State v. Cluley

• Decision Date: 12 November 2002
• Docket Number: No. 2001-569-M.P.,2001-569-M.P.
• Citation: 808 A.2d 1098
• Parties: STATE v. David CLULEY.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

808 A.2d 1098

STATE v. David CLULEY.

No. 2001-569-M.P.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

November 12, 2002.

Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., LEDERBERG, FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.

John E. Sullivan, III, Aaron L. Weisman, Providence, for plaintiff.

Richard S. Humphrey, Tiverton, Amy Stratton, Coventry, for defendant.

OPINION

FLANDERS, Justice.

The law may be a blunt instrument, but it is not an exact science. This driving-under-the-influence (DUI) case illustrates that point, and, at the same time, provides an object lesson on why the law does not concern itself with trifles ("de minimis non curat lex").

Petitioning for certiorari, the state asks us to reverse a District Court decision suppressing certain breath-test results attributable to respondent, motor-vehicle operator David Cluley (Cluley). After a pretrial hearing in connection with the state's DUI case against Cluley, the District Court suppressed the test results. It did so because it found that the Department of Health (DOH) failed to comply with an applicable DOH regulation when it attempted to validate the accuracy of certain breath-testing equipment that the police later used to gauge the alcohol content of Cluley's blood. The state contends that the trial judge erred in suppressing the breath-test results because it duly established that DOH had checked the breath-test equipment for accuracy "no more than thirty (30) days prior to the test," G.L.1956 § 31-27-2(c)(5), and that its validation efforts complied with the applicable DOH regulation because the tested equipment "indicate[d] the same alcohol percent as the standard alcohol solution used in the test."Department of Health, Food and Drug Control Division Rules and Regulations Pertaining to Preliminary Breath Testing and Standards for the Determination of the Amount of Alcohol and/or Drugs in a Person's Blood by Chemical Analysis of the Breath, Blood and/or Urine or Other Bodily Substances, § 7.0 D.1 (2001) (DOH Rules and Regulations). Because the accuracy of Cluley's breath-test results was not called into question by the results of DOH's challenged validation process and because the District Court failed to defer to DOH's reasonable interpretation of its own regulation pertaining to the validation of the testing equipment, we reverse, quash the order suppressing the results of Cluley's breath test, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Travel and Facts

On May 19, 2001, the state police stopped Cluley's vehicle for speeding. Suspecting him of driving his vehicle while under the influence of some intoxicating substance, the police administered two field sobriety tests to Cluley, and then obtained his consent to conduct breath tests. These latter tests resulted in blood-alcohol-content readings of 0.136 in the first testing phase and 0.113 in the second phase¹ — well over the 0.08 legal limit established by § 31-27-2(a) and (b)(1).² As a result, the police charged Cluley with DUI in violation of this statute.

Eventually, Cluley moved to suppress the test results, arguing that DOH had not complied with either § 31-27-2(c)(4) and (5)³ or with an applicable DOH regulation implementing this statute.⁴ The District Court judge granted Cluley's motion to suppress, ruling that the tests DOH had used on May 1, 2001, to determine the accuracy of the breath-testing equipment did not result in readings "indicat[ing] the same alcohol percent as the standard alcohol solution used in the test," as required by § 7.0 D.1 of the DOH Rules and Regulations. The judge also noted that the machine used to test Cluley's breath had been out of service eight times since 1992. Lastly, he pointed to the fact that DOH failed to certify the accuracy of the machine after a DOH tester, on or about May 8, 2001, had moved a lever on the equipment from the "off" to the "on" position.

Analysis

In any DUI prosecution, before breath-test results can be admitted as evidence of a driver's alleged intoxication, qualified DOH agents must have tested the equipment in question for accuracy no more than thirty days before the police administer the breath test to any given suspect. See § 31-27-2(c)(5). According to a DOH regulation, when DOH checks the accuracy of the testing equipment, the "[i]nstruments must indicate the same alcohol percent as the standard alcohol solution used in the test." DOH Rules and Regulations § 7.0 D.1. (Emphasis added.)

In this case, after testing the equipment on May 1, 2001, an experienced DOH tester approved and certified the machine that the police later used to test Cluley's breath on May 19, 2001. Six separate tests showed that the machine was working on May 1 according to the manufacturer's specifications; that is, the "instruments" on the machine indicated "the same" alcohol percent as the standard alcohol solution used in the test because either they were within 0.005 grams (plus or minus) of the actual alcohol content in the test solution, or, when the alcohol content in the test solution was beyond 0.10 grams, then the test results were within a 5 percent plus or minus range of the actual amount of alcohol present in the test solution. Specifically, the machine consistently registered, when tested, a slightly lesser quantity of alcohol than the actual amount of alcohol in the test solution (for example, one test result showed a 0.097 reading on the machine when the actual amount of alcohol in the test solution was 0.10),⁵ but the results were still within the acceptable range specified by the machine's manufacturer. Because each test result fell within the range of variance specified by the manufacturer as acceptable, DOH's tester certified the equipment as accurate.

Nevertheless, interpreting the word "same" as used in the DOH regulation to mean "identical," the District Court granted Cluley's motion to suppress the results of his May 19 breath tests. Although a DOH representative testified that the word "same" in DOH's own regulations meant "within an acceptable range," "within an acceptable variance," "acceptable range [of] .005 plus or minus," "beyond a .10 then it's a 5%" and "[within] a 5% limitation," the District Court rejected DOH's interpretation of the word "same" as used in its regulation. In doing so, we hold, the trial judge ignored the cases from this Court that have held that "while not controlling, the interpretation given a statute by the administering agency is entitled to great weight." Berkshire Cable Vision of Rhode Island, Inc. v. Burke, 488 A.2d 676, 679 (R.I.1985). "The law in Rhode Island is well settled that an administrative agency will be accorded great deference in interpreting a statute whose administration and enforcement have been entrusted to the agency." In re Lallo, 768 A.2d 921, 926 (R.I.2001).

Here, DOH defined the word "same" in its regulation to mean test results that came within 0.005 grams, plus or minus, of the amount of alcohol present in the tested solution. When the testing solution, however, contained an amount of alcohol beyond 0.10 grams, then readings showing an amount that was not more than 5 percent over or under the actual alcohol content in the testing solution also would be considered the "same" as the amount in the testing solution. The department adopted this interpretation of its regulation because it was consistent with the operating specifications set by the manufacturer of this equipment and because, as a practical matter, such small deviations between the measurements shown on the machine and the actual alcohol content in the testing samples would not indicate that the equipment was inaccurate. Giving this administrative interpretation the deference it is due, we conclude that it was not plainly wrong or at odds with the statutory requirement that the equipment be "tested for accuracy" during the thirty-day period preceding its use.

All the statute required in this case was that "[e]quipment used for breath analysis [must have been] tested for accuracy no more than thirty (30) days prior to the test by qualified personnel." Section 31-27-2(c)(5). But it did not clearly specify or restrict what type of testing could be used to determine accuracy, nor did it define the concept of accuracy. "Where the provisions of a statute are unclear or subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, the construction given by the agency charged with its enforcement is entitled to weight anddeference as long as that construction is not clearly erroneous or unauthorized." Whitehouse v. Davis, 774 A.2d 816, 818-19 (R.I.2001) (quoting Gallison v. Bristol School Committee, 493 A.2d 164, 166 (R.I.1985)); see also Pawtucket Power Associates Limited Partnership v. City of Pawtucket, 622 A.2d 452, 457 (R.I.1993)

(deferring to an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute even when other interpretations were possible). Under DOH's interpretation, a relatively miniscule variation between the amount of alcohol in the testing solution and the reading shown on the machine would not indicate that the machine was inaccurate; thus, DOH would treat such slight deviations as "the same" for the practical purpose of determining whether, in any given later use of the machine during the following thirty-day period, the test results could be accepted as accurate. Indeed, a contrary interpretation of the governing statute and regulation would lead to the unwarranted and unreasonable suppression of breath-test results — including ones like those in the case at bar showing readings well in excess of the 0.08 legal limit — merely because of some infinitesimal variance in the accuracy-testing data that could not possibly have affected the reliability of the later readings. Thus, the District Court, we hold, erred in substituting its own definition of the DOH regulation's use of the word "same" for the one used by the governmental entity charged with administering this law.

As we have held previously, the suppression of...