State v. Cloud
| Decision Date | 15 October 1979 |
| Citation | 588 S.W.2d 552 |
| Parties | STATE of Tennessee, Petitioner, v. John Paul CLOUD, Respondent. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
R. Jerome Shepherd, Cleveland, for petitioner.
Robert L. Jolley, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., William M. Leech, Jr., Atty. Gen., Nashville, for respondent.
Certiorari was granted in this case to consider petitioner's plea of double jeopardy, which was rejected by the courts below.
This prosecution was precipitated by the petitioner's arrest for driving while intoxicated and driving without a license. At the time of his arrest, the petitioner was subject to certain restrictions imposed under the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act, T.C.A. § 59-2101 Et seq. These restrictions, in substance, prohibited him from driving within the state and from holding a Tennessee driver's license. The incident resulted in the petitioner's indictment for the violation of three statutes: T.C.A. § 59-709, which prohibits driving without a license in his possession; T.C.A. § 59-1031, which prohibits driving while intoxicated; and T.C.A. § 59-2116, which prohibits operation of a motor vehicle by one subject to the restrictions, noted above, imposed under the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act. Ultimately, the petitioner pled guilty to the charges brought under T.C.A. § 59-709 and § 59-1031, and was sentenced accordingly. He then sought to interpose a plea of double jeopardy, based upon those convictions, to his prosecution for the violation of T.C.A. § 59-2116. Upon the rejection of his claim by the trial court, the petitioner pled guilty to that charge, reserving the right to appeal the decision on the double jeopardy question. That decision was affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals.
The protections against double jeopardy afforded by the state and federal constitutions bar the prosecution for a given offense of one who already stands convicted of a crime included within that offense. See, e. g., Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977); State v. Black, 524 S.W.2d 913 (Tenn.1975). That is precisely the situation presented here. The relevant statutes provide in part:
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State v. Cullop
... ... The Court has also noted that the same elements test is the most certain and predictable to apply. Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 720-721, 109 S. Ct. at 1453 ... Tennessee used the same elements analysis as the basis of its double jeopardy jurisprudence for years. See, e.g., State v. Cloud, 588 S.W.2d 552 (Tenn. 1979) (holding that violation of motor vehicle habitual offender order necessarily includes driving without a license so as to bar separate convictions). In this vein, regarding jury instructions, I note that Rule 31(c), Tenn. R. Crim. P., provides that the jury may convict ... ...
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State v. Clouse
... ... State v. Green, 947 S.W.2d 186, 190 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997); see also State v. Terron Paul Borden, No. 02C01-9802-CC-00050, 1998 WL 315937, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, June 17, 1998); cf. State v. Cloud, 588 S.W.2d 552, 553-554 (Tenn. 1979) ... (FN2). We further note that, in the analogous context of a defendant's detention without a probable cause determination by a judicial officer, we have held that the defendant was "not entitled to a remedy in this Court." State v. Phillip Todd Swords, No ... ...
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State v. Martin
... ... It would constitute double jeopardy if the jury found that the defendant committed first-degree sexual conduct by fellatio and separately convicted the defendant of crime against nature (T.C.A. § 39-707) for the same act of fellatio. 2 State v. Cloud, 588 S.W.2d 552 (Tenn.1979) ... After considering the circumstances, the evidence, the court's instruction and the statutes in accord with Black, we conclude that the convictions for fellatio and anal intercourse constitute double jeopardy. We reverse and dismiss both convictions ... ...