State v. Clift

Decision Date08 November 1976
Docket NumberNo. 57959,57959
Citation339 So.2d 755
PartiesSTATE of Louisiana v. Jerald C. CLIFT.
CourtLouisiana Supreme Court

Mac Allynn J. Achee, Wray & Robinson, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ossie B. Brown, Dist. Atty., John W. Sinquefield, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

CALOGERO, Justice.

In February of 1974, Jerald Clift was stopped by police near an apartment where a search warrant was being executed and heroin was being seized. Clift was searched and found to be in possession of heroin. He was arrested for possession of heroin, a violation of La.R.S. 40:966(C), tried, found guilty as charged, and sentenced to four years at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. He now appeals that conviction and sentence, relying on ten assignments of error.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 1 AND 6.

Defendant Clift argues that heroin and marijuana seized from him by police were unlawfully obtained, and that the trial judge erred in denying his motion to suppress and in later admitting this evidence at trial. Defendant's allegations raise two legal issues: did the police have reasonable cause to stop defendant, and, secondly, did the police have reasonable cause to search his wallet after they had arrested him for possession of marijuana?

As presented by the state, the facts show that at about eight o'clock on the evening of February 4, 1974, members of the East Baton Rouge Police Department, acting pursuant to a warrant, entered the apartment of Julius Sholars in the Lamplighter Apartments, an apartment complex in Baton Rouge. They arrested Sholars and two others in the apartment on the basis of heroin found on Sholars' person, and proceeded to execute the warrant by searching the apartment in order to find heroin. While the search was being conducted by several officers inside the apartment, two men, Jack Mergen, then a narcotics investigator with the District Attorney's Office, and Officer Clyde Porter of the Baton Rouge City Police, waited in the parking lot for the arrival of the police vehicle to take the three arrestees to jail and to detain anyone who sought to enter the apartment during the search. Just before nine o'clock a car pulled into the parking lot at the apartment complex, and a young man (the defendant) alighted and walked toward the building. Both Mergen and Porter recognized him as someone they had dealt with in previous narcotics investigations; Mergen remembered that he had personally arrested the man on a narcotics charge. The young man passed the point where the officers were standing and approached the door of Sholars' apartment. When he was only a few feet from the door, the men testified that they called out 'We're narcotics officers; come here.' Instead of obeying the officers' command, the young man ran down the sidewalk away from the officers, and as he rounded the corner of the building, he threw an object into the bushes. One officer retrieved the object, which was discovered to be a bag containing marijuana, while the other officer captured defendant Jerald Clift and then arrested him for possession of marijuana. The two men took Clift inside the apartment and looked in his wallet for identification. After they found his driver's license, they continued to search his wallet and found, folded in a small piece of aluminum foil, a small quantity of heroin. Defendant Clift was then charged with possession of heroin.

At the hearing on the motion to suppress, defendant testified that as he approached the door he veered away from it, and was walking down the sidewalk, going away from the door, when the two men called out 'halt.' Otherwise, defendant corroborated the officers' testimony as to his flight, his dropping of the marijuana, and the search of his wallet by police.

Defendant argues that there existed no legal cause for the officers to stop him, and alternatively, that if they did properly stop him, that they violated his constitutional guarantees when they searched his wallet.

If indeed defendant's stop was improper, then his arrest was also improper and neither of the two illegal substances could properly have been admitted at his trial. State v. Truss, 317 So.2d 177 (La.1975); State v. Saia, 302 So.2d 869 (La.1974). This Court has repeatedly held that a person may not justifiably be detained by police unless there is a reasonable basis on which authorities believe that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an illegal act. State v. Kinnemann, 337 So.2d 441 (La.1976), handed down September 13, 1976; State v. Cook, 332 So.2d 760 (La.1976); State v. Truss, supra; State v. Saia, supra. Absent circumstances which connect the person with criminal conduct, an individual who is in a public place has a right to be left alone and to avoid encounters with the police. In order to determine whether the officers had sufficient knowledge to allow them to infringe on a citizen's right to be left alone, a reviewing court will look to the circumstances of each case. State v. Cook, supra; State v. Saia, supra.

