or rejecting the accused's story, has the right to consider the fact that he has a vital interest in the outcome of the trial. State v. Palko, 122 Conn. 529, 191 A. 320 (1937), aff'd Palko v. State, 302 U.S. 319, 58 S.Ct. 149, 82 L.Ed. 288 (1937); People v. Kalder, 284 Mich. 235, 279 N.W. 493 (1938); State v. Salimone, 19 N.J.Super. 600, 89 A.2d 56 (1952); People v. Shonka, 3 Utah 2d 124, 279 P.2d 711 (1955).
For example, in People v. Shonka, Supra, the court said:
'The defendant places reliance upon the fact that her own story as to the purpose of taking the money is the only direct evidence as to intent, * * *
What the defense argument overlooks is that the jury was not absolutely bound to believe all of the testimony of the defendant. It was their prerogative to give it only such wieght as they thought it entitled to considered in the light of all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the occurrence, including the self-interest of the witness.' 3 Utah 2d 124, 127, 279 P.2d 711, 713--714.
In the present case, we think it evident the jury did not believe the part of the appellant's testimony that the police informer, Ron, supplied the plan, the marijuana, and the seller and coerced him into committing this crime. This was peculiarly within its province. The jury had the right to disbelieve the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Hess v. Ryan
... ... Grounds 3, 4, and 12 of the habeas petition are procedurally defaulted inasmuch as the petitioner, by failing to fairly present them to the state courts as federal issues, did not properly exhaust them and is now procedurally barred from doing so, (2) that Ground 11 was properly found by the ... Rather, juries are entitled to credit or discredit the portions of a witness' testimony as they determine them to be credible. See State v. Clemons, ... Page 1055 ... 110 Ariz. 555, 557, 521 P.2d 987, 989 (1974) ("The jury had the right to disbelieve the whole of appellant's testimony or ... ...
-
Sandretto v. Payson Healthcare Mgmt., Inc.
...the witnesses and the weight and value to be given to their testimony are questions exclusively for the jury.” State v. Clemons, 110 Ariz. 555, 556–57, 521 P.2d 987, 988–89 (1974). As the First Circuit observed in a medical malpractice action with competing expert opinions, the trial court'......
-
State v. Parker
...and DNA in the home, and Randall's potential role in the murders. The jury rejected Parker's defense. See State v. Clemons, 110 Ariz. 555, 556–57, 521 P.2d 987, 988–89 (1974) (noting that it is the jury's exclusive role to weigh the credibility of testimony, including the defendant's). In s......
-
THE STATE OF ARIZONA v. Villa
...because testimony is conflicting or reasonable persons may draw different conclusions from the evidence."); State v. Clemons, 110 Ariz. 555, 557, 521 P.2d 987, 989 (1974) ("The jury is not compelled to accept [the defendant's] story or believe his testimony."). We therefore reject Villa's c......