State v. Cline, s. 75-322-C
Decision Date | 19 February 1979 |
Docket Number | Nos. 75-322-C,s. 75-322-C |
Citation | 397 A.2d 1309,121 R.I. 299 |
Parties | STATE v. Robert CLINE. STATE v. William H. ANTHONY. A., 78-30-C.A. |
Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Because of substantial public interest, we have decided to make a piecemeal review of the criminal appeals of Robert Cline (Cline) and William H. Anthony (Anthony). Cline is before us following his conviction by a Superior Court jury of the March 16, 1974, first-degree murder of Frank A. Pirri and the trial justice's imposition of a mandatory death sentence. At the time of the homicide, Cline was an escapee from the Adult Correctional Institutions. Anthony stands convicted of the February 28, 1975, first-degree murder of a fellow inmate at the Adult Correctional Institutions. However, the trial justice deferred imposition of sentence and, acting pursuant to the provisions of G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 12-22-10, certified to us a number of questions, several of which relate to the 1973 amended version of § 11-23-2.
Although these appeals raise numerous issues, we have consolidated them for the sole and specific purpose of determining whether the imposition of a death sentence as mandated by § 11-23-2 violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
To put the death-penalty portion of § 11-23-2 in its proper historical perspective, we would point out that prior to June 26, 1973, the death penalty (hanging) was imposed only on any person who committed "murder while under the sentence of imprisonment for life." Following a series of disturbances at the Adult Correctional Institutions which culminated in the slaying of a prison guard, the General Assembly met in special session during the summer of 1973 and on June 26, 1973, amended the death-penalty portion of § 11-23-2 so that it now reads:
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "cruel and unusual punishments (shall not be) inflicted," and the Fourteenth Amendment by its due process clause prohibits the infliction of such punishment by a state. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758 (1962). In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), the question was whether "the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty (in the cases before the Court) constitute cruel and unusual punishment." Id. at 239, 92 S.Ct. at 2727, 33 L.Ed.2d at 350. In each case the determination as to whether the punishment should be death or a lesser punishment was left to the discretion of either the judge or the jury. Two of the justices were of the opinion that the Eighth Amendment was an absolute bar to the imposition of the death penalty. Three justices concluded that the death penalty was not per se unconstitutional but voted to reverse on the basis that discretionary sentencing, unguided by legislatively defined standards, violated the Eighth Amendment because it permitted the death penalty to be "wantonly" and "freakishly" imposed or afforded "no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it (was) imposed from the many cases in which it (was) not," or gave rise to the possibility "where equal or lesser sentences were imposed on the elite, (and) a harsher one on the minorities or members of the lower castes." The remaining four justices had no doubt as to the constitutionality of the death sentence.
The diversity of views expressed in Furman caused state legislatures who desired to retain a constitutionally viable death penalty to revise their criminal codes. Some viewed Furman as requiring a statutory mandatory death sentence for certain classes of proven crime. In other jurisdictions Furman was considered as faulting only an unbridled discretion. There, states enacted statutes that controlled the sentencing authority's discretion.
Similar sentiments have been expressed in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2932, 49 L.Ed.2d 859, 883 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 258, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 2969, 49 L.Ed.2d 913, 926 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 333-34, 96 S.Ct. 3001, 3006, 49 L.Ed.2d 974, 981-82 (1976); and Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 637, 97 S.Ct. 1993, 1996, 52 L.Ed.2d 637, 642 (1977).
The Supreme Court first ruled on the constitutionality of a mandatory death penalty statute in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976). There, the statute provided the death sentence for all persons convicted of first-degree murder. In holding the statute unconstitutional, the Court said:
"North Carolina's mandatory death penalty statute for first-degree murder departs...
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