We believe that under the circumstances of this case there were ample grounds for police to detain defendant Clift at the time of the stop. First, defendant Clift was approaching a door which led only to an apartment where a search warrant was being executed, where three people were being detained following arrest, and where heroin had actually been found. Second, both Mergen and Porter recognized defendant as a person whom they had dealt with on previous drug arrests; Mergen had himself arrested defendant on a narcotics charge. Further, the two men testified that one purpose of their waiting outside was to safeguard the apartment while it was being searched by fellow officers. They were ensuring that the warrant could be conducted, and the coincident arrests concluded, without interference.

If the only evidence produced had been consistent with defendant's testimony, that he had passed the apartment before he was ordered to halt, there would have been no legal grounds to stop him, because the fact that a drug user walks past a drug outlet does not, without more, present reasonable cause to believe that he has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. See Harlan, J., concurring, Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968); State v. Saia, supra. Likewise, a stranger who is approaching a drug outlet or suspected drug outlet, cannot, without more, be forcibly detained by police. State v. Kinneman, supra.

The case before us, however, presents neither of these situations. The state's witnesses, those evidently accepted by the trial court, testified that they called out to defendant Clift as, approaching, he drew near the door of the apartment (i.e., within two to three feet thereof). We find no reason not to accept the state's testimony as did the trial judge. When we do so, we hold that when officers, who are protecting premises where criminal conduct has been discovered and where a search is being conducted under the authority of a warrant, see a man whom they recognize as a person involved with narcotics apparently about to enter the premises, the officers do have reason and authority to stop such person, if only to prevent his entrance or to inquire as to his intentions. Considering these circumstances, the officers properly pursued defendant who fled in response to their order. And when they saw him discard, in flight, a substance they believed to be marijuana, they properly arrested him.

We find, therefore, that the command, pursuit, and arrest were justified, there being no state or federal constitutional violations.

Defendant argues, alternatively, that even if the incipient encounter was justified and his arrest for possession of marijuana legal, the search of his wallet violated the fourth amendment because it was warrantless, and did not fall under any exception to the warrant requirement.

The search of defendant's wallet was made only after the lawful arrest for possession of marijuana. It is settled law that police officers, having legally arrested a person whom they have in custody, may search his person so as to discover and seize additional evidence of a crime. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1941).

Therefore, we find that defendant Clift's first argument lacks merit, because both illegal substances were seized without violation of his rights.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 4.

Defendant complains that the prosecutor's repeated references to defendant's commission of another crime, possession of marijuana, and the introduction of the marijuana into evidence, were prejudicial to defendant and constituted reversible error.

The marijuana at issue here is that which defendant Clift threw down as he fled. It was the basis for his initial arrest, for possession of marijuana, and it led to his search and the discovery of the heroin which formed the basis for the instant prosecution.

Defendant argues that the prosecutor's references to marijuana and the introduction of the drug were irrlevant to the prosecution, had no probative value, and prejudiced defendant. He urges that his motions for mistrial were improperly denied.

Article 770 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides in pertinent part that:

'Upon motion of a defendant, a mistrial shall be ordered when a remark or comment, made within the hearing of the jury by the judge, district attorney, or a...

To continue reading

Request your trial
58 cases
  • State v. Odle
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US
    • November 13, 2002
    ...offense. However, the offense of possession of 400 or more grams of cocaine, requires a showing of general intent. In State v. Clift, 339 So.2d 755, 761 (La.1976), the supreme court found, "Louisiana law requires only a showing of general intent, not specific intent, in order to establish t......
  • State v. de la Beckwith
    • United States
    • Louisiana Supreme Court
    • February 28, 1977
    ...did not constitute a reference to another crime as to which evidence was not admissible. La.Code Cirm.P. art. 770(2); State v. Clift, 339 So.2d 755 (La.1976); State v. Strange, 334 So.2d 182 (La.1976); State v. Scott, 320 So.2d 538 (La.1975). Accordingly, the trial judge did not err in deny......
  • State v. Warren
    • United States
    • Louisiana Supreme Court
    • February 22, 2007
    ...United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 14, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2485, 53 L.Ed.2d 538, 550 (1977); Chimel v. California, supra; State v. Clift, 339 So.2d 755 (La.1976). A search incident to a lawful arrest not only may be conducted without a warrant, but it may also be made whether or not there is......
  • State v. Hall
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US
    • August 23, 1989
    ...which is relevant and otherwise admissible should not be barred just because it is prejudicial. State v. Smith, supra; State v. Clift, 339 So.2d 755 (La.1976). The prosecutor argued at trial that this evidence was relevant to bolster Dep. Fields's identification of the defendant; the trial ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT