State v. Coccomo—Dissent

• Decision Date: 22 November 2011
• Docket Number: SC18443
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. COCCOMO—DISSENT

STATE v. COCCOMO—DISSENT

SC18443

Supreme Court of Connecticut

Date: November 22, 2011

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EVELEIGH, J., dissenting, with whom PALMER and VERTEFEUILLE, Js., join with respect to part I of this dissenting opinion. I respectfully dissent. I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the Appellate Court improperly determined that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting as evidence of consciousness of guilt the fact that the defendant, Tricia Lynne Coccomo, had transferred certain real property that she owned for less than fair value. I further disagree with the majority's conclusion that the judgment of the Appellate Court should not be affirmed on the alternate ground that the trial court committed plain error in admitting into evidence the blood alcohol test results attributed to the defendant and in concluding that the failure to grant relief to the defendant will not result in manifest injustice. Moreover, I also disagree with the majority's conclusion that the defendant did not appeal the trial court's ruling on the issue of the chain of custody of the blood evidence. Instead, I would conclude that the Appellate Court properly concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting as evidence of consciousness of guilt the fact that the defendant had transferred certain real property that she owned for less than fair value. I would further conclude that, at trial, the defendant raised and preserved for appeal her claim that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of the blood alcohol test results because the state failed to meet its burden of establishing the chain of custody and, therefore, this claim was properly before the Appellate Court. I would also conclude that the trial court improperly admitted the blood alcohol test results because the state did not meet its burden of ''showing that there is a reasonable probability that the substance has not been changed in important respects (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Greene, 209 Conn. 458, 479, 551 A.2d 1231 (1988). Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

Because a careful analysis of the facts of this case is critical to an examination of the issues raised on appeal, I find the following facts, as set forth in the Appellate Court opinion, and procedural history necessary for my review. The defendant worked as a schoolteacher at one of Stamford's magnet schools. ''At approximately 7 p.m. on July 26, 2005, the defendant attended a work-related dinner at a colleague's home where jambalaya and sangria were served.'' State v. Coccomo, 115 Conn. App. 384, 386, 972 A.2d 757 (2009). All of the attendees at the party, including the hostess, were colleagues of the defendant. ''The hostess explained that she served two pitchers of sangria to her eight guests, each pitcher containing no more than a magnum of wine. One pitcher had white wine, the other red. Both were mixed with fruit, honey and spar-kling water. There was no other alcohol served at the party. At the end of the dinner party, the pitcher of red sangria appeared untouched and the pitcher of white sangria was three-quarters consumed. The defendant testified that she drank between one and two glasses of sangria during dinner. The other guests testified that they, too, consumed some of the sangria. There was no evidence that the defendant consumed any other alcohol before or after dinner. All of the people at the dinner testified that the defendant did not display any signs of intoxication and that she seemed normal throughout the dinner party.

''Sometime between 9 p.m. and 9:30 p.m., the defendant left the dinner to go home. At approximately 9:28 p.m., the defendant, who was driving northbound at approximately forty-five miles per hour, the posted speed limit, around a curve on Long Ridge Road in Stamford, collided with another vehicle traveling southbound at approximately the same speed. The defendant's vehicle was three feet over the center line of the roadway at the time of the collision. The three occupants of the other vehicle died from the injuries that they sustained as a result of the collision. The defendant sustained a broken ankle and minor lacerations.

''Officer Frank Laccona of the Stamford police department was one of the first police officers on the scene. He helped the defendant out of her vehicle. Shortly thereafter, technicians from Stamford Emergency Medical Services, Inc. (emergency medical services), arrived. Robert Voss of the emergency medical services testified that the defendant was stable and ambulatory and that she was alert and oriented. Jennifer Mardi, also of the emergency medical services, testified that the defendant had the odor of alcohol on her breath. She asked the defendant if she was okay and if she had been drinking. In response, the defendant stated that she had had a few drinks. After checking the defendant's vital signs, Mardi transferred her care to paramedic Kirsten Engstrand who, along with fellow emergency medical technician, Yannick Passemart, accompanied the defendant to Stamford Hospital [hospital]. Engstrand testified that, although she did not write it in her report, the defendant did have the odor ofalcohol on her breath. Engstrand stated that the defendant was conscious, alert, oriented and ambulatory.'' Id., 386-87. Engstrand asked the defendant if she had been drinking and the defendant replied that she had consumed ''a few glasses of champagne and a glass of wine at a party downtown.'' Passemart testified that he heard the defendant say that she had consumed ''a few drinks.'' ''Passemart also testified that he detected a slight odor of alcohol on the defendant. Both Engstrand and Passemart indicated that the defendant's speech was slightly slurred, but Engstrand acknowledged that such slurring was consistent with having just been in a seri-ous accident and with having been upset and crying.

''The defendant's blood was drawn in the ambulance on the way to the hospital. Although the emergency medical technicians' report indicates that the defendant's blood was drawn by Passemart, who was not legally qualified to do so, the testimony at trial was that her blood was drawn by Engstrand. Engstrand indicated that she had a distinct recollection of her treatment of the defendant due to the serious nature of the collision. Engstrand testified that she used five tubes to collect the defendant's blood, one [ten] milliliter tube with a pink top, and four [five] milliliter tubes: one with a blue top, one green, one lavender and one yellow. Engstrand testified that she never used tubes of any other description and that she did not have access to any other tubes. After she filled the tubes, she placed them in a biohazard bag, rolled the bag up and taped it to the defendant's intravenous bag. Engstrand did not label the tubes as containing the defendant's blood, as it was not procedure to do so, nor did she label the biohazard bag.'' Id., 387-88. The emergency medical technicians testified that the defendant attained a perfect score on the Glasgow coma scale,¹ which was given during transport to the hospital.

''The ambulance arrived at [the hospital] between 10:10 and 10:18 p.m. Engstrand indicated that upon arrival at the hospital, she placed the intravenous bag and the biohazard bag containing the tubes ofthe defendant's blood on or between the defendant's legs. The defendant was met at the hospital by Officer Robert Bulman of the Stamford police department who asked her a series of questions. Bulman indicated that he had no problem understanding the defendant's responses and that her speech was not slurred. Bulman testified that in his experience, intoxicated individuals are unable to answer the questions he posed to the defendant. Bulman did, however, note an odor of alcohol on the defendant's breath.

''Emergency room nurse Toren Utke assumed the defendant's care from Engstrand. Utke testified that the defendant appeared alert and oriented, and was not confused or slurring her words and that he never smelled the odor of alcohol on her breath. He indicated that the defendant attained a perfect score on the Glasgow coma scale. Utke testified that Engstrand identified a biohazard bag of blood as the defendant's and that he left the blood with the defendant while he printed labels for the tubes. Utke indicated that he individually labeled the tubes of blood, placed them back in the biohazard bag and sent them to the laboratory.

''Utke and other emergency room staff testified that the emergency room was very hectic and 'crazy' that night due to the trauma...